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Modeling the Variety of Decision Making 
Introduction 
Static or deterministic actuarial models work with a single set of assumptions for all of the variables in the 
model. Most commonly, those assumptions might be selected to be the most likely values, or to values that 
produce an outcome for the model calculations that is likely to be achieved “most of the time” (i.e. most 
likely assumptions with provisions for adverse deviations). Deterministic models are also used in risk 
management related stress and scenario testing, where the assumptions are chosen to be static but at 
unlikely and adverse values. 
It has become common in risk management related calculations to use dynamic or stochastic models. One 
or several of the key assumptions are set to vary under a set of rules and other assumptions as well as the 
ultimate calculations should vary along with the stochastic variables. And yet one assumption that is often 
held to be a static table of actions are the things that management has discretionary power to do in the 
future. Often called simply “management actions.” Examples that relate to risk models include choices 
regarding execution of ALM and hedging programs, structure and extent of reinsurance purchases as well 
as underwriting standards and choice of the products/markets to do business. These management actions 
are usually the most critical in the lead up to and immediately following an experience of acute adverse 
experience.  
This report presents the argument that (a) management actions cannot be definitively determined from 
past actions or current intentions; (b) there are a number of potential actions that management might take 
in and around times of adverse experience, and which of those actions that will be taken will be 
determined by the future management at that time based upon their vision at that time of the most likely 
potential future; and (c) an actuary can build this additional variability into a stochastic model to provide a 
more realistic range of future experience among the stochastic scenarios.  
RISK ATTITUDES, STRATEGIES AND ENVIRONMENTS 
We treat risk as something that can be measured but only if we have enough data and enough computer 
power and we follow the right highly complex methodologies. But risk is all about the future, and there are 
no facts about the future. All we can have is opinions.  
These opinions can be classified into four risk attitudes: Pragmatists, who believe that the world is 
uncertain and unpredictable; Conservators, whose world belief is of peril and high risk; Maximizers, who 
see the world as low-risk and fundamentally self-correcting; and Managers, whose world is moderately 
risky, but not too risky for firms that are guided properly. Managers and Maximizers exhibit a belief in the 
legitimacy of models which is not shared by Conservators and Pragmatists (see Aggarwal et al., 2015).  
Over time, these risk attitudes change via the process of surprise. Surprise is the persistent, and very likely 
growing, mismatch between what we expect to happen and what actually happens in the real world. 
Because firms and individual managers have totally different risk attitudes, there is a varied and varying set 
of surprises that are happening all the time. Individual managers might expect a moderate market with 
fluctuations that follow past experiences; an uncertain market with unpredictable volatility; a market boom 
when everything seems to be going up; or a recession when everything seems to be going down. And 
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business strategies are chosen because of an expectation of a market in one or the other of those states. 
This means that surprises, when they come, can come in 12 different ways, as shown in Table 0.1.  
Table 0.1  
SURPRISE MATRIX 
 Uncertain Bust Boom Moderate 
Uncertain 
(Pragmatist) 
No surprises. Expected windfalls don’t 
happen – Only Losses. 
Unexpected runs 
of good luck. 
Unexpected runs 
of good and bad 
luck. 
Bust 
(Conservator) 
Caution does not 
work. 
No surprises. Others prosper 
(especially 
Maximizers). 
Others prosper 
(especially 
Managers). 
Boom 
(Maximizer) 
Skill is not rewarded. Total collapse. No surprises. Partial Collapse. 
Moderate 
(Manager) 
Unpredictability. Total collapse (when 
only partial was 
expected). 
Competition. No surprises. 
 
Along the diagonal of the matrix (Table 0.1) the world is indeed the way it is expected to be — there are no 
surprises. To understand the surprises in the other 12 boxes, we contrast the strategy that seems sensible 
to each firm, with the responses the resulting tactics will provoke in each of the actual worlds. 
• In the uncertain market, there is no discoverable pattern to the reactions of the marketplace to 
the company strategies. This is the world of financial uncertainty, when business activity and 
markets might turn abruptly. Maximizers, Conservators and Managers are all surprised by the lack 
of predictability of the uncertain market. Each had formed their own idea of what they were 
predicting and they all end up disappointed. 
• In a bust, there is a discoverable order: the world is a vast negative-sum game. This is the world of 
the recession. Of course, Maximizers and Managers are surprised. The Maximizers thought that 
persistent losses would not happen and Managers are surprised by the magnitude of the losses. 
The Pragmatists are surprised when "correlations all go to one" and their preferred strategy of 
diversification fails to protect them.  
• In a boom, the reverse happens — the world is a huge positive-sum game. This is when financial 
bubbles form. Managers and Conservators see the large gains of the Maximizers and are surprised 
that they can get away with that. Pragmatists see their own larger-than-expected gains and are 
surprised.  
• In a moderate market, there is a discoverable order. This is the "normal" world. The Maximizers 
will be surprised that they underperform their expectations, while Conservators see the careful 
risk-taking of the Managers succeeding. Pragmatists are puzzled and surprised by the success of 
the orderly bean-counting Managers as well.  
This process of changing risk attitudes typically takes two routes. First, individual managers will be 
surprised, as their unmet expectations wear away their convictions about how the world works. As these 
individuals then shift their risk attitudes, they will also shift their approach to their business and the risks 
that they're willing to take. If they are very perceptive and adaptable, they will change to a belief that aligns 
with the current environment and the process will begin again. If they are less adaptable and perceptive, 
they might shift to a different risk attitude that does not align with the environment. Their firms might then 
lurch along from one type of sub-optimal performance to another. 
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The second way that firms adapt is by changing leaders, most often when the firm has been spectacularly 
surprised. When the board reacts to a collapse — or even to a disappointment — by changing leaders, the 
new leader then faces the problem of shifting the prevailing risk attitude of the firm. Through a series of 
persuasions, orders, reorganizations, promotions, retirements and layoffs, the new leader will eventually 
get the firm's risk attitude to align with what they and the board want it to be. (See Section 3.1)  
The third way that firms adapt is through an understanding of the entire four-fold paradigm with a risk 
attitude of Adaptor. (See Section 3.2) Those firms will seek to assess and identify the environment, then 
choose the approach to risk that best fits with that environment.  
MODELING THE VARIETY OF DECISION MAKING 
This project will work from the perspective described above (and in more detail in Appendix A), i.e., that 
management decision making in a firm will vary in complex patterns that systematically fit with the four 
environments, five risk attitudes and five strategies. There are many steps necessary to develop a full 
application of this perspective to modeling the variability of management decision making. This project 
undertakes the following steps: 
Section 1: The Theory – takes us through the journey of these ideas from where they originated in 
anthropology to Enterprise Risk Management then finally to Institutional Evolutionary Economics (IEE), a 
complete theory of economics. A comparison of IEE to four other theories of economics is provided. 
Section 1 addresses the variety of decision making, for example, according to a strategy of neoclassical 
economics, or behavioral economics, evolutionary economics, institutional economics, ecological 
economics, and so on. 
Section 2: An Application – shows how actual historical data for a group of 100 insurance companies can be 
mined to empirically develop a transition matrix which shows the frequencies of changes from any one risk 
attitude to another. This section provides a demonstration that the variability that is suggested by IEE can 
be found in the real world. And it also provides an example of how a practitioner can go about 
parameterizing a transition matrix from actual public data about insurance companies. Section 2 looks at 
the variability over time of the decision rules, for instance, Risk Steering being succeeded by Loss 
Controlling, then Risk Trading, and so on. 
Section 3: The Model – control and systems theory is applied to modeling such variety and variability. Three 
tentative models of variability are p[resented. These models are cast in terms of the input output behavior 
of systems, of control theory. This involves the presumption that recursive time series analysis could be 
used to estimate the time varying parameters in any of the three models. The first of these three models 
proceeds from the idea of transition probability from Section 2. These transition probabilities take an 
enterprise from a previous decision strategy to a new decision strategy, one of the three others among the 
four basic strategies of risk coping. There is a prior and posterior probability of a strategy being good for 
the times based on working with what strategy is now, what the transition probabilities are, and what 
strategy could therefore be most probable next period. The second model is a control theory model, which 
also stems from Section 2. The third model is then a blended model. 
Finally, Section 3 presents a Blueprint of the Adaptive Strategy. Plural Rationality has almost universally 
dealt with the four basic rationalities, four strategies and risk environments. Plural Rationality literature 
also mentions a fifth rationality. And that is what is now called the Adaptor. The adapter really has her or 
his eye on the long term, and is somehow standing above and observing what is going on among the other 
rationalities and trying to take care of the resilience of the company. The details of this strategy are a 
“Design for Resilience” for the long-term health of the enterprise.   
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Section 1: The Theory: Institutional Evolutionary Economics  
1.1 WE ARE PLURALLY RATIONAL AND INHERENTLY RELATIONAL  
Conventional diagnoses of the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis see it as “abnormal”, and then resort to 
explanations (if you can call them that) in terms of “irrational exuberance”, “animal spirits”, “herding 
behavior”, “group-think” and so on. The prescription – “better regulation” – then follows automatically, as 
it has done after every such crisis, all the way back to Tulipmania 400 years ago. But if there are different 
seasons of risk, and if financial actors are able to latch onto different risk-handling strategies, each 
appropriate for one of those seasons and inappropriate for the others, then we have a different 
explanation: one in which there is no longer any place for abnormality. That is the approach we will be 
taking in this report: an approach which we call institutional evolutionary economics. 
1.2 BEGIN WITH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Our approach has its origins in social anthropology: specifically the cultural theory (or theory of plural 
rationality) that was pioneered by Dame Mary Douglas.1 In fact, Gillian Tett (in a 2 August 2012 Financial 
Times article: “Anthropologists join Actuaries on Risk”) referred to it as “the anthropological approach”.2 A 
good label, we feel, in that it helps distinguish our institutional assumptions from the essentially non-
institutional (i.e. individual psychological) ones that characterize most economic theorizing: neoclassical 
economics, for instance, with its rational maximizers; behavioral economics with its individual actors falling 
short, in variously patterned ways, of what neoclassical economics demands of them; and Keynesian 
economics with its “fundamental psychological law” (that “men [sic] are disposed, as a rule and on the 
average, to increase their consumption as their incomes increase, but not by as much as the increase in 
their incomes” [Keynes 1936:96]). More specifically, our point of departure is not the familiar “individual” 
but the much less easily grasped pair of assumptions that are bound up in the slogan (and this chapter’s 
title): “we are plurally rational and inherently relational.” 
First, people can consistently do very different things and yet be perfectly rational, given their very 
different convictions as to how the world is and people are. Hence, in contrast to the familiar DMUU 
(Decision Making Under Uncertainty), there is the notion of DMUCC (Decision Making Under Contradictory 
Certainties [Thompson and Warburton 1986]). The theory of plural rationality proposes a typology of four 
sets of convictions3 -- myths (or social constructions) of nature – only one of which aligns with the “rational 
utility maximizer” assumed by neoclassical economics: that humans are self-seeking, and that nature is 
mean-reverting (i.e. can be relied on to “bounce back” after any perturbance). 
Second, individuality, far from being something that is inherent in each of us (like our fingerprints, say), is 
something that, to a considerable extent, we get from our involvement with others. We discover our 
preferences by establishing our social relations. Since the theory of plural rationality proposes that there 
are just four forms of social solidarity (just four ways of binding ourselves to one another and in so doing 
 
 
1 “Plural rationality” is perhaps a better title in that “cultural theory”, as well as causing confusion with other (e.g. literary) theories that have 
adopted the same name, can too easily give the impression that it is culture that is doing the explaining (which, of course, is not at all the case). 
The two-volume The Institutional Dynamics of Culture (6 and Mars 2008), especially its introduction, is perhaps the best summary of this 
theory’s development and widespread application (mostly in fields other than financial risk). 
2 She was reporting on a joint keynote presentation she had made, together with Michael Thompson and Alice Underwood, at the IFoA’s (U.K. 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries) Risk and Investment Conference in Leeds that year. 
3 The full typology, as we will be explaining is actually “four-plus-one” in that we need to allow for the Adaptor. 
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determining our relationship with nature),4 there will always be four distinct and contending “models of 
the person” – individualist, hierarchical, egalitarian and fatalist – only one of which (the individualist) is 
countenanced by neoclassical economics (Douglas and Ney 1988). Put another way, the anthropological 
approach reveals the invalidity of that much relied-upon distinction between the individual and the 
institution. Indeed, it makes more sense to speak of the “dividual” (Marriott 1967), since we all move in 
and out of different solidarities in different parts of our lives: workplace and home, for instance.  
One of us, Michael Thompson, recalls a drill-sergeant at Britain’s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, whose 
seven-year old son had been naughty. He had his wife march the young offender into the living-room in 
their married quarters where, the charge having been read out, he was duly sentenced to three nights 
early bed and a week’s stoppage of bicycle. It was not a great success. The drill-sergeant’s refusal to 
dividualize himself upset the harmony in his home and led to him becoming something of a figure-of-fun, 
among both the instructors and the officer cadets, in his workplace. 
1.3 INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS: A NEW THEORY OF ECONOMICS 
One of the eternal troubles with comparing theories, and putting them into competition with one another 
– which, of course, is what we are intent on doing – is that the proponents of those theories tend to be so 
immersed in their chosen ones – so institutionally embedded, that is – that they find it almost impossible to 
entertain the possibility that things might be otherwise. (See Section 3.1) As someone once said, “we don’t 
know who first discovered water, but we can be sure it wasn’t a fish”. That is why we have begun by setting 
out our theory’s two foundational assumptions and then contrasting them with those of other theories. 
However, since this is only the very tip of the assumptional iceberg, Table 1.1 summarizes what we see to 
be some of the key differences between some of the economic theories, our own among them, that are on 
offer.  
  
 
 
4 Four-plus-one, properly speaking, as is explained in the previous footnote. This is the generalized version of the definition of forms of social 
solidarity that is set out (in relation to climate change) in Rayner et al (1999:34). 
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Table 1.1 
COMPARING FIVE THEORIES OF ECONOMICS 
  
Theories 
 
Characteristics 
Neoclassical 
Economics 
Behavioral 
Economics 
New 
Institutional 
Economics 
Evolutionary 
Economics 
Institutional 
Evolutionary 
Economics 
1. Rationalities 1 1 2* 2** 4-5 
2. The System Simple Simple Simple Complex Complex 
3. Institutional 
Embeddedness*** 
No No  Yes No Yes 
4. Increasing 
Returns: 
History Matters 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
5. Equilibrium Yes Yes Yes No No 
6. Technology 
Crucial 
No No No Yes Yes 
7. Scarcity 
Crucial 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
 
8. 
Emergent 
Behavior 
(Evolution) 
 
No  
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes (Some) 
 
Yes (More) 
9. Fit With 
Neuroscience 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Sort of 
 
No 
 
Yes 
10. Ideas of 
Fairness 
1 1-2 2 Not Clear 4-5 
11. Myths (Social 
Constructions) of 
Nature 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
12. Allometric 
Relations (TIME-
dynamics) Matter 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Not Clear 
 
Yes 
(in respect of 
scales of 
Time) 
 
Yes 
 
*As in the distinction between “substantive rationality” (the bottom line) and “procedural rationality” (who 
has the right to do what and to whom). 
**Implicit, for instance, in the bifurcation – between “fundamentalists” and “chartists” – that emerges in 
the Santa Fe artificial stock market (Arthur 1995; Tayler 1995). 
***The unquestioned assumption that people are rational utility maximizers, for instance, together with 
the similarly unquestioned assumption that Mother Nature can take anything that we throw at her, 
generates a thought style (Douglas 1996) that is very different from those that are generated by those who 
cleave to the other pairings of the myths of nature (row 11). 
1.4 SOME THEORIES AND THEIR KEY DIFFERENCES 
This is an incomplete list, of course. No Marxist theory, for instance, no Buddhist economics (as in 
Schumacher’s [1973] Small Is Beautiful) and no Keynesian theory, but the interested reader might enjoy 
trying his or her hand at adding them in. Keynesian theory, for instance, seems to have much in common 
with the “new institutionalism” (e.g. Williamson 1975), in that it entertains two rationalities: those of the 
market and the hierarchy, thereby opening the way for the sort of government interventions that Hayek 
  11 
 
Copyright © 2021 Society of Actuaries Research Institute 
was so opposed to. Hayek, being more in the neoclassical camp, wanted the market to do everything (or 
rather, everything it could) but, even so, as Keynes famously pointed out, a line has to be drawn 
somewhere (see Thompson 2008a). 
At this stage, one thing, we submit, is clear: our institutional evolutionary economics has much more in 
common with evolutionary economics – the rejection of equilibration, for instance, the centrality of 
technology, and the insistence that history matters (that small, random events cannot always be counted 
on to iron themselves out in the aggregate) – than it has with any of the others. Certainly, while the 
institutional embeddedness of Plural Rationality is indispensable to the development of the Adaptor 
strategy in Section 3, its discussion draws more heavily on the evolutionary nature of things. Time and the 
dynamic behavior of systems — including across scales of time, hence the evolutionary (as in the allometric 
relationships of the last row of Table 1.1) — are key to this novel Adaptor strategy.  
Also evident in Table 1.1 is that there seems to be virtually no key differences between neoclassical 
economics and behavioral economics. This is perhaps surprising, given that the latter shows that people are 
simply incapable of doing what the former requires of them (Kahneman et al 1982). However, there is one 
rather crucial difference in that behavioral economics, by introducing a status difference between those 
who (contra the theory) are more capable of doing what neoclassical economics requires and those who 
are not, makes possible intervention by "nudging" (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). This, of course, takes things 
across from individualism to hierarchy, with the nudgers saving the nudgees from themselves: "wise 
guidance", as it is called. 
We begin in clearly recognizable economic territory: the turbulent events of 2007/8 and mainstream 
economics’ all-too-evident inability to answer the British Queen’s question: “Why did nobody see it 
coming?”. However, it is, as they say, an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and this spectacular and very 
public failure of orthodox economic theory has provided us with a wonderful opportunity to come up with 
something better. As we progressively open up these key differences – some, inevitably, in rather more 
detail than others – we set out what we see as the full answer to the Queen’s question. Unsurprisingly, the 
resulting institutional evolutionary economics turns out to be very different from those theories (among 
them, the ones we list in Table 1.1) that were unable to provide Her Majesty with an explanation.  
1.5 OUR APPROACH BY WAY OF ANTHROPOLOGY: BOTH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PHYSICAL, 
I.E. BIOLOGICAL, ANTHROPOLOGY 
In contrast to the founding fathers of social thought (for example, Maine, Tönnies and Durkheim) all of 
whom fastened on dualistic schemes (for example, status/contract, Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft and 
mechanical solidarity/organic solidarity), theorists of institutions now routinely invoke three (or four or 
five) different ways in which we bind ourselves to one another and, in so doing, determine our relationship 
with nature.5 In other words, at least one more way of interacting has been added to the classic markets-
and-hierarchies distinction: community (Etzioni 1988), for example, or clubs (Williamson 1975)6 or clans 
 
 
5 For an account of the mismatches between these dualistic schemes see Thompson and Rayner (1998). For an unpacking of all the schemes – 
single, dualistic, threefold and fourfold – that are possible if there are in all four solidarities – there are 50 of them – see Thompson (2008b ch. 
8). 
6 This may appear to contradict our Table 1.1, where we say that the new institutionalism entertains just two solidarities/rationalities. But 
Williamson’s clubs, we have observed, “do not come from the same matrix, built out of the same dimensions as, markets and hierarchies” 
(Thompson et al 1990, p. 14). In consequence, his dynamics are “simple” (row 2, Table 1.1: the system): a back-and-forth between markets and 
hierarchies in response to upward – or downward – spiraling transaction costs. 
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(Ouchi 1980) or collegiums (Majone 1989) or bonding social capital (Szreter and Woolcock 2004) or cliques 
(Burt 1992) or, going a bit further back, charisma (Weber 1930).7 
Proponents of the new institutional economics, in contrast to their political science and sociology 
colleagues, seem not to have moved on from two to three (or more) solidarities. Like Oxford's New College, 
they are now a bit long in the tooth: still back there with Ronald Coase's characterization of firms as islands 
of central planning (hierarchy in our terminology) in a sea of market relations (individualism in our 
terminology) and with Oliver Williamson's afore-mentioned dynamical back-and-forth, in which spiraling 
transaction costs lead to market failure and to the hierarchy then having to step in and set prices, with 
things going the other way in situations where the spiral is downwards (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; see 
also Richter 2016). The one partial exception is Elinor Ostrom who, despite her explicit attachment to 
rational choice (and an accompanying aversion to plural rationality [see Ostrom and Ostrom 1997]), ended 
up with three (and implicitly four) distinct forms of behavior: "rational egoists", "conditional co-operators" 
and "willing punishers": fatalism, individualism and hierarchy, respectively (Ostrom 2000). In other words, 
institutional economics, at present, is insufficiently plural: it lacks what cyberneticians call the "requisite 
variety": that a control system (about which we will have much more to say in our Part 3) must contain as 
much variety as exists within that which it aspires to control (see Ashby 1968). 
In this sort of institutional approach, we are arguing, it is the form of solidarity – the way of organizing, 
perceiving and justifying social relations – that is the unit of analysis, not the individual (row 3 – 
Institutional Embeddedness – in Table 1.1). Indeed, as we have already suggested, we really need to speak 
of “the dividual”, since a psycho-physiological entity may be expected to move in and out of different 
solidarities in different areas of his or her life (with our exceptional Sandhurst drill-sergeant proving the 
rule, as it were). Also, in going from the time-honored two to three (or four or five), these theorists have 
taken social systems from simplicity to complexity (row 2 – the System – in Table 1.1).8  
What is very important for this approach in terms of plural rationality is that the sorts of neurological 
processes it requires of each of us – that he or she be able to internalize all of these rationalities, for 
instance, and then be able to switch from one to another in response to appropriate “cues” – not be 
physiologically impossible. Indeed, “very important” is understating it; if it turns out to be physiologically 
impossible then the theory itself is finished! 
So, quite early on, we took the precaution of organizing a workshop – held in 2010, under the joint 
sponsorship of the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) and the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and titled “The Human Brain and the Social Bond” – that 
brought together a wide range of scientists from these hitherto rather poorly connected social and natural 
science realms. To our great relief, we found that the neuroscientists were quite comfortable with this 
plural rationality framing. There was, they assured us, nothing physiologically impossible about it. Rather, it 
was the uni-rationality required by rational choice theory (be it in its neoclassical or behavioral economics 
form), along with the other extreme (in which rationalities proliferate towards infinity) that is required by 
post-modernism, that they had difficulty with (row 9 in Table 1.1: Fit With Neuroscience). So, taking a leaf 
out of the modern physicist’s book, we can hypothesize that, if this sort of “constrained pluralism” is 
possible, perhaps it is compulsory. And that, we have somewhat belatedly realized, is the deep hypothesis 
that underlies our institutional evolutionary economics. Since then, these somewhat tentative findings 
 
 
7 For an exhaustive overview, see Tilly (2005). 
8 In the mathematical sense of these terms; complex systems being indeterminate, unpredictable, non-equilibrating, sensitive to initial 
conditions and so on. For the policy implications of this shift from simplicity to complexity see Thompson and Trisoglio (1997). 
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have been much strengthened, thanks to some sustained joint work by social scientists and neuroscientists: 
social anthropology reconnected with physical (i.e. biological) anthropology as we have put it (see, in 
particular, Verweij et al 2015; Verweij and Damasio 2019).9 
That there is one word – system – that recurs throughout all our discussion is far from accidental. Indeed, 
our entire framing and approach is in terms of systems: dynamical, and very often self-transforming, 
systems. This is hardly surprising, we concede, given that all of us are connected – some loosely, others 
rather tightly – to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA): a think tank, housed in a 
Habsburg palace just south of Vienna, whose researchers strive to understand why, at times and in places, 
things – be they social, environmental or governance-related – do not go quite as swimmingly as they 
might.  
  
 
 
9 Over the years, in most universities, social and physical anthropology have drifted apart; at Oxford, for instance, they are housed in separate 
institutes. But they have stayed together at University College London, thanks in no small part to Mary Douglas’ enthusiasm for both, 
exemplified by her support for Robert Turner who has had a distinguished career in both these components of the discipline. We mention this 
because we feel that our argument really cannot stand up without a foot in each: social anthropology and physical anthropology.  
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Section 2: An Example – Identifying the Rationalities in Insurance Firms 
Plural Rationality theory says that we are situated within a complex adaptive world. We seek to understand 
the world, we choose a strategy based upon that understanding, our choice (as well as the choices of all 
others) of strategy has an impact upon the world and the world either continues upon its course or 
changes direction as our combined activities bring the world towards or pulls away from tipping points that 
thrust things into different regimes.  
2.1 ACTUARIAL MODELS 
When actuaries build models of the future, however, our strategy sometimes gets reflected as fixed in 
amber. Regardless of events, we project that any and all of the choices that management makes on a daily, 
weekly, monthly basis, especially the choices related to risk mitigation activities are made in the same way 
that they were made in the recent past. Not a believable prediction, but perhaps the best of the few 
choices that have been imagined.  
For example, in Shang and Sethi10 the management choice for setting a bonus is first defined as a fixed 
formula, and then occasionally modified to reflect certain more extreme situations in the environment.  
We suspect, however, that an approach to modeling future management practices that includes likely 
variety of changing future environments (the exact variations that are at the foundation of our risk models) 
might produce significant differences in results, though at this point, we cannot predict whether those 
differences would expand or contract the variabilities that are the output of the models.  
In U.S. insurance sector, the “underwriting cycle” is an oft observed phenomena that seems likely to be the 
result of variations in management decisions over time. Modeling of the underwriting cycle is proposed by 
Wang, Major, Pan and Leong11 using a regime switching approach as well as in Yang et al (2016). This cycle 
has also been described in terms of the four rationalities of Plural Rationality by Ingram & Underwood.12 
You will see that these two approaches can be combined in Section 3. 
Changes in management choices regarding risk management strategy and tactics may potentially have at 
least as powerful of an impact upon the modeled variability as management has the option to change 
those choices for the entire block of business at any time. These choices are seen to be impacted by the 
biases that were identified within Behavioral Economics literature by Shang.13 
The claim of market value-based regimes to properly value options totally ignores valuing management’s 
options to change their choices. Such choices include the degree and direction of durational mismatch that 
is targeted and permitted within an asset liability management system, the choices between the wide 
variety of reinsurance structures as well as the amount of risk retained and the maximum amount of 
reinsurance purchased (as well as the market appetite and price for all of those choices), the hedging goals 
for a variable annuity program (as well as the market appetite and price for different options) just to name 
three such possibilities.  
 
 
10 Shang, K and Sethi, R  Managing a With-Profit Portfolio using a Stochastic Approach, 2016 Presented at Asian Actuarial Conference. 
11 Wang, S Major, J Pan, H and Leong, J  U.S. Property-Casualty: Underwriting cycle modeling and Risk Benchmarks. 2011 Variance. 
12 Ingram,D Underwood, A  The Human Dynamics of the Insurance Cycle, 2010, Presented at ERM Symposium. 
13 Shang, K Optimal Timing of Risk Management, 2016, SOA Monograph. 
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This section will illustrate a first step in an approach to systematically model changes in management 
choices that is consistent with Plural Rationality theory and Institutional Evolutionary Economics.  
2.2 MODELING CHOICES IN THE SURPRISE GAME  
The Surprise Game is an agent-based model of a stylized economy within which 30 companies operate.14 
They each observe the environment, make judgments about their environments, choose strategies based 
upon those judgments and have an impact upon the environment. In this paper, we will be seeking to show 
how an actuary might mimic a part of that process to incorporate into a risk model.  
In the Surprise Game, the choices are simulated by a set of transition probabilities. In many periods, for 
many of the companies, there is no urge to change strategy. But in some periods, there is a perceived 
disconnect between the company’s prior judgment about the environment and the emerging experience in 
the actual environment. 
As the game progresses companies will make choices according to their beliefs and will experience either 
success or disappointment. Individual companies will change their beliefs when they find themselves in a 
predefined situation reflecting some version of disappointment (or Surprise). The change in belief will 
follow the following transition probabilities. For a complete description of the definitions of the 
“Situations” please refer to the Ingram, Thompson and Underwood paper.15 
Table 2.1 
EXAMPLES OF TRANSITIONS WITH LIKELIHOODS 
 PRAGMATIST MANAGER CONSERVATOR MANAGER 
Situation 1 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Situation 2 33% 33% 33% 0 
Situation 3 33% 33% 0 33% 
Situation 4 0 33% 33% 33% 
Situation 5 0 50% 0 50% 
Situation 6 --------No Change-------- 
 
This is what we are proposing for actuarial models of future management behaviors: that future choices of 
management may be made by people with similar goals and experiences and education as current (or 
recent past managers). Or they may be different people. And they may have different beliefs about the risk 
environment from current managers – beliefs that have been shaped by their experiences.15 And those 
experiences will have been driven by the random variables of the risk model which express the changing 
environment. 
Let’s look at an example of this idea. We will start in a moderate environment for equity market risk. It may 
seem like the moderate environment predominates, but likely because of a survivorship bias. Businesses 
will tend to operate in situations where they can flourish.  
With this perception of predominant Moderate environment, many businesses will operate with a Manager 
risk attitude and a Risk Steering approach to their risks.16 If this company is a life insurer in the years prior 
 
 
14 Ingram, Taylor, Thompson Surprise, Surprise (2012) ASTIN Bulletin. 
15 Bush,E  Ingram,D  2013 Collective Approaches to Risk in Business: An Introduction to Plural Rationality Theory.  North American Actuarial 
Journal. 
16 See Ingram, Thompson, Underwood Rational Adaptation for ERM in a Changing Environment 2009 – 2013. 
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to the Financial Crisis, then a variable annuity product with enough extra guarantees would have looked 
completely reasonable.  
2.3 EXAMPLE OF TRANSITIONS IN ACTUARIAL LITERATURE 
The most common usage of transitions similar to the approach that we are examining is the Regime 
Switching approach such as that described by Hardy (2001). The two regimes of stock returns resemble the 
boom and bust approach to viewing business cycles (Yang et al 2016) which is found in the way that the 
National Bureau of Economic Research divides the business cycle between periods of Recession and 
Recovery.17 In Freedland, Hardy, Till (2009) a Markov model is described where the transition probability 
from one regime to the other for time t depend upon the regime in time t-1. This is the approach that we 
take in the example below. 
2.4 BUILDING A TRANSITION MATRIX FOR U.S. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 
We will now look at an example where we develop parameters for a four belief, four strategy, four 
environment model with parameters developed from actual insurer experiences during the 18-year period 
from 2001 to 2018. This period was chosen because of data availability on the SNL database. We will be 
working with statutory data from 100 of the largest mutual Insurers.  
This period of time includes the tail end of the Dot Com bubble bursting, the 2005-2006 hurricane seasons, 
the 2008 financial crisis and the earthquakes of 2011. It also includes the favorable experience of many of 
the other years in that time period.  
This example is intended to provide both a demonstration that activity consistent with the Institutional 
Evolutionary Economics and with Plural Rationality Theory can be found in an actual business situation and 
to also demonstrate an approach that can be applied to other sub sectors of businesses to develop 
transition matrices that more specifically apply to those sub sectors. 
2.4.1 ASSIGNMENT OF A PROMINENT BELIEF 
The actions of each of the 100 insurers can be classified as fitting with one or another of the four beliefs of 
IEE: Conservator, Manager, Maximizer and Pragmatist in each year. We will illustrate an approach to that 
classification that uses three separate aspects of observable company outcomes, assuming that the 
outcome for the company in any one year was broadly what they wanted. The three observations will be: 
Premium Growth, RBC Ratio and Common Stocks as percent of Surplus. In each case, we will look to 
separate the 100 companies into three groups with a high risk, medium risk and low risk group.  
2.4.2 PREMIUM GROWTH 
In the Insurance industry high growth is considered potentially risky for two reasons. First, the most 
common way to achieve high growth is to offer the insurance products at lower rates than the competition. 
This approach can easily lead to setting rates that are below the cost of the insurance (which would be the 
claims paid plus the expenses incurred by the insurer). Second, the insurance business is fundamentally 
 
 
17 NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee Determination of the February 2020 Peak in U.S. Economic Activity  June 8, 2020.  Is the most recent 
example.   
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about transferring the financial consequences of a risky situation from an insured to the insurer. Writing 
more insurance adds to the risk of the insurer.  
The 18-year study period and 100 insurers provides 1800 data points for annual premium growth. When 
we examine those 1800 data points, we see the following distribution of growth rates by company by year 
(Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 
ANNUAL PREMIUM GROWTH RATE 
Percentile Premium Growth Rate 
1.0% -20.4% 
5.0% -8.1% 
10.0% -4.2% 
25.0% 0.3% 
33.3% 2.0% 
50.0% 4.8% 
66.7% 7.5% 
75.0% 9.6% 
90.0% 16.1% 
95.0% 22.2% 
99.0% 38.9% 
Max 91.7% 
 
If we classify premium growth of below 2% as Low growth (a Conservator choice of growth rate), premium 
growth above 7.5% as High growth (a Maximizer choice) and in between as Medium growth (Manager), 
those break points do divide the data into even thirds and are conveniently also reasonable break points 
for the High, Medium, Low split as shown in Chart 2.1.  
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Chart 2.1 
100 INSURERS GROUPED BY PREMIUM GROWTH RATE CATEGORY 
 
When we apply these labels to individual companies based upon their actual reported premium growth, we 
get an interesting display of the year-by-year dynamics of premium growth. 
2.4.4 RISK BASED CAPITAL (RBC) RATIO 
Risk Based Capital is the amount of capital required by the regulator that an insurer must hold and is based 
upon the various risks of the insurer. The RBC ratio is the surplus of the insurer divided by the RBC. A high 
RBC ratio indicates that an insurer has a high cushion against potential losses and would be consistent with 
the Conservator point of view and a low RBC ratio would be consistent with the Maximizer point of view, 
with Manager again in between. The distribution of the RBC ratios for each year for the 100 insurers can be 
seen in Appendix C Table C.1 
One third of the results fall below 770% and one third above 1070%. As with the Premium Growth, we will 
use these values as the break points for dividing results between Conservator (above 1070%), Maximizer 
(below 770%) and Manager (between 770% and 1070%). This results in the annual distribution between 
the three groups shown in Chart 2.2. 
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Chart 2.2 
100 INSURERS GROUPED BY RBC RATIO 
 
2.4.5 COMMON STOCKS AS PERCENT OF SURPLUS 
Common stocks are generally the most volatile investment that is made by insurers. In most cases, insurers 
will purchase bonds or other fixed income investments with funds that are being held for future claims 
payments and they will invest some portion of surplus in common stocks. A larger common stock holding 
compared to surplus would be higher risk and more consistent with the Maximizer point of view, and a 
smaller common stock holding as percent of surplus would be lower risk and consistent with the 
Conservator point of view, with Managers in between as usual.  
The distribution of the common stocks as percentage of surplus can be seen in the Appendix C Table C.2. 
And again, we will use the 33.3 percentile and 66.7 percentile values as our breakpoints with the results 
shown in Chart 2.3.  
0
20
40
60
80
100
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
In
su
re
rs
RBC Ratio
Conservator
Manager
Maximizer
(High RBC) 
(Medium RBC)
(Low RBC)
  20 
 
Copyright © 2021 Society of Actuaries Research Institute 
Chart 2.3 
100 INSURERS GROUPED BY COMMON STOCK HOLDINGS AS A PERCENTAGE OF SURPLUS 
 
 
In this case, the ratio is changing due to both numerator and denominator effects. When there were large 
losses of value of common stocks, as in 2008, Surplus was depleted, and common stock values dropped 
even if no actions were taken.  
2.4.6 ASSIGNING OVERALL BELIEF 
Now we have three risk attitudes for each company for each year. We have coded the Conservator 
assignments as a 1, Manager 2 and Maximizer 3. The company/years observed give us a variety of 
combinations of 1, 2 and 3. See Table C.3 in Appendix C. 
Now, we will make an assignment of overall belief. When all three assignments are the same, then the 
belief assignment is obvious. When two of the assignments are to one belief and the third is another, we 
will assign the belief of the two assignments. When all three beliefs are different, we will assign the 
Pragmatist belief (because the Pragmatist is not committed to any one course of action). This results in the 
following assignments of overall belief (And Appendix C Table C.4). 
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Chart 2.4 
100 INSURERS GROUPED BY ASSIGNED OVERALL BELIEF 
 
You notice that the Maximizers almost disappear in 2008 at the time of the financial crisis and in that year, 
at least, Conservators dominate as would be predicted by Plural Rationality Theory.  
2.4.7 TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
The assignments leave us with a time series of assignments for each company. We can aggregate those 
series with a focus on the current assignment and the next assignment at each year. From that look, we can 
determine transition probabilities of a change in strategy. And it is our capacity to generate results such as 
those of Table 2.3 that gives us the prospect of developing the Transition Probability model of the 
variability in actuarial decision making in Section 3.  
Table 2.3 
TRANSITION MATRIX 
  Future Year Belief 
  Pragmatist Conservator Maximizer Manager 
C
u
rr
en
t 
Ye
ar
 B
el
ie
f Pragmatist 46% 16% 13% 25% 
Conservator 16% 66% 4% 13% 
Maximizer 17% 7% 66% 10% 
Manager 26% 12% 6% 56% 
 
This suggests that in most years, persisting with the same belief into the next year is most likely. With 
Conservator and Maximizer most persistent (66%), Manager somewhat less persistent (56%) and 
Pragmatist least persistent (46%).  
Overall, insurers in this group are somewhat less likely to transition into Maximizer than the other three 
beliefs. That is to be expected from common knowledge about mutual insurers. 
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Table 2.4 
TRANSITIONS OBSERVED 
Belief in Year T+1 Count of Company-Years Percentage 
Conservator 455 27% 
Manager 449 26% 
Maximizer 340 20% 
Pragmatist 456 27% 
Total 1700 100% 
 
A similar study of stock insurers would be expected to show a preference for Maximizer as that belief is 
thought to be the most closely aligned with “Shareholder Value Maximization” capitalization.  
We can look at the variety of assigned belief of the 100 companies over the 18 years and we find that some 
insurers are assigned all four beliefs in one year or another; many insurers are assigned three of the four 
beliefs at one time or another; some insurers are assigned only two; and a few insurers earn the same 
assignment in all years.  
Table 2.5 
VARIETY OF BELIEFS OVER TIME 
Pragmatist Conservator Maximizer Manager 
Number of 
Companies 
 X X X 1 
X  X  5 
X X X  6 
 X   3 
X  X X 14 
 X  X 5 
X X X X 27 
X X  X 20 
X   X 6 
X X   5 
  X  5 
  X X 2 
 
2.5 APPLICATION TO ACTUARIAL MODELS 
This section will address two aspects of application of the above ideas to actuarial models: (1) What to do 
with a Transition Matrix and (2) How to develop a Transition Matrix for different types of organizations. 
2.5.1 USING A TRANSITION MATRIX IN AN ACTUARIAL MODEL 
The mechanical application of a transition matrix in an actuarial model is well described in the references 
cited in section 2.3 above. The issue that is unique to the application of IEE and Plural Rationalities in an 
actuarial model relates to what it might mean for the model to have transitioned from one belief to 
another. In the above development of the assignments of companies in particular years to beliefs, we used 
examples of possible approaches to business risk taking that were easily measured from public data 
relating to Premium Growth, Risk Based Capital Ratio, and Common Stock Holdings as a percentage of 
surplus. 
An additional example for application of a Transition Matrix would be relating to investment strategy that is 
more detailed than just the ratio of Common Stocks to surplus that might be a major part of an actuarial 
model.  
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For this example, a generalized Transition Matrix will be used. (Section 2.5.2 discusses the development of 
a Transition Matrix for a specific situation). Under this generic transition matrix, Conservators and 
Maximizers (the most extreme beliefs) are expected to persist 65% of the time, while Pragmatist unbelief 
would persist less than half the time at 45%. Maximizers and Conservators are highly unlikely to transition 
from one to the other (5%), while all of the other transitions are higher but still low likelihood (in the 10% 
to 25% range).  
Table 2.6 
GENERALIZED TRANSITION MATRIX 
  Future Year Belief 
  Pragmatist Conservator Maximizer Manager 
C
u
rr
en
t 
Ye
ar
 B
el
ie
f Pragmatist 45% 15% 15% 25% 
Conservator 15% 65% 5% 15% 
Maximizer 15% 5% 65% 15% 
Manager 25% 10% 5% 60% 
 
In a model that does not reflect this variety of decision-making approaches, the strategy of the company is 
directly incorporated into the model. To reflect the idea of IEE into the model, there needs to be four 
strategies. One that aligns with each of the four beliefs. 
For the investment portfolio model, there would be four investment strategies. Those might be something 
along the lines of the following: 
Table 2.7 
INVESTMENT STRATEGY EXAMPLES 
Belief Investment Strategy 
Conservator Selection of securities based upon avoidance of losses. Portfolio exceeds all regulatory and 
rating agency constraints. Fixed income investments restricted to higher investment grade 
highly liquid securities. Tight asset liability matching with frequent rebalancing. Immediate sale 
of securities that fall outside of these constraints. Otherwise, buy and hold. Equity investments 
restricted to value funds and amounts limited to the free surplus of the firm (i.e., funds in 
excess of those needed to satisfy accounting basis liabilities plus board approved additional 
funds held for security under stress.)  
Maximizer Selection of securities based upon maximization of returns. Portfolio satisfies all regulatory 
and rating agency constraints, if only at quarterly closing. Will usually hold maximum allowed 
risk assets of many types. May run a moderate asset liability mismatch of fixed income 
securities depending upon the slope of the yield curve.  
Manager Portfolio strategy based upon maximization of risk adjusted returns with level of risk also 
restricted by risk tolerance. Portfolio satisfies all regulatory and rating agency constraints. 
Careful asset liability and hedging strategies. Stock/Bond mix determined strategically to meet 
company objectives and adjusted tactically according to current market conditions. High 
reliance upon Investment Policy Statement. 
Pragmatist Usually favor highest return on investment. Few hard and fast rules for investment strategy – 
more guidelines that can be ignored in special circumstances. Equity positions are usually 
larger investments in promising companies – so equity returns will have less correlation with 
broad market returns. Less concerned with asset liability matching, except for institutional 
products. Less concerned with rating agency constraints. Will meet regulatory requirements.  
 
More specific investment portfolio rules will need to be developed based upon each of those strategies.  
These strategies may seem like exaggerated extremes. However, they are all real observed insurance 
company portfolio strategies. All of these extremes may not have recently existed at one company, except 
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over a fairly long observation time frame. A modeler can look back over changes in investment strategies at 
a single company over ten or twenty years to see the range of actual variations and reflect those in the 
model. 
Whenever there is a change of beliefs, the investment portfolio will not, at the time of that change, be very 
consistent with the new belief. Actual portfolio managers will often want to implement changes to the 
portfolio gradually over some period of time. To represent that in a model, transition rules are needed in 
addition to the portfolio strategies. The approach to transition could be simple and uniform for all 
situations. Something in the form of “the portfolio will be brought into compliance with the new strategy 
within three years.” 
Alternatively, a more complicated transition process might consider the different sensibilities of the four 
beliefs.  
Table 2.8 
INVESTMENT STRATEGY TRANSITION 
New Belief Transition Program 
Conservator Portfolio manager will sell all risk assets that exceed portfolio constraints within one year with 
the expectation that the riskiest positions would be closed the soonest. All new purchases will 
conform with new portfolio strategy. Illiquid investments will be divested within three years.  
Maximizer Apply portfolio strategy of return maximization to determine which parts of the portfolio 
should be sold first. Transition to full compliance with new strategy within one year.  
Manager Three-year transition. Assess risk adjusted returns of existing portfolio to determine what 
needs to be replaced and how fast. All new purchases will conform with new portfolio 
strategy.  
Pragmatist All new purchases will conform with new portfolio strategy. Assess largest positions for 
replacement of lower ROI. Transition as portfolio turns over except for lower ROI positions.  
 
With something along these lines in place, the model can proceed with using the Transition Matrix to 
determine what change in belief, if any, happens in a year; and then what change in investment strategy 
results; and how the modeled portfolio manager reacts to the new strategy with the transition program.  
2.5.2 WHEN THE GENERALIZED TRANSITION MATRIX DOESN’T FIT 
There are several possible approaches to resolving situations where the generalized Transition Matrix does 
not fit well with past experience (or expected future experience) of changes in belief systems and therefore 
strategies.  
Frequency of Changes 
Some companies seem to stay with their strategies for much longer than the study of U.S. P&C mutual 
insurers would suggest. With the probabilities in the Transition Matrix, the likelihood of an insurer staying 
with the same belief (and therefore the same strategy) for even four years is 18% or less. A simple way to 
extend this was employed in the Surprise Game. There a company would not change beliefs/strategies for 
three years after making a change. This approach would allow for a “hold” period of two or more years 
depending upon the expected minimum duration of a new regime.  
Severity of Beliefs 
As was mentioned above, the examples for investment strategy are fairly extreme. The range of differences 
can be adjusted by defining strategies that are relatively more similar with leanings in the direction 
indicated by the beliefs. Small differences can make large differences in a long-term model.  
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Likelihood of Certain Beliefs 
Other work18 has suggested that Maximizer and Manager beliefs predominate among U.S. insurance 
executives and boards. While the above study of mutual insurers showed significant adherence to 
Conservator and Pragmatist aligned strategies, it is quite possible that expectations for a stockholder 
owned firm would be significantly less likely to transition into Conservator or Pragmatist beliefs for any 
length of time. In addition, mutual insurers would not be as likely to be dominated by a Maximizer belief as 
a Stockholder owned firm might. (Though it could be easily argued that some of the largest insurers are 
Mutual firms that are or at some point were run under a Maximizer consistent strategy.) An additional 
study of transitions among a homogenous set of insurers could be undertaken to determine a different 
transition Matrix for stockholder owned firms. That study could be similar to the study above or might use 
different parameters for determining the different implied beliefs. Including shareholder dividends in some 
way is an example of one such parameter.   
 
 
18 Underwood, Thompson, Ingram 2014. 
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Section 3: Systems Thinking, Social Anthropology, and Control Theory 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
When actuaries build models, company strategy is conventionally accounted for as singular and fixed, 
immutable in time, while all else may vary. Regardless of events, we forecast that the choices management 
makes on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis, especially choices related to risk mitigation activities, are made 
in the same way as they have been made in the past — according, that is, to the same invariant, single 
decision rule. This is not actually a very plausible model for simulating company decision-making behavior, 
even though it may be the best of the few options for future strategy that have been imagined. Such a 
fixed-for-ever, singular decision rule does not avail itself of any (simulated future) data on company 
operating conditions as they evolve with time. The resulting (simulated) decision is not conditioned on 
actual experience in the vicinity of the current decision point; it does not take account of observations from 
the recent past and the present, nor of any foresight about the near future. Such a rule would not be 
deemed “dynamic”, therefore, as in the “dynamic management actions” (DMA) life insurers are urged to 
model by Clark et al (2012). DMA in its turn, however, does not fully address modeling of either the 
“variety” of actuarial decision making or its “variability over time” as intended in the present project.  
To provide context and clarification, imagine the following. Suppose the prevailing season of risk at some 
point in the (simulated) future is judged to be “Uncertain” (Appendix A), with the streams of data signaling 
the nature of the company’s risk environment and its operating performance as those akin to the irregular 
volatility of the statistician’s white-noise process. The company, in the light of the (simulated) sometime 
future data it is receiving, is correctly adhering to the “Diversification” decision strategy of the “Pragmatist” 
rationality of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) (also Appendix A). If incorporated in a model, this, or any 
of the three other strategies for the three other seasons of risk, would each be a model of a dynamic 
management action (sensu Clark et al, 2012). In principle, four differently structured models of each risk-
coping decision strategy should be incorporated into the overall systems model of the insurer’s behavior. 
That alone would be a model of the variety in actuarial decision making, as futures are simulated, fanning 
out from the present time. At each decision point in time, four possible ways of making the decision — four 
strategy-decision rules — would be expressed in the model. Only one of the four, however, would be the 
right rule for the current season of risk. 
Suppose now, however, that something not immediately obvious in the current and past data (of the 
hypothetical future) is beginning to shift qualitatively, subtly but surely. We would say that the season of 
risk is on the cusp of a transition, to “Moderate”, or “Bust”, or “Boom”; and that the rationality of the 
company’s decision strategy should accordingly change qualitatively, to “Risk Steering”, or “Loss 
Controlling”, or “Risk Trading”. Yet how should the company apprehend the imminence or actuality of the 
risk transition? Having somehow done so, how then does the company diagnose and duly categorize the 
newly arrived season of risk? And, to go yet further — to go thus to the core of our project — given the 
correctly diagnosed shift, how could we model and simulate the way in which this switch takes place: the 
swapping out of one risk-coping autopilot (one decision rule) for another? 
That indeed is the challenge we have set ourselves, in particular, here in Section 3.  Could we, accordingly, 
come up with better models, heuristic or mathematical, of how company strategy, i.e., company decision 
rules themselves, may change over time? In this, modeling the variability of decision making over time (as 
just illustrated) is tantamount to modeling the variety of decision making at any single instant in time. For 
at one and the same point in time different groups of company employees and stakeholders will adopt 
quite different stances on the purpose of the decision and have quite different attitudes towards coping 
with the associated risks. There will always be those in the company who maintain, even insist, that 
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Diversification, or Risk Steering, Loss Controlling, or Risk Trading is right for the times: the one and only 
correct decision rule for today (and forever). Such a plurality of stances and risk attitudes is observed 
empirically (Thompson, 2018), is inherent in Cultural Theory and plural rationality (Thompson et al, 1990), 
and is now to be accommodated in some manner in a model. 
In Section 1, we have seen how the discipline of social anthropology (Thompson et al, 1990; Thompson, 
2008) has been brought to bear on our challenge of modeling the variety of decision making. In Section 2, 
actuarial science and practice, as expressed previously in InsuranceERM (2009-13), have been applied to 
our core challenge. Section 1, we might therefore observe, was about the variety of decision making, for 
example, according to a strategy of neoclassical economics, or behavioral economics, evolutionary 
economics, institutional economics, ecological economics, and so on. Section 2 was about the variability 
over time of the decision rules, for instance, Risk Steering being succeeded by Loss Controlling, then Risk 
Trading, and so on. In the present section, we apply control and systems theory to modeling such variety 
and variability. In the yet wider picture, this third section of our paper draws its motivation in significant 
part from the recent (UK) Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ report on “Economic Thought and Actuarial 
Practice” (Clacher, 2019). In sum, therefore, we consider our entire project to have been an exercise in 
cross-disciplinary Systems Thinking. 
3.1.1 ORGANIZATION OF SECTION 3 
We now present in summary the results of our research from this third and last part of the project. Section 
3.2 focuses on new results concerning the modeling of actuarial decision making for Rational Adaptability 
(RA) in ERM. Such modeling, and the supporting evidence it may generate for decision making in practice, 
calls upon a fifth rationality from Plural Rationality (PR), which we shall refer to as the Adaptor rationality-
cum-strategy. This is a significant and novel addition to all our previous studies. Accordingly, a first 
blueprint for the Adaptor strategy is presented and elaborated in Section 3.3. 
This final part of our project is cast within the logical and theoretical framework of Institutional 
Evolutionary Economics (in Section 1 above) and subsequently shaped in significant part by the empirical 
statistical results of the second component of our project (in Section 2 above). Two of the present (third) 
component’s three prototypical models of variability in actuarial decision making are inspired by the results 
of Section 2. Beyond that, this final part contributes new developments to the two foregoing parts of our 
report. They are essentially and distinctively drawn from the reasoning of control theory, especially in 
respect of the Adaptor strategy. The following caution is therefore vital: Although contact with control 
theory usually results in the rapid resort to some quite complicated mathematical sophistication,19 such is 
emphatically not our objective in any of our research. 
3.2 MODELS FOR DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES 
To a not-insignificant extent what is novel about the results of this final part of our project is a perhaps 
surprising combination (and subsequent extension) of two hitherto completely separate lines of original 
enquiry, one dating from as far back as the 1960s (Benjamin, 1982), the other from the 1980s (Thompson, 
1982). Surprisingly fused thus herein, these two original pillars are, first, the seminal combination of control 
theory with actuarial science, which is due to Balzer and Benjamin (1980) and Balzer (1982) (of which the 
 
 
19 The London School of Economics, for instance, has a Financial Mathematics and Control Theory Research group 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/Mathematics/Research/Financial-Mathematics-and-Control-Theory). See also the Wikipedia entry for Stochastic Control, 
with even a separate sub-section addressing applications thereof specifically in finance: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_control#In_finance. 
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DMA of Clark et al (2012) is a contemporary manifestation); and, second, the fifth rationality of PR, which 
was originally designated the rationality of the hermit (Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al, 1990), but will 
now in this project be referred to as the Adaptor (Appendix A). The first pillar of our approach in the 
present section, being a matter of control theory, addresses variability over time in a decision strategy; the 
second, a matter of social anthropology and, in particular, Cultural Theory (PR), addresses plurality in the 
variety of decision making. 
To the foregoing combination, a third essential ingredient must be added in order to achieve the new 
results shortly to be summarized. Its provenance lies in the early years of modern control theory, 
developing, as it was, at the turn of the 1960s/70s. Specifically, this is the presumption that all models may 
be populated with time-varying parameters (coefficients), whose variations with time may be estimated (in 
real-time, in principle) by the recursive algorithms of filtering theory and time-series analysis (Jazwinski, 
1970; Young, 1984; Beck, 2002; Lin and Beck, 2012). To single these parameters out, because they are so 
fundamental, we shall write them as α(T), wherein the argument of time T denotes variations with “macro” 
or “slow” time over (in general) the longer term, of typically the several quarters, years, perhaps even 
decades, over which seasons of risk prevail. This α(T) device animates the role of the Adaptor in the 
modeling of Section 3.2 and brings us to the culmination of this third section of our project, the blueprint of 
the Adaptor’s strategy in Section 3.3.20 
If there is to be a practical implementation of the Adaptor strategy, as something necessarily apart from all 
the other four risk-coping strategies, it must address the following challenges: (i) be able to diagnose 
correctly the prevailing season of risk and check that actual company decision-making strategy is consistent 
with it; (ii) be able to apprehend at the very earliest juncture a qualitative change in the season of risk and 
— even more difficult — diagnose to what season the company’s operating environment is shifting; and (iii) 
concern itself in earnest with infusing and supporting resilience in the composition and behavior of the 
“social” and “material” worlds of the company. 
3.2.1 THE BARE NECESSITIES OF SOME PRINCIPLES OF CONTROL ENGINEERING 
Before visualizing the logic of Rational Adaptation (RA), hence why and how we develop our models of 
variability in actuarial decision making, a minimal grasp must be acquired of what exactly control 
engineering is and what exactly it does. Again, we emphasize that the importance of our providing this 
basic grasp resides in the concepts and principles underlying control theory, not its mathematical fineries. 
So important is this basic grasp of control engineering to what follows, we choose not to relegate its 
presentation to an appendix. 
At bottom, control engineering seeks to re-engineer how a system behaves over time; it seeks to re-
engineer the system’s dynamics. In particular, it takes the system’s dynamic behavior as is and then re-
engineers it so that it is more to “our” liking. It is as the difference between the comfort and smoothness of 
flight in an aircraft with control and the discomfort of flight in an aircraft without such highly controlled 
 
 
20 When the present project was proposed (in December 2018), it was presented as the second of three inter-related projects. The need to 
develop an Adaptor strategy is the final recommendation of our precursor project for the AFIR-ERM Section of the IAA-AAI (Beck et al, 2020). 
The closure of the present project, in Section 3.3.4 specifically, anticipates what should be the subject of our third project (currently under 
discussion with the U.K. IFoA). 
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dynamics. In general, of course, and in its natural domains of application, control theory would not 
recognize any social plurality about the “our”. 
The controller in control engineering is a form of automated decision making. It may be intended to serve 
two purposes, known in the jargon as solutions to the “load” problem and the “regulator” problem. The 
latter seeks to transfer the state of the system from one performance condition at a start time to another 
state (condition) at a future end time. We might conceive of solutions to the regulator problem as being 
conceptually akin to getting the plane off the runway and transferring it with comfort (smoothly) to a cruise 
altitude at 10km. Solutions to the load problem keep the behavior of the system where and how we want it 
at all times (to “our” liking indeed), come what may, whatever untoward and unknown disturbances may 
buffet the plane. In this sense a controller may be designed primarily for “disturbance rejection”. 
Significantly, the automation of decision making arose historically as the human brain of the operator was 
confronted with the dynamic behavior of ever faster, bigger machinery delivering products designed to 
ever finer margins of tolerance against inadequacy and failure. The brain simply could not reason through 
any divergence between the observed actual performance of the system and its desired performance 
sufficiently quickly to determine appropriate corrective action and then implement it in a timely manner. 
And since speed of response was becoming of the essence, design of the automated decision-making 
scheme became dominated by a re-engineering emphasizing the need to expedite return to desired 
performance as quickly as possible. The trouble is, most ways of achieving such re-engineering bring with 
them increasingly oscillatory (bouncy, bumpy) transient behavior, and even eventually instability in the 
system’s controlled behavior. In other words, whereas without control, the behavior of the system might 
not have been to our liking, re-engineering it to bring things around to our liking is bounded by that very 
control inducing deeply undesirable instability (though others might conceivably welcome exactly that for 
some systems). 
Historically too, as “classical” control gave way to “modern” control in the 1960’s, so arose the fixation in 
control theory on finding optimal solutions to the load and regulator problems. Moreover, given suitable 
assumptions about the statistical nature of the disturbances to which the system would be subject and a 
model of the system’s responses to those disturbances, it became possible to answer this question (as a 
regulator problem): what would be an optimal sequence of decisions for each of the decision steps 
(marked in fast, micro time t) between the start (now) and desired terminal (end) future state of the 
system well out into macro time T (perhaps even beyond)? 
One crucial further feature emerged with modern control theory. Computers were facilitating the 
mobilization and embedding of mathematical models of the system’s dynamic behavior within the control 
schemes determining the decisions and actions to be implemented; and the computational devices 
embodying the resulting controllers were themselves being incorporated within the object of the system 
itself. It was accepted that the necessarily “minimalist” models could never be anything more than rather 
crude approximations of the system’s actual dynamic behavior. They had to be minimalist for reasons of 
limited computational capacity. Crucially, therefore, the proposition arose that all models could (and 
should) be populated by time-varying parameters, by our α(T). Indeed, as with all aircraft, and 
quintessentially so with guided missiles, the structure of the dynamics of the system is itself necessarily 
changing over time. Fuel is being expended, such that between departing from and returning to the ground 
the mass of the system is never constant, hence the essential structure of its dynamic behavior in response 
to any disturbance impinging upon it will inevitably change over the relatively longer term of T. Thus, a 
buffet of the craft half-way into the flight that is identical to an earlier buffet will evoke a different 
uncontrolled response to the earlier uncontrolled response. Given such structural change, the control rule 
would need to be adapted over time: variability upon variability in decision making, we might say. A 
strategy for changing strategy was needed. By tracking (estimating) the α(T) minute-by-minute, the model 
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would continue to provide the controller with its best current snapshot at the current decision-point t of 
the (ever-changing) structure of the dynamics needed to inform the decision rule of the controller. If 
collected together, the sequence of snapshots at each t in micro time would constitute a film (motion 
picture) of the evolution of the system from its beginning structure to its terminating structure. 
If the familiarity of flight in an aircraft assists the reader in understanding some of the basic, generic 
principles of control engineering, the metaphor will have served its purpose. The principles are about the 
problems and solutions to decision making: whether for achieving “our liking” in respect of flight or coping 
with risk and other operating challenges (to “our” liking) in an insurance company. 
Feedback Control 
Figure 3.1 is cast in terms of classical control system block diagrams. Shortly, the same will be used to 
visualize the logic of Rational Adaptation, as a stepping stone en route to expression of our models of 
variability in actuarial decision making. More immediately, Figure 3.1 explains how the fundamental 
principle of feedback control — as a control rule; as a decision-making rule; as a decision strategy — 
enables an insurance company to “get” what it “wants”, as opposed to merely getting what it “gets” come 
what may. Figure 3.1 takes us visually from an uncontrolled “open-loop” system (Figure 3.1(a)), in which 
there is no control (no intervening decisions), to a controlled “closed-loop” system (Figure 3.1(c)), with this 
latter opened up for closer scrutiny of its parts in Figure 3.1(b). The transformation wrought by the re-
engineering principle of feedback is therefore that of enabling the company to get what it wants (Figure 
3.1(c)) instead of just getting what it gets (Figure 3.1(a)). 
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Figure 3.1 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF FEEDBACK CONTROL* 
 
*Figure 3.1 The fundamental principle of feedback control: How to transform company behavior from getting what it “gets” 
(in (a)) to getting what it “wants”, come what may (in (c)). The inner workings of feedback (in (b)): showing the System versus 
the system’s Environment i.e., everything other than the System, including, in particular, the company risk environment; the S 
block for the company’s non-executive processing operations; and the decision-making (executive) K block. 
To grasp the essence of the transformation we need the exposed detail of Figure 3.1(b) and some 
accompanying algebraic notation. Looking at Figure 3.1(a), we label the incoming, input stream of 
disturbances impinging on the company as d(t). Formally, we may now note that argument t here tags 
variations of the disturbances over the relatively short-term of micro or quick time; thus, to complement 
the already introduced T for macro time. Micro time t signifies higher-frequency variations over days and 
weeks, perhaps months; macro time T signifies lower-frequency variations over quarters and years, in 
general. The disturbances d(t) in Figure 3.1 were taken to be the unpredicted claims in the original 
treatment of Balzer and Benjamin (1980), who referred to problems of instability in setting premium rates 
in an insurer operating a profit/loss-sharing scheme for one of its products. The block for the system “S” 
symbolizes the operational procedures the insurer employs to convert the incoming unpredicted claims 
into the outgoing cash surplus (deficit) responses y(t). In the uncontrolled system of Figure 3.1(a), where 
SOL signals the open-loop uncontrolled behavior of the system, the surplus the company “gets” is simply 
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y(t). Whatever the pattern of buffeting of the incoming claims, the insurer’s output performance will 
similarly bump about. 
Of course, what the company really “wants” is to have its operational performance be to its liking, i.e., to 
conform as closely as possible to what it wants of its surplus, yw(T). This “want” is portrayed as the output 
from the closed-loop controlled system (SCL) behavior in Figure 3.1(c). Significantly, these wants are 
presumed not to change quickly with time, but slowly. Hence their argument is slow macro time T, as 
opposed to fast micro time t. In the case of Rational Adaptation (as discussed later), company wants are 
assumed not to change during any one season of risk (“wants” prevail unchanged for each decision point t 
within that season) but to change abruptly as the season turns, which we would label as season T−1 
(Moderate, for example) changing to season T (Boom, for example). There is, as we have said, a kind of 
swapping out of one autopilot and a swapping in of another. 
Coming now to the heart of the matter of the re-engineering that achieves the transformation from Figure 
3.1(a) to Figure 3.1(c), let us examine Figure 3.1(b) more closely. Two blocks appear in the diagram: the S 
block, which denotes the corpus of company operations previously present in the uncontrolled situation of 
Figure 3.1(a); and the controller “K” block, in which the notation KPr and f appear. Here, subscript Pr refers 
to the decision that sets the premium (price) of the company’s product, which goes all the way back to the 
specifics of the seminal study of Balzer and Benjamin (1980). Symbol f denotes what is at the very heart of 
the matter for us: the company’s decision-making strategy; the control rule that is to be modeled as 
proposed below (and defined later as a Group III type of model, in Section 3.2.2); the control rule that is 
subject to variability over time, i.e., from one season of risk to another. 
How the principle of feedback control works is the subject of Figure 3.1(b). But first, note how both the S 
and K blocks comprise the “System” and all else that surrounds the “System” is its “Environment”. The two 
blocks are the operational processing procedures (S) of the company together with the decision-making (K) 
that sets the product premium rate. Just to the right of the K block, we see what is called in control 
engineering a “summation junction” (denoted Σ), or better “comparator junction” here. It compares the 
two incoming signals one to another and, noting their respective signs, generates an outgoing signal. In 
Figure 3.1(b) the surplus the company is currently getting, y(t), is compared with what it wants, yw (where 
we have removed the argument T for simplicity) to give thus the mismatch between the two, i.e., yw − y(t), 
which is fed into the decision block (K). Duly manipulated by the decision rule, i.e., function f, decision u(t) 
emerges as the selected premium applied as a second input to the operational processing block S. The 
negative sign attaching to the company’s current output y(t) in the mismatch defines the feedback as 
(stabilizing) “negative feedback”. Accordingly, if actual surplus is falling short of what the company wants, 
the premium rate will be increased (and vice versa). 
The supreme success of the principle of feedback control is that it enables the company to get what it 
wants consistently, irrespective of how well or poorly the behavior of the system (S) is known (which 
knowledge will be seen to be typified by a model of the Group II category soon to be introduced in Section 
3.2.2), and irrespective of the uncertainty attaching to the sequence of unpredicted claims d(t), knowledge 
of whose patterns of variation will be seen to be the subject of a Group I model below. If much is known 
about these two categories of knowledge, such that their corresponding Group I and II models are subject 
to relatively little uncertainty, wondrous things (arguably) might be conceived of for the design of the 
decision strategy f, ergo the (for us) core Group III class of model for the decision (K) block in Figure 3.1(b). 
For instance, we may come up with a (so called) model-based predictive form of control, which could steer 
the insurer’s fortunes (output y(t)) all the way from where they are now (today) to where the company CEO 
wants them to be several quarters, if not years, into the future — and all in accordance with a 
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predetermined sequence of product prices u(t) for t spanning from the decision for today to the decision 
years hence, one decision step prior to the future desired end-state.21 
Finally, the cross-disciplinary limitation of Figure 3.1, if this is what it is, resides in the very fact of its being 
grounded in control theory, wherein input-output (cause-effect) models are generally essential and the 
custom. This, we recognize, may not necessarily be the case in the disciplines of modeling more familiar in 
actuarial science, such as Statistics, for instance. 
3.2.2 THE STRATEGY OF THE ADAPTOR RATIONALITY: AS QUITE APART FROM THE DECISION 
STRATEGIES OF THE BASIC 4 RATIONALITIES 
Conventionally, according to Plural Rationality in ERM (Appendix A), each of the Basic 4 risk-coping 
strategies amounts — in the phrasing of control theory and when inserted into the controller K block of 
Figure 3.1(b) — to a time-invariant autopilot for the company. Put another way, there can be four versions 
of Figure 3.1(b), one for each distinctive “style” of risk-coping; four functional forms (or models) for the 
decision strategy f in the decision block. As the seasons of risk come and go, therefore, there is variability 
about the actuarial decision making, as the strategy (f) of the Conservator, say, is switched to that of the 
Maximizer, and so on. The switch is discrete, technically from one decision period to the next, such that the 
variability of decision strategy to be modeled is quite special. We note therefore that our four models (one 
for each of the Basic 4 decision strategies (f ’s)) should in theory have no need of the device of time-varying 
parameters α(T), since over any given season the α in each such model of each f should not vary with micro 
time t. 
The elementary simplicity of Figure 3.1, however, has served its purpose. To embark now on contemplating 
and reasoning about the (fifth) decision strategy of the Adaptor, within the context of Rational Adaptation, 
requires the graduated complication of Figure 3.2. It is time too to introduce the classes of models (Groups 
I, II, and III) and clarify their distinctions with respect to Figure 3.2. The composition of Figure 3.2 is based 
on the logic of the agent-based model of the Surprise Game as originally used to develop and explore 
Rational Adaptability (Ingram et al, 2012). Here, however, the essence of the simulation has been simplified 
somewhat for present purposes. 
The first thing to observe about Figure 3.2 is the way in which the “System” has been structured as two 
segments, of “Adaptation” and “Strategy”. In terms of its logic, the lower Strategy segment is essentially 
identical to the simple feedback control scheme of Figure 3.1(b). It has the recognizable S block, 
comparator junction, and K block. The Adaptation segment stands apart, above. But the insurer content of 
the Strategy segment differs from that of Figure 3.1(b). It is configured according to what we shall call the 
“reserving” decision process of an insurer in the controller (K) block.22 Mismatches between what the 
company is currently getting for its cash surplus and what it wants to achieve in the current season of risk 
are fed into the decision (K) block, from which duly emanate the (reserving) decisions u(t) applied to the 
company operational procedures for husbanding its assets in the S block. 
 
 
 
21 We surmise that such is the principle underlying procedures akin to the Black-Scholes formula for pricing virtual assets (today) given a 
desired goal for the asset owner several quarters and years hence. 
22 Since this word (reserving) is open to several particular interpretations in actuarial science, it is being used herein as follows: the decision 
exiting the K block is that of either putting a sum of money aside by investing it in some form of savings asset or of taking it out of the asset. 
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Figure 3.2 
RATIONAL ADAPTABILITY IN ERM* 
 
*Figure 3.2 Control-systems block diagram for Rational Adaptability in ERM, as a simplified approximation of a company 
participating in the Surprise Game (Ingram et al, 2012). The arrows for information flows and decisions are labelled as taking 
place on the scale of micro time t (shorter term) or macro time T (longer term). 
Putting aside the upper Adaptation segment for the moment, and focusing on Strategy, the word 
“Rationality” in the K block of Figure 3.2 refers to that chosen one of the Basic 4 rationalities whose 
decision rule (f) is so well tailored to the needs of the current season of risk. In other words, under Rational 
Adaptation, within the block-diagram scheme of Figure 3.2, just the single Basic 4 decision strategy f — 
with constant time-invariant parameters in its attaching (Group III) model — can occupy the K block at any 
given point in time (t). Accordingly, in any given season, the goal of the feedback control scheme of the 
Strategy segment is for the season-appropriate decision strategy occupying the K block to facilitate 
achievement of the desired company cash surplus flows at all times. Such a surplus must be achieved 
irrespective of the sequences of disturbances d1(t) emanating from the peril realm of asset behavior in the 
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markets “out there” in the company’s “Risk Environment” and impinging upon the assets held by the 
company, i.e., the S block in Figure 3.2.23 
Group I: Models of the Risk Environment of the System-Company 
Group I models seek to grasp the essence of whatever is determining both the basic nature and detail of 
the risk environment to which the company is subject. Characterization of the variability in the stream of 
disturbances originating in the peril realm of the asset market place, and impinging on the insurer’s 
operations as incoming disturbances, the d1(t) in Figure 3.2, are the essential archetypal subject of Group I 
models. Pragmatically, the behavior of d1(t) (and d2(t) for the Adaptation segment — the behavior of the 
company’s risk environment — may be modeled (for control purposes) as typically a univariate time-series 
model. In principle, such models could be required for all the variously distinguished disturbance streams, 
of which two are plotted in Figure 3.2, although for present purposes d1(t) is the obvious candidate 
requiring modeling. 
The parameters α(T) of a Group I model, presumed equally significantly to vary relatively slowly (with T), 
may cover not only the coefficients in the univariate time-series representation but also statistics, such as 
the mean and variance of d(t). Their essential intended purpose is to enable the trajectories over T of their 
recursively estimated values to track the progression of the seasons of risk, not least as affairs migrate 
towards and through a qualitative shift in season. Apprehension of the season changing, from Uncertain to 
whatever, for example, is expressly intended to be detectable through these reconstructed α(T). 
Group II: Models of Company-System Behavior 
The subject of this second group of models is the dynamic behavior of the S block in the Strategy segment 
of Figure 3.2. Input-output time-series models of the company’s operating behavior (in the S) are 
presumed.24 The inputs comprise the incoming disturbances of market volatility d1(t) and the applied 
operating decisions of reserving, u(t), which, through the model, evoke outgoing (performance) responses, 
y(t), such as operating surpluses-losses, asset accumulations, liability accumulations, and so on. 
For Group II models the reconstructed trajectories of their α(T) are intended to reveal whether (and how) 
the structure of the company’s operating procedures is changing over time. In effect, they should reveal 
incipient failure and distortion within the “idealized principles” (i.e., within the idealized model thereof) by 
which the company is dealing with its perceived risk environment through its decisions, i.e., through its risk-
coping decision strategy. Ideally, then, one would like to be able to infer something to this effect: that the 
company’s risk-coping strategy and its actual — as opposed to supposed — risk environment do not 
comport one with the other; that, for example, the Pragmatist with her/his Diversification strategy (one of 
the f’s) no longer comports with the (now erroneously) presumed Uncertain season of risk. 
 
 
23 In contrast to Figure 3.1(b) note how Figure 3.2 has two categories of disturbance streams impinging on the company from its surrounding 
environment: d1(t) for the risks associated with the behavior of the asset market; and d2(t) for the risks associated with the insurance market, 
notably the performances of other companies. In passing, we may note that to conceive of a companion control theoretic block diagram for 
the U.S. mutual insurer analyses of the second part of our report (Section 2 above) would entail five such disturbance streams. The three other 
streams include variations in the regulatory regime, dividend and interest rates, and (as in Figure 3.1) the peril realm giving rise to claims. The 
block diagram for the U.S. mutual insurer analyses would also oblige us to work with what is called a multivariable controller, i.e., one that has 
two or more control loops (K blocks) operating in parallel, e.g., one for reserving (as in Figure 3.2), one for premium pricing (Figure 3.1), and a 
third for company processing-operating decisions, e.g., in respect of decisions about allocating personnel and IT resources. Yang et al (2016) 
provide a good illustration of a multivariable controller, as discussed in more detail in Beck et al (2020). 
24 Although much of the work from which the present discussion derives was conducted on the basis of (so-called) state-space, ordinary-
differential-equation models, as in Beck (2002). 
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The focus of our project, however — that very “modeling of the variety in actuarial decision making” — is 
the subject of scrutiny in the about-to-be-defined Group III models. 
Group III: Models of Company Decision-Making Strategy 
The K (controller) block in Figure 3.2 is the nub of the matter: the reserving control rule and its decision 
strategy f. It is in these respects we present the novel results and propositions of our project. 
In principle, the decision-rule model (of K) may conform to the general rule (of control theory) of being 
structured as an input-output time-series model. Its inputs are the mismatches between what the company 
wants, its yw(T) in Figure 3.2, and what it is actually getting, its y(t), i.e., yw(T) − y(t). Its outputs are the 
decisions u(t) deduced from the decision strategy f and the input mismatches. Thus, if we label the 
Pragmatist strategy as fP, and the Pragmatist strategy has been adopted by the company within its K block 
because the season of risk is Uncertain, then reserving amounts u(t) are being chosen according to a risk-
coping principle of Diversification, i.e., fP. All should be well, provided the risk season actually is that of 
Uncertain and remains so. Furthermore, presuming (not unreasonably) that the wants yw(T) of the 
Pragmatist are not changing within the span of the current prevailing season of risk (Uncertain), an input-
output time-series model of the controller block would be based on the higher-frequency fluctuations in its 
input y(t) and its output u(t). 
But where now does the key instrumental concept of the (slowly) time-varying model parameters α(T) fit 
into these Group III models? To answer this, we need to reach up to the Adaptation segment of Figure 3.2. 
The Adaptor Strategy 
In Rational Adaptability (RA) for ERM, something else has to be decided about, and quite apart from the 
decisions being made on a day-to-day basis within the Strategy segment of Figure 3.2. It is, of course, the 
decision to swap out one version of the autopilot f occupying the reserving K block and replace it with 
another, from time to time, as the seasons of risk to which the company is subject change, over the longer 
term of macro time T. This is supposed to happen according to the essence of the “Rational Adaptability” in 
the single block of the upper Adaptation segment of Figure 3.2.  
Figuratively, and from time to time within macro time T, the switch on the output side of the RA block is 
closed for an instant. The symbolic signal passes to the reserving (K) block in the Strategy segment, and 
Diversification therein, for instance, is swapped out for Loss Controlling, or Risk Steering, or Risk Trading. 
Crucially, however, this requires someone in the RA block having somehow apprehended a change of risk 
season and duly diagnosed the new season of risk (at the earliest possible juncture). 
By way of inputs to the RA decision-making process, Figure 3.2 shows that information about asset 
variability and the states of the market and competitor firms flow in continuously (and conspicuously so) 
with micro time t. What emanates from the RA block, however, is just as conspicuously something that 
varies with macro time T. In fact, to emphasize the distinction, each conceptual signal flow in Figure 3.2 is 
tagged with either the t of fast micro time or the T of slow macro time. 
We assign the fifth Adaptor strategy as the permanent incumbent of the Rational Adaptability block in 
Figure 3.2. But when and how might we want to exploit the key concept of time-varying parameters α(T) 
for a Group III model to account for the behavior of the Adaptor? 
3.2.3 SOME PROTOTYPICAL GROUP III MODELS OF AN ADAPTOR STRATEGY 
Of these, we envisage three specifically, as follows. Model (1) is supposed conceptually to account for the 
decision making of the Adaptor rationality taking place in the upper Adaptation segment of Figure 3.2. 
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Models (2) and (3) are imagined as time-varying approximations of the Adaptor’s decision strategy taking 
place in the K block of the lower Strategy segment of Figure 3.2. All three, to reiterate, belong technically to 
the Group III category of models. 
(1) Transition Probability Model 
Our first proposition is based on the results of the U.S. mutual insurer analyses of the second part of our 
project (Section 2 above). Within the block diagram structure of Figure 3.2, therefore, we presume that 
one of the Basic 4 risk-coping strategies will occupy the K block and remain unchanged until receiving an 
intervention from the RA block in the Adaptation segment (via its switching device). Within that RA block, 
we conceive of computations taking place along the following narrative lines. 
The decision point is marked by t, such that the current-prior strategy, e.g., of Diversification, is that 
applied from the previous decision point up to time t. The updated-posterior strategy will be that applied 
to the insurer’s operations from t onwards, until the next decision point. It is presumed that the strategy 
(Diversification) of the Pragmatist has hitherto been applied because, in all probability, the season of risk 
has hitherto been that of Uncertain (at least in the relatively recent past). Given this, and with prior and 
posterior now defined, we write of the essence of the Transition Probability model as implementing these 
calculations: 
{Posterior probability of Basic-4 Strategy i (for i =1, 2, 3, 4)} 
= ∑(Summation over j, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4) of 
[{Prior probability of Basic-4 Strategy j; conditioned upon 
current risk Season being that of Rationality j} 
multiplied by 
                        {Transition probability i,j of prior Strategy j changing to posterior Strategy i}]                      (3.1) 
 
To anchor this equation in the frame of the analyses of the U.S. mutual insurer time-series, this last line — 
the transition probabilities — was the end result of the statistical analyses of Section 2 above, specifically, 
Tables 2.3 or 2.6. Given the fourfold plurality of the seasons of risk, there are 16 transition probabilities in 
all. 
Subject to diagnosis of the current season of risk — no trivial task whatsoever in the real world (as opposed 
to in any self-contained foresight simulation) — the above computation can be completed, under the 
presumption that strategy i strictly accompanies season i. In other words, as decision point t arrives, 
adherence to the prior Pragmatist strategy of Diversification follows from the determination that the 
current season of risk is most probably Uncertain. After the above computation, the Adaptor (in the RA 
block of Figure 3.2) would have access to the four respective posterior probabilities of each of the Basic 4 
strategies. If the posterior probability of Diversification is no longer the highest, the Adaptor closes the 
switch and replaces the Pragmatist occupant of the reserving K block with the alternative rationality 
corresponding to the strategy with the highest posterior probability. Thereafter, until further notice, that 
particular Basic 4 rationality will remain in power making the company’s decisions according to its 
distinctive risk-coping strategy. 
The 16 transition probabilities become the set of time-varying parameters α(T) at the heart of the model. In 
the real-time operating world of an actual insurer, with access to data akin to those used in Section 2 
above, we conceive of the recursive algorithms cited earlier as supporting, in principle, the Adaptor’s 
capacity to apprehend a qualitative change in the season of risk and to diagnose the category of the new 
season. We are, of course, not unaware of the profound significance in this of the phrase “in principle”. In 
the foresight-generating mode of the DMA advocated by Clark et al (2012), we can imagine that this all-
important Group III Transition Probability model, when coupled with its companion Group I and II models, 
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would require the slow temporal variations in α(T) to be generated by some collective of stochastic process 
models, most obviously those referred to as Generalized Random Walk (GRW) models (along the lines of 
Young, 1984). Accordingly, given the time-varying transition probabilities, the risk-season transitions and 
the sequences, the cycles, and the durations of the risk seasons are not destined to identically repeat 
themselves over macro time T and beyond, ad infinitum (∞), as it were. 
But there is a problem. For can it really be that an Adaptor, looking out on the company’s operating 
environment (in real-time) actually perceives a strict and abrupt switch in the season of risk? It is unlikely, 
on technical grounds, that any reconstructed (real-time) trajectory of an estimated element of the time-
varying parameters α(T) of any model would signal an abrupt dislocation in its value between decision 
points t−1 and t, even, one suspects, when Boom turns to Bust. 
Our two other types of model serving the Adaptor’s (Group III) decision strategy are structures that seek to 
circumnavigate this problem of abruptness. Both require us to conceive of the approximate surrogate 
Adaptor rationality occupying (throughout all time) the controller (K) block in the lower Strategy segment 
of Figure 3.2. 
(2) PID Model 
The defining acronym of this second model needs to be spelled out. Focusing on the K block of Figure 3.2, 
the classical design of the archetypal feedback control rule (our decision strategy f) allows for the 
combination of three types of controller action. Proportional (P) action in control engineering means that 
the countervailing feedback decision is proportional to the mismatch between what is got and what is 
wanted at decision point t, i.e., yw − y(t).25 Integral (I) action addresses the problem of persistent offset or 
mismatch, for example, that surpluses are below par quarter after quarter, or whatever. Accordingly, the I 
action is made proportional to some measure of the integral of the mismatch going back in time, i.e., over 
t−1, t−2, t−3, and so on. Derivative (D) action has an anticipatory sense about it, in that this constituent of 
the control action is made proportional to the derivative of the mismatch, i.e., the speed and direction of 
its change over time. Significantly, if a central difference approximation of the derivative is employed, D 
action is proportional to the difference between the mismatch at t−1 and that forecast in some way for t+1. 
PID control is the composite of all three elements of action. 
In the very simplest of forms, with the wants component (yw) of the mismatch deliberately subsumed 
under parameters α, we may write the PID model as  
                                                         u(t) = α1(T)y(t−1) + α2(T)y(t) + α3(T)ŷ (t+1)                                                  (3.2a) 
 
in which ŷ would need to be a forecast — a model-based forecast deriving from an S block Group I (d-y) 
model, for example. 
Things should work as follows. We have to imagine that this “surrogate Adaptor strategy f ” of Equation 
(3.2a), i.e., the simple linear functional form on the right-hand side of Equation (3.2a), occupies for all time 
— season in, season out — the K block of the Strategy segment of Figure 3.2. Equation (3.2a) is our first 
attempt to circumnavigate the significant awkwardness, if not conceptual and practical difficulties, of the 
abrupt, instantaneous switching function serving the (“true”) Adaptor in the RA block of the Adaptation 
 
 
25 Argument T has been omitted from the wants, yw. In other words, desires for output company performance across any single season of risk 
are taken to be unchanging (for the given rationality exercising control). 
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segment of Figure 3.2. In contrast to all that has gone before — that one after the other of one of the 
(time-invariant) Basic 4 risk-coping strategies occupies in turn the K block of Figure 3.2 — here now we 
have a single functional form of a strategy for all time. Crucially, through the device of the α(T), the strategy 
is enabled to migrate with time among one or the other specific Basic 4 decision strategy (or hybrid 
combinations thereof). It may figuratively enable the strategy to “touch one or the other base”, in 
whatever sequence matches the sequence of shifts in the seasons of a company’s risk environment. But we 
have yet to demonstrate how this strategy f of the surrogate Adaptor embraces distinctive elements of 
those other strategies of the Basic 4 rationalities. Such a link will follow very shortly. 
First, however, as we observed in introducing the PID model of Equation (3.2a), something about it is 
redolent of a key, but perhaps not obvious, practical assumption in the statistical analysis of Section 2 
above. Many of the data streams analyzed therein are, in fact, differenced data time-series; and they are so 
because they were judged to be more indicative of actual styles of insurer decision strategy. While these 
data are not technically data on the mismatches underlying the derivation of Equation (3.2a), their use 
emboldens us in conjecturing about how the plural rationalities of the Basic 4 are latent in Equation (3.2a). 
If nothing more, this instinctive empirical “finding” persuades us likewise to entertain the potential merits 
of including the ŷ (t+1) in Equation (3.2a). Balzer and Benjamin (Balzer, 1982; Benjamin, 1982), for example, 
found that the D component of their controller’s action in fact did not assist in stabilizing the dynamics of 
claims processing, something that can often be found to be the case in other (engineering) applications. 
Grounding the PID Model in Plural Rationality and ERM 
Here then is the link between the PID model (Equation 3.2a) and the Plural Rationality and ERM of 
Appendix A, the Institutional Evolutionary Economics framework of Section 1, and the Rational Adaptability 
in ERM that shapes the statistical analyses of Section 2. Indeed, this vital link comes with a question: Could 
there be evidence for guiding interventions by an Adaptor A-type in an insurer that may be inferred from 
the evolving estimates of the model’s time-varying parameters α(T)? One would not pose this question in 
respect of using a Group III PID model coupled with companion Group I and II models in an entirely self-
contained computational foresight-generating exercise. Rather the question is of merit in assessing the 
potential value of the (real-time) α(T) trajectories as an informative operational decision-support device for 
the Adaptor (as below in Section 3.3.1 of the Adaptor blueprint). 
More specifically, the link has much to do with what are referred to as the various social constructions of 
time of each of the Basic 4 rationalities (Thompson and Rayner, 1998; Douglas et al, 2002; Verweij, 2011). 
To see this, let us rewrite Equation (3.2a) as follows 
                                                                  u(t) = αH(T)y(t−1) + αM(T)y(t) + αE(T)ŷ (t+1)                                        (3.2b) 
 
thereby assigning one parameter each to the Manager (H), the Maximizer (M), and the Conservator (E). 
The intended social constructions of time are that H is “retrospective” in outlook, M is “in and of the 
present (moment)”, and the E is “anticipatory”. 
 
Now reflect on what might be happening with respect to the company’s “in principle” decision strategy, 
i.e., that which ideally “ought to be” in Figure 3.2, as encapsulated in the three-element vector of the 
parameters [αH(T);αM(T);αE(T)]. Suppose it is found — by fitting the model of Equation (3.2b) to the (error-
corrupted) time-series streams y(t) and u(t) — to evolve slowly and smoothly through the following 
sequence of parameter estimates: from [1;0;0]; to [0;1;0]; to [0;0;1]; and to [0;0;0]; and so on. The mix of 
parameter estimates could be deduced to have passed through the Maximizer strategy, on to the Manager 
and Conservator strategies, and through to the Pragmatist strategy (the [0;0;0] parameter combination). 
For this to be so for the Pragmatist, however, we would have to hypothesize that the P type runs for cover 
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and battens down the hatches, as it were, at the onset of its Uncertain season and thereafter takes her/his 
hand off the tiller, thereby engaging in a defensive open-loop control strategy. Otherwise, in between the 
0/1 entries in the estimated parameter vector, it could be said that various hybrid strategies are being 
followed by the company (as empirically found in Underwood et al (2014), as well as in the foregoing 
Section 2). And to recall, the mix may vary slowly over the longer-term (T) according to the “weights” of the 
constituents in the mix, in effect the parameters α(T). 
Looked at another way, the vector of smoothly time-varying estimates of the parameters is a means of 
obviating the abruptness of the Adaptor switch. Which prompts the question of whether, in the real world, 
there is ever a correspondingly abrupt transition in the season of risk with which the company is having to 
cope.  
(3) Blend (or Hybrid-Mix) Model 
With the words “hybrid” and “mix” having just been employed, it is no great stride to arrive at the third of 
our proposed Group III models for the Adaptor strategy, or more strictly speaking, our second surrogate 
Adaptor decision function f for permanent occupancy of the K block in the Strategy segment of Figure 3.2. 
Four terms (as opposed to three) are to appear in this blend model, however, one each for something of 
the strategy of each of the Basic 4 rationalities. In addition, the constituent, rationality-specific terms in the 
model can be made explicit a priori, without having to go through something akin to revelation of the social 
constructions of time en route from Equation (3.2a) to (3.2b) above. If anything, the following is more like a 
smoothly evolving way of fragmenting, breaking down, and blending those archly opposed things that 
make up the challenge of Decision Making under Contradictory Certainties (DMuCC) for the Institutional 
Evolutionary Economics of Section 1 above.26 We propose therefore a style of decision making for the 
Adaptor A-type as a (simple) function of the constituent candidate decisions of the Basic 4: 
                                                       uA(t) = α1(T)uM(t) + α2(T)uE(t) + α3(T)uH(t) + α4(T)uP(t)                                   (3.3) 
Subscripts M, E, H, and P denote the four rationalities as previously, hence their tagged candidate u’s. 
Subscript A, unsurprisingly, signifies the Adaptor rationality. 
It is not hard to picture the now four-element estimated parameter vector evolving smoothly but generally 
slowly among the various 0/1 combinations, and everything in-between. For instance, 
[α1(T);α2(T);α3(T);α4(T)] could be estimated to change through the seasons as first [0;0;1;0] (Manager 
strategy), then [0.5;0;0;0.5] (hybrid Maximizer-Pragmatist), on to [0.33;0;0.33;0.33] (hybrid Maximizer-
Manager-Pragmatist), and so on. Section 2 hints at the possibility of such occurrences, as (more 
substantially) do the earlier results in Underwood et al (2014). 
(4) Adaptive Control 
Needless to say, the possibilities for modeling the Adaptor strategy are several, if not many, not least those 
associated with the deployment of models in adaptive controllers. Thus, as already observed, when 
modern control engineering was emerging in the 1960s from classical control engineering, it was becoming 
possible to embed simple and essentially computationally-concise models within what became known as 
adaptive controller schemes, themselves in turn embedded aboard the engineering object they were set to 
control. The guided missile is again the appropriate mental image. One can obtain a sense of the extensive 
 
 
26 As opposed to the much more familiar problem of Decision Making under (Risk or) Uncertainty, i.e., the DMuU addressed in Clacher’s 2019 
IFoA report on “Economic Thought and Actuarial Practice”.  
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scope of what an adaptive controller was supposed to do if we cite one of its alternative names as that of a 
“self-tuning controller” (Åström and Wittenmark, 1973). The sine qua non of success in the performance of 
the on-board, in-line, digital controller was the capacity of the model always (without fail) to reflect a best 
current snapshot in real-time t of the ever-evolving structure of the missile’s behavior (through a Group II 
model, that is). With recursive parameter estimation and filtering theory co-evolving with such weaponry 
(see, for example, Jazwinski, 1970; Young, 1984), equally real-time estimates of the ever-changing model 
parameters α(T) could likewise be generated computationally (precisely because recursive estimation was 
so demonstrably efficient computationally). Thus, originated our device of α(T). It enabled the necessary 
“best current snapshot”. 
Indeed, exquisitely careful design judgements would have had to be made to secure this objective — the 
snapshot — in terms of learning (for adaptation) and unlearning (forgetting the ever-receding past 
snapshots). Learning and unlearning have their counterparts among the styles of the Basic 4 rationalities, 
not least in what we can perceive now of the benefits of deliberately forgetting, in order to arrive at the 
Rumsfeldian “unknown knowns” (things now unknown that were once known), which are associated with 
the Pragmatist rationality (and explicitly so in the IFoA’s study of model risk; Aggarwal et al, 2016; see also 
Beck et al, 2020).27 Moreover, it is possible to draw a parallel between the assigned and distinctive strategy 
of the Adaptor — to deliver the ever-best snapshot — with the risk-coping styles of prominent members of 
the hermit-proximate Sherpa, notably mountaineer Ang Phu (Thompson, 1982). 
Technically, of course, it is the control engineering device of the time-varying parameters — the α(T) at the 
very heart of our way of modeling variability in actuarial decision making — that enables our shaping herein 
(and subsequently deploying) the essential strategy of the Adaptor rationality. This brings us to the second 
tranche of novel results in this third section of our project. 
3.3 BLUEPRINT FOR THE ADAPTOR STRATEGY 
The Adaptor, the fifth of the plural rationalities, should necessarily stand apart and be distinct from the 
other Basic 4 rationalities, of Maximizer, Manager, Conservator, and Pragmatist. In principle it should 
occupy exclusively the single block in the Adaptation segment of Figure 3.2 (which is based on the Surprise 
Game), whereas the other four are all occupants for some season of risk of the controller K block of the 
Strategy segment. In the foregoing, however, and as a simple first step, we have approximated (and 
modeled) a surrogate of the “genuine” Adaptor strategy in the PID and Blend models: as a smoothly time-
varying permanent incumbent of the K block of the Strategy segment. The essential and defining 
“otherness” of the Adaptor, in all its respects, is an entirely untapped conceptual resource for reasoning 
about ways to improve the risk-coping endeavors of insurers. Like the preceding modeling propositions, 
however, any proper development of the blueprint for the Adaptor (other than the beginning now to 
follow) is a matter for investigation well beyond the scope of the current project. 
 
 
27 Having cited Rumsfeld, it is timely to note this. Modeling the variety of actuarial decision making is not just a matter of variability as a 
function of time, as treated herein. It is also a function of certainty-uncertainty and of the social-power dynamics among those groups of 
employees influencing an insurer’s decision making. In research prior to the writing of this report, both were investigated extensively, in 
particular the former. In effect, the Basic 4 rationalities cover four stances on certainty-uncertainty, i.e., four significantly different classes of 
Decision Making under Uncertainty (DMuU) — roughly, according to the four pairwise combinations of “knowns” and “unknowns”. None of 
this preparatory work is reported upon herein. Variability as a function of social-power dynamics, however, will be touched upon later. 
  42 
 
Copyright © 2021 Society of Actuaries Research Institute 
3.3.1 OPERATIONAL DIAGNOSIS OF SURPRISE AND RATIONAL ADAPTATION 
The surprise typology of Rational Adaptation (RA), so central to our earlier work on PR in ERM 
(InsuranceERM, 2009-13), is given as Table 0.1 in the Introduction of this project report. It requires the 
capacity, somewhere within the insurance company, to apprehend that the season of risk in its operating 
environment has changed; that technically there has been a qualitative shift in the nature of the variations 
in the incoming disturbances d(t) of Figure 3.2. RA then requires exercise of the capacity of the company to 
diagnose to which specifically of the four seasons of risk (Boom, Moderate, Bust, Uncertain) things have 
shifted. 
But Why Not Charge the Basic 4 With the Task of Diagnosing “Surprise”? 
The answer to this question comes down to the data and, crucially, to who chooses which components of 
them to heed and which to ignore. 
At any decision point, therefore, let us suppose d and y are the “true” values of data on respectively the 
company’s risk environment and operational performance, i.e., on the inputs and outputs of the “Assets” 
(S) block in Figure 3.2. In practice, these d and y are not observed. Only their counterpart error-corrupted 
values, dʹ and yʹ, say, are available for understanding the world and acting in it. There is noise in the 
observed data of the evidence base for actuarial decision making. The truth is seen through the frosted 
glass of the prime (ʹ) notation. 
Cultural theory, our theory of plural rationality, acknowledges the fact that with any world view comes a 
mindset that takes heed of some things and ignores others. In effect, for each of the Basic 4 rationalities 
the world is being seen through a second layer of almost willful distortion and obfuscation, as dʺ and yʺ we 
may write, using the double prime (ʺ) notation. Evidence, as we well know, may be selected to confirm 
one’s world view. We may write that the world is observed by the Maximizers as [dʹM ;yʹM], by Managers as 
[dʹH ;yʹH], by Conservators as [dʹE ;yʹE], and by Pragmatists as [dʹP ;yʹP]. Here, the subscript is being used to 
signal the rationality-specific “biasing” of the heed taken (or not) of the constituents of the error-corrupted 
observations [dʹ;yʹ]. Less cumbersome is to write of the observed (O) world being simply OM, OH, OE, and OP 
for the four rationalities respectively (at any decision point t in time). 
The truth is one thing, [d;y]. What can be empirically observed of it in the real world is yet another, [dʹ;yʹ]. 
What is heeded of the empirically observed is yet another, or rather, is yet four others, OM, OH, OE, and OP. 
We have four plural “takes” or “spins” on the state of the world, upon which to base the making of 
actuarial decisions using the respective decision-making rules of the Basic 4 rationalities. In which case, let 
us consider what might happen when the season of risk changes, from Moderate, to Uncertain, to Bust, to 
Boom or whatever. Absent the Adaptor from the original exposition of RA, we submit now that the 
operative decision strategy fi will not change. The presently “successful” Basic 4 rationality will not be 
surprised into changing its ways or yielding its grip on the decisions being enacted. It will not apprehend 
the failure of its ways; it will insist on spinning its Oi so as to convince itself the evidence base is 
demonstrating continuing success. 
It is for this reason we charge the Adaptor rationality with the tasks of RA. 
The Focal Role of the Time-varying Model Parameters 
Our intention is that models may be deployed to support the Adaptor in discharging this responsibility of 
diagnosis within the scheme of RA. The word “support” is important, because our concern now is to 
envisage models as being run “off-line” in support of the making of the current decision. The models are 
now not supposed to be encoded in the computer as a “self-contained” simulation of the entire affairs of 
the company, including its strategies of decision making, for the current and all future simulated decision 
periods. The model here is not simulating the making of the future decisions. More specifically, it is our 
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contention that the device of time-varying model parameters α(T) enables and enhances discharge of this 
task of operational diagnosis. 
Unsurprisingly, we posit that the kernel of such diagnoses — of whether the season of risk has changed 
and, if so, to what? — lies in the device of the α(T) in any of these model structures. Which device permits 
the possible revelation (under uncertainty) — through the recursively reconstructed estimates of the 
relatively slow temporal patterns in the α(T) — of significant and diagnosable information about qualitative 
structural change in the system and its risk environment. 
For the servicing of this purpose there is much precedent (as in Beck, 1979, 1983, 1987, 2002), including a 
recent treatment of the same in respect of actuarial model support for RA in ERM (Beck et al, 2020). This 
precedent originated in the notion of testing the structure of a model of a system’s behavior to the point of 
failure and destruction. What was sought in this, however, was not the revelation that the model as a 
whole was failing or plain wrong. It was rather exposure of the fact that one or more of its constituent parts 
(its constituent hypotheses) was failing, together possibly with how it was failing (in what way, if not why). 
For present purposes, such failure is presumed here to occur because of some change in the structure of 
the real system’s behavior over time, which does not comport with the “null hypothesis” that the model in 
all its parts, in respect of all of its parameter values α, is correct and invariant with time. 
Suffice it to say merely this, therefore, on this potentially voluminous subject. If the estimates of the α(T) 
are invariant with time in any model structure, the presumption of the model being correct is not 
significantly denied. Otherwise, something not ascribable to pure chance in the data streams — the d(t), 
the y(t), and the sequence of decisions u(t) — does not comport with some feature in these data. 
All Three Groups of Models May Serve the Purpose 
A Group I model of the variations in d(t) is an obvious choice for serving this purpose of diagnosing a 
changed season of risk. In principle, in the case of Figure 3.2, one model for each of the two risk streams 
(d1(t) and d2(t)) would be needed. We may also argue, however, that the Group II models and the Group III 
models have a role to play, except for the transition-probability model of Equation (3.1). It is hard to 
conceive (as yet) how such a model would work for the purposes of (real-time) operational diagnosis of any 
shift in the season of risk. 
To summarize the particulars, in deploying a Group I model the hope is of diagnoses along these lines: that 
irrespective of company behavior, the external season of risk may be concluded to be this, that, or the 
other. 
With a Group II model (for Assets behavior in Figure 3.2) one might hope to elicit the conclusion that the 
reserving actions u being taken to counter the (generally) deleterious consequences of the incoming 
disturbances d for company performance, surplus y, are not succeeding, i.e., that (the presumed known) 
decision strategy does not appear to be addressing the issues of the current season of risk. For instance, 
the parametric variations might signal that, while the current season of risk (from the Group I model and its 
respective α(T)) is Uncertain, the pattern of the y, when reconciled (via the Group II model) with the 
patterns of the d and u appears to be more the consequence of the Manager’s strategy of Risk Steering 
than of the (presently season-correct) Pragmatist’s Diversification.28 
 
 
28 Technically, the models are of course not reconciled against the hypothetically observed “true behavior”, but the error-corrupted 
observations thereof, i.e., the [dʹ,yʹ], if not error-corrupted records of past decisions u as well. In contrast, if the logic of Cultural Theory holds, 
any one of the Basic 4 rationalities would seek to reconcile its models with its respective take on the data, namely the [dʺ,yʺ], which, one 
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For a Group III model, of the K decision block in Figure 3.2, the hope would be this: that its outgoing 
(feedback) actions u are inconsistent with this K block’s input company performance data y, but with an 
attaching hint of what evolving blends of strategy (or hybrid decision strategy) might actually succeed. 
All the foregoing are conjectures, however; and conjectures moreover, in the very (very) early days of 
reasoning through the blueprint of the Adaptor. Nevertheless, for the purpose of diagnosing a qualitative 
shift in the company’s risk environment, there does appear to be a reasonable prima facie case for 
asserting that some trace of seasonal change should be evident in the estimated variations of the α(T) 
populating the univariate time-series (Group I) model of the company’s d(t). 
Taking stock of this charge (of diagnosing surprise under the rubric of Rational Adaptation), all of the 
evidence — the error-corrupted data streams [dʹ,yʹ], the time-varying estimates of the various α(T) in the 
three Groups of models, and the kind of evidence implied in the surprise typology of Table 0.1 
(Introduction) — passes into the purview of the Adaptor. Indeed, as if to gild the lily, there are yet other 
ways of generating diagnostic evidence for guiding and supporting decision making under the Adaptor 
strategy (Beck et al, 2020). 
In the context of future possible actuarial practice, the following nevertheless is salient. What is to be put 
to work in developing the blueprint of the Adaptor are the conceptual principles of problem-solving 
according to control engineering, not (necessarily) the undergirding mathematical fineries typically 
associated with control theory. 
But there is a potentially disruptive undercurrent circulating beneath these principles of diagnosing a 
qualitative shift in a company’s season of risk. 
A Confounding Factor: Social-power Dynamics Among the Basic 4 Solidarities of Company Decision 
Influencers 
The primary determination of RA must be this: Are the current season of risk and the currently applied risk-
coping strategy logically consistent with one another according to the theory of plural rationality? The 
consequent determination is whether the season is correctly identified, but that the current decision 
strategy is not logically consistent with it. 
Something not so far discussed, hence completely absent from any models and, indeed, from the scheme 
of RA, is this. Consider each of the Basic 4 rationalities. Each, in principle, wants to have things its way; each 
wants to have control of the mechanics of decision making in the company; to be the autopilot in the 
company driving seat. According to Cultural Theory, in particular, in the last chapter of Organising & 
Disorganising (Thompson, 2008), a three-dimensional visualization is given of how a theory of the dynamics 
of power and control over social affairs, including the making of decisions, might be played out among the 
plural rationalities in any organization or institution. The visualization appears on page 144 of the book. 
Significantly, for the metaphor that follows shortly, the word “grip” is used as a measure of the power and 
influence (persuasive or coercive) any one rationality may exercise over any other rationality. Grip is 
gauged up a vertical axis in the 3-D visualization. An illustrative curved topographical surface mapping the 
contours of power stands above the 2-D “control space” formed by the two original axes of Cultural Theory 
for plotting an agent’s social context, i.e., grid and group. Five points of stability are plotted in five 
 
 
suspects, would minimize that rationality’s chances of ever apprehending that something is wrong or has changed. In this, we find another 
reason to charge the Adaptor with the task of operational diagnosis of surprise within the scheme of RA. 
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respective domains of stability on the 2-D plane (one for each rationality), together with the trajectories 
homing in on each stability point. These trajectories trace how the grid-group status of an individual agent 
should evolve — in respect of being signed up to membership of any one of the solidarities of PR — from 
wherever they might find themselves on the grip (power) surface above.29 
Keeping the idea of grip in mind — as in the exercise of power and influence (or the lack thereof) among 
the plural groupings of employees in an insurer — picture now this metaphor. It is from the Introduction to 
the second (2017) edition of the 1979 book Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value 
(Thompson, 2017; pp 4-7). The 1979 theory of value is being recast within the subsequent 1990 theory of 
plural rationality, i.e., Cultural Theory (Thompson et al, 1990). A system’s diagram, one essentially similar to 
the block diagrams of control engineering (such as Figures 3.1 and 3.2), charts the possible (and not 
possible) flows of objects or goods among the value categories of “transient”, “durable”, and “rubbish”. 
The categories are the blocks (cisterns in the book); the flows of goods are the arrows between any pair of 
blocks. Taps associated with the flows (arrows) are imagined, as the means to control the magnitude of a 
flow. The taps would be referred to as the actuators in control engineering, i.e., those things that actually 
apply the deduced control actions to the system. They give effect to the decisions emanating from a 
conceptual controller block. Each rationality is imagined as placing its hands on the tap, four pairs of hands, 
that is, for the Basic 4 rationalities. That pair of hands (rationality) with the greatest, most influential grip 
on the tap has its way. One rationality, the one currently in power, determines and gives effect to the 
current risk-coping strategy of the insurer, in the K block of Figure 3.2. 
The trouble for Rational Adaptability, and for all the preceding propositions for the Adaptor’s task of 
operational diagnosis of the season of risk, is the potentially disruptive nature of the unfolding social-power 
dynamics. In particular, the members of one rationality may — over time, perhaps slowly (as over macro 
time T), perhaps more rapidly, over micro time t — “predate” the members of another rationality, or 
coerce, or try to persuade them to shift their allegiance: from a competing rationality to theirs; hence to 
buy into a different risk-coping strategy. The narrative of the Insurance Cycle provided by Underwood and 
Ingram (2013) is replete with the empirical experience of just such. 
The potential difficulty for RA, is that a change of grip over the company’s risk-coping decision strategy, 
from one of the Basic 4 to another, may occur in the complete absence of any accompanying change of risk 
season. In which case, the season of risk and the company’s risk-coping strategy would not be logically 
consistent with one another, according to the theory of plural rationality. Perhaps the Adaptor, standing 
determinedly quite apart from the social-power dynamics of the Basic 4 and equally hermit-like utterly 
disengaged from them, could detect something of this nature, even in the (possibly enduring) absence of 
any model of them. 
 
 
29 Some clarification of phrasing and terminology will be helpful at this juncture. “Grip” is not only tantamount to “power” but also, in our 
everyday language, to “control”. However, in a discussion where control theory and control engineering provide the intellectual spine, care in 
the use of words (in certain places) is important. Thus, first, this notion of grip is due to a Canadian engineer, Nils Lind, perhaps even a control 
engineer. Yet merely through its appeal to alliteration, of grip, grid, and group, one can appreciate why grip is being employed in the present 
setting of Cultural Theory. But then there is the phrase “control space”, as used (in Organising & Disorganising) for the two dimensions of grid 
and group in the 3-D visualization. For what this 2-D plane represents, a control engineer would refer to the details of plural stability domains 
(or basins of attraction) plotted on it as technically the “phase plane” portrait of stability in the (unforced) transient dynamic behavior of a 
system. In slightly more readily understandable words (from control and systems theory), the 2-D plot has two system “state” (output) 
variables for its axes, such that the trajectories in the plot signal the pair of two state-output values at any point in time through which the 
entity (an agent in this instance) passes as it returns to stability from its initial state of displacement out of stasis or equilibrium. In the case of 
an insurance company two of its states-outputs could be the company’s accumulations of assets and liabilities. The phase plane portrait will 
become important (shortly) in Section 3.3.2, in respect of grasping an important distinction between the notions of stability and resilience. 
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3.3.2 MYTHS OF NATURE, RESILIENCE AND SCALES OF TIME 
It is possible the reader could be wondering why the distinction has been drawn (so strongly) between 
change in the shorter term, i.e., change in micro time t, and change over the longer term, over macro time 
T. We surely trust this is not the case, but if it is, here is yet a further reason why this distinction is so very 
important in so many ways, including in respect of PR for ERM. It resides in the perhaps often neglected 
but profoundly important distinction between stability and resilience. In fact, we must go further now, to 
define and label formally a third overlapping scale of time: the “quasi-evolutionary” denoted by the symbol 
∞ already introduced for the very long term. Which very long term here will be on the scale of economic 
cycles, Kondratieff waves of innovation (Section 1 above and Appendix B), and the dynamics of climate 
change. In short, the trio of t, T, and ∞, will serve as our scales of time. 
Each of the five rationalities of Cultural Theory has an attaching Myth of Nature, a social construction of 
nature, of the way the world is. They are touched upon in Section 1. These Myths are originally due to 
ecologist C .S. Holling (1977). Their expression followed shortly after his seminal paper on “Resilience and 
Stability of Ecological Systems” (Holling, 1973). In spite of this distinction’s presence in the paper’s title, it 
has subsequently been all too easy to lose sight of the roots of the distinction between these two systemic 
properties (of stability and resilience).30 Yet more of the “Adaptor exceptionalism” accumulating in this 
blueprint will now become apparent. The Adaptor’s Myth of Nature is that of Nature Resilient; all of the 
other Basic 4 Myths have to do with variations on the theme of stability. Indeed, since resilience is 
associated with the behavior of any system over the longer term (of the T and∞ time scales) — and since 
insurers with products in the domain of pension funds ought to be greatly concerned about asset and 
investment behavior in the long term — resilient company performance (as opposed to short-term 
stability) ought to be a prominent consideration in everyday decision making. To put it bluntly and 
technically, actuaries (above all others) must contemplate the ∞ and then wind the implications therefrom 
back through T to decision making in the here and now of t. Holling’s seminal work, we judge, is more 
informative on the matter of resilience, with its horizons spanning the ∞ and the T, than many others of 
the many attempts to get to its very essence.31 
Quick Time, Stability, and the Myths of the Basic 4 Rationalities 
A phase-plane portrait of a system’s stability, or more commonly a topographical ball-surface icon (see, for 
example, Thompson et al, 1990; Thompson, 2008), can be drawn for each of our Basic 4 rationalities of 
ERM, Maximizer, Manager, Conservator, and Pragmatist. For the iconography imagine a ball on a surface. 
The joint narrative of the portrait and icon is as now follows. 
To begin with, the ball may be in stasis, with its position on the surface invariant with time, at the point of 
equilibrium-stability. Much more likely, however, is that the ball will be in motion upon and about the 
surface. Its movement, its changing position with time, is the metaphor for the transient behavior of the 
state of the insurer (effectively output y here), for instance, the changing value of its accumulation of 
assets (as the single state variable for the ball-surface icon) or the varying combination of asset and liability 
 
 
30 The word “systemic” here is being used specifically and precisely to signal properties inherent to the dynamic behavior of a disturbed system 
whose state has been pushed out of stasis. 
31  Deciding today how to invest for the long term (decades hence) can be said to be the driving motivation for the recently launched (2020) 
Financial Systems Thinking Innovation Centre (FinSTIC) of the U.K. IFoA (see finstic.org,uk). Silver’s 2017 book Finance, Society and 
Sustainability is a damning indictment of the finance industry for its short-termism (Silver, 2017). The same is prominent in the 2019 Clacher 
Report commissioned by the IFoA on Economic Thought and Actuarial Practice (Clacher, 2019). We shall have more to say on this shortly 
(https://www.actuaries.org.uk/system/files/field/document/Economic_Thought_and_Actuarial_Practice_0.pdf).   
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accumulations for the location of the insurer’s performance in the two-state, 2-D, phase-plane portrait of 
stability. The movement of the ball is supposed to be the consequence of its being struck in some way by 
an imagined “off-stage” and equally iconic billiard cue, as metaphor for the disturbance d emanating from 
the company’s external risk environment. Finally — and this, we might say, is the bottom line here — if we 
are going to reference change (movement) to slow time T for the affairs of the Adaptor, as we are below, 
then relative to T, all of the movement of the ball over the stability surface or the movement of the state of 
the system about the portrait will be measured as occurring in comparatively quick time t. 
Given the ball-surface iconography and the phase-plane portrait, each of the Basic 4 rationality’s Myth of 
Nature and its accompanying social construction of stability (not resilience) can be expressed as follows: 
The Maximizer holds that Nature is Benign. No matter how much and how hard the 
system is struck by disturbance, things will return to the equilibrium point Maximizers 
have come to know and love. The system’s behavior is mean-reverting. The ball-surface 
icon is bowl-shaped (ꓴ). If struck by the billiard cue and displaced from stasis at the 
bottom of the bowl, the ball always will eventually return to that stasis (to that 
equilibrium point) at the bottom of the bowl. In the phase-plane portrait, the surface 
contours of the bowl shape are plotted as concentric circles; the state of the system, 
when disturbed away from the center-most stability point, traces out a trajectory 
crossing the circles and returning back to this point of stasis. The dynamic behavior of the 
system, all in quick, micro time t, is said to be unconditionally stable. 
The Conservator, in complete contrast to Maximizers, cleaves to the Myth of Nature 
Ephemeral. The iconic bowl-shaped surface is upturned; it is ∩-shaped. Only an utterly 
precarious stability obtains at the peak of the upturned bowl. Any perturbation of the 
ball, no matter how minuscule, will cause it to crash off and into some abyss (of disaster) 
somewhere. The state of the system, once perturbed away from the precarious stasis, 
will pursue a trajectory, perhaps with an ever-increasing speed of change, that sooner or 
later will seek to break out of the frame of the phase-plane portrait. We have an intuitive 
sense of all this in the risk season of Bust. The system is said to be unconditionally 
unstable. 
The Manager claims her/his Myth as that of Nature Tolerant but Perverse. Significantly, 
this is the only Myth requiring two adjectives. Its accompanying surface is that of a bowl 
with its rim turned downwards. The behavior of the system is conditionally stable. Up to 
a point, company affairs will mimic the dynamics of the ball remaining within the bowl: 
stability. If struck too hard, however, the ball may be metaphorically propelled all the way 
up to the rim of the bowl, over, and out: instability. Conventional ERM works, we might 
say, provided the company does not experience any unacceptably large, risky, event. In 
the phase-plane portrait, one of the outer concentric rings will equate to the rim of the 
bowl. Realization of the high-amplitude risky event causes the state of the insurer to 
follow a trajectory (through quick time t) that crosses this outer circular (rim) boundary, 
never to turn back towards the center. 
The Pragmatist has assigned to it the Myth of Nature Capricious: no bowl, merely a flat-
land; no contours in the phase-plane portrait, nor any point of equilibrium. The ball, 
struck any and every which way by the billiard cue, traces out a trajectory in t zig-zagging 
about the phase-plane portrait (as the ball is struck again and again by the stream of d 
striking the company), perhaps remaining within the frame, perhaps not. The ball has no 
point of stasis at which to come to rest. The dynamic behavior of the system is technically 
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neither stable nor unstable. And yet, for all this seeming negativity about the Pragmatist’s 
Myth, there can be several positive elements within it in respect of a risk-coping strategy. 
We mention but one, because it presages the imminent exceptionalism of the Adaptor in 
respect of our appreciation of resilience. Thus, in the practice of an insurer, the 
Pragmatist may recognize — or pursuit of a (reactive) strategy of Diversification may 
signal — that the old order or structure of the world in which the company is operating 
has disintegrated, yet the nature of any new order to come is not discerned (or even not 
discernible for the time being, in this Uncertain season of risk). 
It is time to shift our attention from the local property of stability in quick time t to the global property of 
resilience in slow time T. 
Slow Time, Resilience, and the Myth of the Adaptor Rationality 
Since our Adaptor is being assigned Holling’s fifth Myth of Nature Resilient, in which the property of 
resilience is said to be global, this Myth may rightly be supposed to subsume in some way — indeed, in 
some way still being elaborated (and possibly destined ever to be so!) — all of the locally circumscribed 
behaviors of the other four Myths. But we shall be brief. 
Each of the four ball-surface icons and phase-plane stability portraits for each of the Basic 4 rationalities 
encapsulate the short-term transient behavior in the state of the company’s output performance y(t) in 
response to perturbation and disturbance. We may refer to these as local properties of the system’s 
behavior in time, specifically within the short scale of time indicated by micro time t. 
Each iconic form may be thought of as a snapshot, a still photograph, or a single frame in a film: of how 
short-term transient behavior y(t) varies in a particular manner — according to the given Basic 4 rationality 
and its attaching Myth of Nature — for the duration of each season of risk over the scale of macro time T. 
In particular, this being so, the Myth of Nature Resilient of the Adaptor can be drawn as that which 
encompasses the gradual morphological (structural) transformation of the (stability) surface from one 
season of risk to the next, over the longer-term of multiple seasons within broadly still the temporal scale 
of T. The transformation is as that of an animated cartoon film in macro-time T. It is as that introduced 
above for the slowly but inexorably changing structure of the aircraft’s dynamics as it expends fuel. 
Each of the four phase-plane portraits, while likewise capable of sustaining quite the same animation over 
the dimension of time, can also be supposed to be but a single (locally defined) tile in the full global mosaic 
of the stability properties of the company’s dynamic behavior y(t) over its global range of conceivable 
values for, say, the asset and liability accumulations comprising the y. That mosaic — the complete 
composition of the host of tiles of constituent local stability maps — may be regarded as, in fact, a 
portrayal of the global systemic property of resilience, subsuming, as it does, all the (in fact) many tiles of 
local systemic stability. And that is how the distinction between resilience and stability was originally 
conceived of in Holling (1973). 
Time, however, remains our focus, as does our control theoretic device of time-varying parameters α(T). 
Together, they yield this fundamental distinction between the rationalities of the Basic 4 and the Adaptor 
rationality, between respectively stability and resilience: 
The engine of the animation connecting the stills into the film for the never-ending 
qualitative (structural) shifts in the short-term transient behavior y(t) of the company, as 
it experiences and undergoes the companion shifts in the seasons of its risk environment, 
is the relatively slow changing of the α(T). 
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What is more, technically, the high-frequency buzz and flutter in the movement of the ball (the y(t)) may 
influence the low-frequency rumbling and shifting of the α(T), and every bit as much vice versa. Tentatively, 
we draw also this further distinction. The reconstructed variations in α(T) are to the Adaptor what the 
observed (or spun) variations in the evidence base of the y(t) are to each of the Basic 4 rationalities in 
respect of decision making, i.e., in respect of Rational Adaptability in ERM. The global α(T) are indicative of 
the notion of longer-term resilience in the way that the local y(t) are indicative of stability in the short term. 
To put palpable actuarial flesh on this abstract, control-theoretic skeleton of a principle, we offer these two 
images. First, in the animated film of the Myth of Nature Resilient as visualized in Thompson (2008), the 
economic-business cycle from Boom to Bust would begin with the rim of the ꓴ-shaped surface of Boom 
turning down into the season of Moderate and, with the ever progressive turning down and flattening out, 
into the flatland still of Uncertain, and eventually, as a bump manifests itself and rises up in the flatland, 
the Bust of the upturned ∩-shaped bowl. Second, Diks et al (2015) and Rye and Jackson (2016) have sought 
to identify the progressive weakening over time (T) in the restorative forces of a national economy 
subjected to the occasional disturbance of bust and collapse (as manifest in long GDP time-series, over a 
time-scale edging towards that of ∞ for economics). To buttress their analysis, they liken the behavior of a 
national economy to that of a disturbed mechanical spring-mass-damper system and invoke the theory of 
catastrophe. The surface of the ball-surface iconography is supposed to be undergoing structural 
(morphological) change as a function of what catastrophe theory refers to as a “control parameter”, i.e., an 
α(T), such that as the value of this parameter passes a critical (cusp) point, the pattern of high-frequency 
fluctuations in national GDP, the y(t), undergoes a significant, qualitative change (technically, more 
oscillatory in form as a function of the weakened restorative forces in the economy). The original ꓴ in the 
surface of the ball-surface iconography for the national economy slowly shallows and flattens, eventually 
tipping the ball of GDP performance over and out in a newly forming ꓴ in another zone of the phase-plane 
portrait. Over the span of the long term (T and ∞), the relatively short-term (t) recovery of the GDP of an 
economy subject to a Bust in, say, 2008, will be qualitatively different (notably more oscillatory and 
“bouncy”) than was the recovery when that same economy was subject to the (hypothetically) identical 
Bust disturbance in 1978, say.  
How exactly the Adaptor might act so as to preserve or enhance resilience in the insurer’s behavior over 
the long term is something to be addressed below (in Section 3.3.4). More immediately, the Adaptor’s 
social construction of time must be touched upon, as follows. 
Although the fourth of the Group III models in Section 3.2.3 (for models as they might be found in adaptive, 
self-tuning controllers) has yet to find a more formal place in our diagnosis of surprise, hence support the 
implementation of RA (in Section 3.3.1), its essence nonetheless gives us a rough working conjecture for 
the Adaptor’s social construction of time. Oddly, the metaphor of a guided missile once again serves our 
purpose. We shall also need to avail ourselves of the three scales of time over which variation and change 
may occur: the short term t, the long term T, and the quasi-evolutionary, ∞. In respect of this last we have 
in mind specifically the timescale referencing the evolutionary economic behavior set out in Arthur’s (2009) 
book The Nature of Technology. What It Is and How It Evolves. It would be the same temporal scale as that 
covering the cycles and Kondratieff waves addressed in the Institutional Evolutionary Economics (IEE) of 
the first part of our project (Section 1 and Appendix B). We have thus this social construction of time for 
the Adaptor: 
The evidence of the way the world is, upon which the Adaptor should seek to base an 
intervention in company affairs, is the “best current snapshot”, not of the current 
company performance in and of the moment, i.e., y(t), but of the current, momentarily 
arrested, ever-evolving structure, α(T;∞), of how the company is currently functioning, 
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subject to a most judicious balance between learning about future such structural 
essences and forgetting about those past. 
To make an “intervention” in the terms of control engineering, however, requires a knowledge of the 
Adaptor’s “wants”, which obliges us, unfortunately, to grapple with the conceptually elusive systemic 
property of resilience in more specific, technical terms — to culminate thus in Section 3.3.4, after what 
comes next. 
3.3.3 PLURAL WAYS OF ECONOMIZING—WHAT THE ADAPTOR BRINGS TO INSTITUTIONAL 
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS (IEE) 
Fifty percent of what could be involved in strategies of actuarial decision making is missing from the block 
diagrams of Figures 3.1 and 3.2. To appreciate this rather shocking acknowledgement, bear down on the 
comparator junction in either figure. It is the circle containing the summation symbol Σ, into which flows 
the signal on company performance (y) and the signal specifying the company’s “wants” for that 
performance, i.e., yw. Now reflect on how this latter (generally taken for granted by the control engineering 
draftsperson, as specified by someone else!) seems to be parachuted into the affairs of the company from 
somewhere off-stage, off-diagram. This, of course, is not the case. For it is entirely feasible, in principle, 
that those decision-influencers conceptually lodged inside the reserving control (K) block of Figure 3.2, or 
inside the premium-setting control (K) block of Figure 3.1, could decide about not only what should be 
done to change the y — the fifty percent we have supposed they do indeed do — but also what should be 
done to change the other half, the company’s wants yw. What may emanate from these K blocks in one 
direction, back into the company’s operating mechanisms (the S block), may be accompanied, in principle, 
by an arrow feeding back to the something “off-stage”, which something may change the yw desires of the 
company. 
The foregoing can be drawn in the setting of Figure 3.1 for each of the Basic 4 decision strategies. But 
again, consideration of what is to be done in respect of the Adaptor must be reasoned about in the more 
complex frame of Figure 3.2. All five rationalities taken together, nevertheless, allow us to reason first 
about the similarities and differences among the five plurally rational ways of economizing expressed in 
Thompson (2010). “We Are Plurally Rational and Inherently Relational”, as Section 1 proclaims. And this 
gives us the Institutional parent of IEE, to which we shall return (very shortly). But it is the dimension of 
time and Evolutionary Economics, especially as expressed in Arthur (2009), that gives us the more complete 
form and scope of IEE. 
The “Evolutionary” About It All 
To begin to appreciate this, we must conceive of four co-evolving systems, written in parentheses {⋅} as 
{“Mobilizable” Resources}, {Technology}, {Economy}, and {Human Needs-Wants}. The {“Mobilizable” 
Resources} in conjunction with the {Technology} constitute jointly our common-language “means”; 
whereas the {Human Needs-Wants} constitute our everyday “ends”. Thus, the {Economy} can be taken to 
be, in essence, about the challenge of reconciling “ends” with “means”, hence the plural ways of 
economizing. 
Each system merits a minimum of further qualification: 
{“Mobilizable” Resources} amount to natural capital, social capital, intellectual capital, 
financial capital, and so on. 
{Technology} includes “all the myriad devices and methods and all the purposed systems 
we call technologies” (Arthur, 2009; pp 192-3). It entails much more than widgets, 
machines, mills, locomotives, and the like (again in Arthur’s words): “markets and pricing 
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systems”; “trading arrangements, distribution systems, organizations, and businesses”; 
and “financial systems, banks, regulatory systems, and legal systems ... the New York 
Stock Exchange”. Significantly, for our purposes here, we may treat company decision 
strategy as an element of the ever-evolving {Technology}. “All these”, Arthur continues, 
“are arrangements by which we fulfill our needs, all are means to fulfill human purposes” 
— all are “purposed systems” (emphasis added). 
{Economy}, or the ways of economizing, is the focus around which, as we say, means and 
ends are reconciled. 
{Human Needs-Wants} are those abstract notational wants yw parachuted into our block 
diagrams of Figures 3.1 and 3.2. According to Thompson (2010), they derive from the 
utopia to which we hold fast, on the never-ending journey to what should be the 
eventual condition of the world. Crudely and instrumentally put, currently prevailing 
wants — as in the subscript lower-case “w” of the yw(T) for company performance in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 — are derived from the upper-case subscript “W” of the yW(∞) of the 
utopian vision. 
The very long, quasi-evolutionary, time-scale of ∞, having to do with our utopia, which do influence what 
we want in the prevailing season of risk (T), come down to influence the actuarial decision making of the 
here and now in immediate present of time-scale t. 
We must also tag each system, therefore, with a characteristic time-scale (or two, or three) over which 
significant change may take place: 
{“Mobilizable” Resources} vary typically over the short (t) and long (T) terms as the 
resources at our disposal are being mobilized in the day-to-day production of goods and 
services. 
{Technology} varies according to t, as in the everyday, operational decision making of the 
Basic 4 rationalities; it varies according to T, as in a season of risk, which characteristically 
marks out the pace of decision making for the Adaptor, hence RA; and it varies according 
to the quasi-evolutionary ∞, of invention, innovation, and Kondratieff waves of those 
innovations and inventions over the decades (Appendix B). 
{Economy}, when thought of in the context of its structure, typically varies significantly 
over the scale of business cycles (T) and waves of innovation and social change (∞). 
Certainly, Arthur’s subtitle to his book, the “What It Is” of technology, is striking at 
understanding the economic structural change — our α(T) — that co-evolves with the 
accompanying “How It Evolves” of technology. 
{Human Needs-Wants} certainly vary on the time scale of our seasons of risk (T). For 
what, after all, does the Adaptor do under RA in ERM? S/he swaps out one Basic 4 auto-
pilot with its liking of the way company performance should be and installs a different 
auto-pilot with its quite different respective, ever-inseparable, and distinctive wants for 
company performance. 
The four systems co-evolve with one another, each with their respective structural changes (α(T)), which 
logically gives us something of the chicken-and-egg problem. But let us start with the “means” side of an 
economy, with the behavior of each system duly tagged by a time scale(s): 
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{“Mobilizable” Resources (t,T)} co-evolve with {Technology (t,T,∞)}, which co-evolves 
with {Economy (T,∞)}, and both changing technology and economy induce co-evolving 
{Human Needs-Wants (T,∞)}, which induce in their turn yet more structural change in 
the economy, technology, and the way resources are deemed “mobilizable”, and so on 
(and on). 
At the heart of this complex of complicated co-evolution, for Arthur (2009), is this: that technology is 
autopoietic; technology creates itself. 
In the complex we may also discern the essences of stability (t), resilience (T), and the quasi-evolutionary 
(∞). We may extract the simple ball-surface iconography: that the high-frequency dynamics of the ball (t) 
— somewhere symbolically “in there” in the complex — influence low-frequency co-evolving changes in a 
companion surface (T); or that, with scales shifted a notch, these latter low-frequency variations, as iconic 
balls (T), induce very-low frequency changes (∞) in yet another scale of their companion iconic surfaces. 
Or, going the other way, we may say that these very slow fluctuations (∞) give rise to changes in the 
patterns of behavior of the very fastest of iconic balls (t) — the “evolutionary about it all”. 
Massively complex indeed. But that is not the end of it. 
The “Institutional” in Much of This 
Returning to our close scrutiny of Figure 3.2, let us home in again on the comparator junction (symbolized 
by Σ) in the lower Strategy segment of the Figure. Two variables meet at this junction, conceptually one on 
either side of the balance between what the insurer is “getting” and what it is “wanting” of its operations. 
On the “get” side of the balance we have the y, behind which stands the concept of “means”, behind which 
in turn stand the “actuarial decision-making technology” and the “mobilizable insurer resources”. On the 
“want” side of the balance we have the yw, behind which stands the concept of “company wants”, 
conditioned upon the wider “human needs-wants”, which are themselves conditioned upon a utopia 
residing in the intellectual, if not spiritual world. Or, at least, we might say that if the “economy” — which 
reconciles means with ends or uses means to reach ends — inhabits “this concrete world”, then utopias are 
“not of this concrete world”. 
When expressed in the framework of control engineering, the plural ways of economizing of Thompson 
(2010) boil down to the essence of reconciling the y, the consequence of the means, and the yw, as the 
consequence of utopia: two variables; or, as Thompson describes them, two degrees of freedom. The four 
respective ways of economizing for each of the Basic 4 rationalities may be defined as follows: 
Pragmatists have no degrees of freedom. They are entirely unable to dislodge either the 
y or the yw from what it will turn out to be.32 
Managers have one degree of freedom. It is within their capacity to change what the 
company gets, y, but not what it wants yw. In other words, algebraically, they strive to 
achieve y(t) = yw as nearly as possible, and at all times t. 
 
 
32 This seemingly unappealing attribute of Pragmatists derives from the same original cultural theoretic logic the Pragmatists of the risk-coping 
realm share with what have been labelled the social anthropological (Durkheimian) solidarity of “fatalists”. Yet the very cross-disciplinary 
translation of PR from the realm of social anthropology to that of ERM, not to mention that of ecology, is revealing distinctly positive attributes 
of the Pragmatist’s outlook on the world (see, for example, Beck et al, 2020). 
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Conservators have but one degree of freedom too. In contrast to the Managers, however, 
they accept that the mobilizable resources are finite, very limited, scarce indeed, and 
philosophically not within their desire or capacity to change. Instead, they exercise their 
avowed capacity to reduce their wants yw over time (t), such that eventually these wants 
are brought below the fixed resources, hence y(t) ≥ yw(t), for all t ... and T and ∞. 
Maximisers have two degrees of freedom, to change both y and yw. However, according 
to the non-satiety requirement of Neoclassical Economics — that “people will always 
prefer a larger basket of goods to a small one” (Rayner, 2010) — they elect only ever to 
increase the company’s wants yw, never to reduce them.33 In the dry, abstract algebra of 
control engineering (and Figure 3.2), they are ever seeking to achieve y(t) = yw(T), with 
the yw ever growing. 
That much (enjoying the two degrees of freedom) the blueprint for the Adaptor rationality will share with 
the Maximiser, but no more. Separated and contrasted again with the Basic 4 rationalities, therefore, we 
have the following for the Adaptor’s way of economizing: 
Adaptors may exercise the capacity to alter the means (y) and the wants (yw), and indeed 
with the complete freedom to increase or decrease both. In particular, given the 
Adaptor’s logical alignment with the hermit rationality of Cultural Theory (Thompson et 
al, 1990; Thompson, 2008), it is not hard to align her/his way of economizing with the 
notion of renouncing (worldly) wants, hence subsisting most frugally on the barest 
minimum of resources. In other words, both the y and yw are brought down towards 
“zero” over time (t and T). 
There is a bigger social and economic picture in which the Adaptor’s way of economizing can helpfully be 
placed. The basic hypothesis of the idea of “social malleability”, upon which Cultural Theory (Thompson et 
al, 1990) is founded, is this — to quote now from Thompson (2010; p 133): 
that whether a person is able to manage his needs and his control over resources 
depends on the way in which he is caught up in the process of social life. Po Chu-I, for 
instance, was not able to prefer a smaller bundle of goods to a larger one until he had 
withdrawn from the sort of social involvements that went with his privileged yet 
demanding life as a mandarin — in his case, a regional governor. 
Po Chu-I, therefore, had earlier in his life had a career in pursuit of the Manager strategy, before 
renouncing (note the word!) worldly wants and retiring to a life, in effect, as a hermit. That said, Thompson 
proceeds to conclude as follows (Thompson, 2010; p 135): 
We should be careful not to demonize scarcity. ... But markets and hierarchies — the 
standard duo in institutional economics, and in much of political science theorizing — are 
only two out of the five forms of social solidarity: the five ways of economizing ... And it is 
important that the other three are not squeezed out of the picture ... So, it is not scarcity 
per se that we need to worry about; it is when the scarcity-based arguments and policy 
 
 
33 Both Rayner (2010) and Thompson (2010), upon which we are drawing here, are contributions to a collection of criticisms of the 
foundational concept of scarcity of resources conventionally associated with Neoclassical Economics. They appear in the book The Limits to 
Scarcity (Mehta, 2010). 
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decisions go uncontested — when the voices of the likes of Po Chu-I, Keynes and Blake 
are silenced — that the little red warning lights should start blinking. 
It is thus on the basis of these two extracts from the bigger picture that we now make a further crucial 
assertion about the Adaptor’s strategy of decision making, which again emphasizes what we have referred 
to as the strategy’s exceptionalism. But first, we must address this question: What should constitute the 
utopia of the Adaptor? Our provisional response, for the purposes of our preliminary blueprint of the 
Adaptor’s strategy is this, that: 
The Adaptor should renounce the gauging of wants in the domain of the company’s 
operational performance y and — taking very good note of the metaphor of a dashboard 
with blinking red warning lights — elaborate a utopia within the domain of our crucial 
control theoretic device of time-varying parameters α(T). 
This will be the culmination of our new results from this project, in Section 3.3.4, subject to one passing 
observation on how all of the above relates to the original motivation of the research of this final part of 
our project, in the IFoA report on “Economic Thought and Actuarial Practice” (Clacher, 2019). Consider 
therefore the following play on the words of that report’s title. 
Actuarial Decision Making and the Economic Thinking of IEE 
To reform and re-express IEE, now in this final segment of this project, we have drawn upon the 
Evolutionary Economics of Arthur (2009) and the Institutional Economics of Thompson (2010). Yet at the 
heart of the resulting compound of the four co-evolving systems ({“Mobilizable” Resources}, {Technology}, 
{Economy}, {Human Needs-Wants}) and the five ways of economizing, stands the focal element of actuarial 
decision making and its variability over time. What is more, we are asserting that the strategies of such 
decision making vary over each of the overlapping measures of the short, the long, and the quasi-
evolutionary scales of time: of respectively t, T, and ∞. 
The IFoA Clacher Report, as a frame of reference, is gathered around a small sample of interviews with 
actuarial professionals and economists. It addresses inter alia four themes of special relevance to our 
present project. First, there is economic pluralism. Second, there are the challenges flowing from the 
“mathematizing” of a subject, notably that of financial economics. A third key theme is that of the 
distinction between happenings and behavior in the short and the long term, i.e., time and system 
dynamics — in effect, our distinction herein between micro time t and macro time T. Fourth, there is the 
continuing significance of the distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
We respond to just the first three of Clacher’s four themes, with two quotes from the Report. The first is 
this (Clacher, 2019; p 8, with emphasis added): 
The core message from this paper, and the most important result of the work, is that 
economic plurality is the defining characteristic of well-applied economic understanding. 
Economic theory is simply that – theory. It is a way of viewing the world, and so to use 
only one lens for all economic problems or the same economic problem can, through 
time, have unintended consequences. A broadening out of the way in which the 
profession uses economics is therefore needed. 
The pluralism to which Clacher is referring here is, we (strongly) suspect, not the same as that in the 
fivefold rationalities of our theory of Plural Rationality, whose logical organization is quite specific. 
Second, although enfolded into other matters of significance, the importance of the split in temporal 
outlooks — short contra long — is expressed most clearly as follows (also on page 8 of the Clacher Report): 
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[F]inancial economics was useful and remains so in several contexts. However, over-
reliance on markets and mathematically tractable models may be making long-term 
institutions short-term in their outlook, giving a false sense of security to firms and to 
regulators and skewing long-term investment in the real economy. 
For our purposes — of considering variability in decision strategy as a function of time — we have equated 
the dichotomy with that between behavior in the short term and behavior over the long term. It is as that 
between relatively fast changes in micro time (t) and relatively slow changes over macro time (T), if not the 
very (very) slow of the quasi-evolutionary time (∞), of business cycle after business cycle (and so on). The 
dichotomy is also as that between the systemic dynamic property of stability (t) and the systemic property 
of resilience (T,∞). It is as that (in terms of plural rationality) between temporal fluctuations within a 
season of risk (t) and change marked by the transitions from one season to another (T). Which last is 
indeed the very thing that calls for Rational Adaptation in ERM. 
The exceptionalism of the Adaptor (as yet integral to IEE nonetheless) is apparent in that this fifth 
rationality has no favored season of risk. For the Adaptor the seasons come and go. Navigating with aplomb 
through all of them — insurance-business cycle after insurance-business cycle and into the distant future 
— is what counts. And that navigation must be alert to the Adaptor somehow not being caught up in the 
playing out of the social-power dynamics among the Basic 4 rationalities within the company, which may 
occasion “erroneous” flips among the four risk-coping strategies, even within a given season of risk. 
So, what exactly is this elusive thing called resilience, that Myth of Nature to which the Adaptor holds; and 
how might we acquire more of it in company operations — if an insurer deems it desirable — day-in day-
out, year-in, year-out, and ever onwards into the longer-term future? 
3.3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL AND DESIGN DECISIONS FOR ENHANCING COMPANY RESILIENCE 
A quarter of a century on from his seminal 1973 paper on stability and resilience, Holling co-authored a 
paper on “Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and Scale” (Peterson et al, 1998). One of the paper’s section 
headings is salient: “Models of Ecological Organization” (Peterson et al, 1998; p 7, with emphasis added). 
The paper develops and proposes a synthesis of the four key earlier models — Darwin/Macarthur; 
idiosyncratic; drivers and passengers; and rivet34 — from which these further insights are then drawn 
(Peterson et al, 1998; pp 16 and 13, respectively): 
[E]cological resilience is generated by diverse, but overlapping, function within a scale 
and by apparently redundant species that operate at different scales, thereby reinforcing 
function across scales. 
The combination of a diversity of ecological function at specific scales and the replication 
of function across a diversity of scales produces resilient ecological function. 
Our interest (and that of our Adaptor A-type) is in the organization of an insurer, for which we need to 
introduce two tentative, but crucial, cross-disciplinary conceptual equivalences. Think, therefore, of the 
insurance company as an ecosystem; think too of the upholder of a given risk-coping rationality in the 
company as a biological species. And, to continue, let us equate the mission-critical “function” of the 
 
 
34 This rivet model is cited by Martin and Sunley (2015) in their rather comprehensive work on resilience in regional economic systems, in 
particular the “bounce forward” aspect thereof, as opposed to mere “bounce back”. The former roughly equates with that of greatest interest 
here, namely ecological resilience, as opposed to the engineering resilience of the latter (see Holling, 1996). 
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system in the foregoing quote from Peterson et al (1998) with the risk-coping tasks discharged by the 
ensemble of all the company’s decision-influencers. 
In the Social World: Requisite Variety and Duplication of Rationalities and Roles 
First, therefore, the enduring viability of each of the Basic 4 rationalities may be deemed indispensable to 
resilience (of the ecological variety) in the company’s behavior. The loss of viability of any one of them, or 
extinction of any one of them — because the unfolding of the company’s social-power dynamics causes the 
membership of any one rationality (grouping, solidarity) to decline towards zero at any time (t) — would 
therefore undermine resilience in the company’s performance (over T and ∞). An imagined four-light 
dashboard panel upon which the Adaptor gazes — from within her/his Rational Adaptability block in the 
Adaptation segment of Figure 3.2 — should show none of those “blinking red warning lights” of Thompson 
(2010), only steady greens (or steady, not blinking, oranges). In which case, we conjecture, the time-varying 
parameters α(T) in the domain of the Adaptor’s utopia could be the colors of the four dashboard lights, 
with the pursuit of all-green being the Adaptor’s “want”; and with her/his interventions then prompted by 
any non-green status of any one (or more) of the lights.35 
Second, more subtly if not more completely — yet palpably and quite deliberately apparent in practice (as 
we shall soon see) — each employee can be said to exhibit a personality with a specific role, a specific 
mission-critical function, that is, which they discharge for the company as a whole (ecosystem like). A more 
refined warning-light system may be conceived. The argument supporting this proposition runs as follows. 
Our four seasons of risk in ERM map one-to-one across to the four isomorphic phases in the development 
and renewal of an ecosystem, according, that is, to Holling’s so-called adaptive eco-cycle (Holling, 1986; see 
also Thompson, 2008). A corresponding “adaptive social system” can be mapped onto the eco-cycle (Fath 
et al, 2015); and 12 personality types, each with their personality-specific roles and functions, can be 
plotted as tailored to contributing to the social resilience of the system at various points in time around the 
four phases of the cycle (Katzmair, 2019). Indeed, some types are especially well suited to enabling the 
system to escape various “social traps” coincident with what we would describe as the transitions between 
seasons of risk. The 12 personality types may therefore be distributed logically among the Basic 4 
rationalities, such that a 2-D array of warning lights can be imagined on the Adaptor’s dashboard. And 
again, we may invoke the green-orange-red color scheme (with flashing options) for numbers of employees 
occupying each rationality-type slot.  
To give practical effect to such a scheme, there is a spin-off company in Vienna called FASresearch 
(https://www.fas-research.com/about-us). It has been engaged in building and enhancing resilience in the 
affairs and performance of an innovation ecosystem on the site of the former Tabakfabrik in Linz, Austria. 
At any point in time, the challenge to be met is this. Is the “inventory” of employment niches in all the 
constituent businesses of the entire ecosystem replete with the requisite spectrum of personality types 
(hence rationalities) for serving the goal of resilience? If not — because some of the niches are no longer 
occupied by the requisite personality type (they have gone extinct) — then someone (in a notional human 
resources department for the entire ecosystem) needs to act: to recruit prospective employees with the 
right personality traits to fill the empty slots. That “someone” should, of course, be the archetypal Adaptor 
 
 
35 This merits two qualifications. First, intuitively (even for actual practice), the color of any light might be geared to the respective numbers of 
insurer employees adhering at any given time to each of the Basic 4 rationalities. In which case, in control engineering terms, the four numbers 
could be said to be something like the four state variables of the company’s social world, as the social-power dynamics among them play out, 
with indeed, more than one rationality member fulfilling the desirability of the “duplication” and beneficial “redundancy” of agents discharging 
system-wide mission-critical functions. Second, none of the rationalities simulated in the Surprise Game technically become extinct, i.e., with 
zero membership, at any time (Ingram et al, 2012). 
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of the fifth rationality. In practice, in the Tabakfabrik ecosystem, the founder of FASresearch, Harald 
Katzmair, approximates such a type (something he wisely neither confirms nor denies!). 
In the Material World: Requisite Variety and Duplication of Systemic Dynamic Properties 
There is an important word — it is “scale” — in the definition of resilience of Peterson et al (1998) quoted 
above. We now attempt to benefit from this attribute, although not so much in the sense of the volume of 
an economy or the scope of a financial asset. Rather, we focus on scale as manifest in time, including our 
trio of three scales t, T, and ∞. To do so, we begin by citing the mouse and moose (whose alliteration, one 
suspects, did not escape the notice of Peterson and colleagues). Both species of animal discharge at least 
two mission-critical functions for the well-being of a wetland eco-system: seed dispersal and nutrient 
renewal-redistribution, both realized through their respective metabolisms. But of course, the dynamics of 
one of them (the mouse) are a matter figuratively of a fast, high-frequency, frenetic buzz; whereas the 
dynamic behavior of the other is a slow, ponderous, low-frequency rumbling. 
The mouse and the moose are present and thriving in the wetland ecosystem as a result of complex co-
evolution unfolding over the eons according to no particular pre-ordained plan. In contrast, a portfolio 
(ecosystem) of company assets (species) may be designed, assembled, and operated at the will of the 
company. In matters of a system’s dynamics, control is the branch of engineering that takes these 
dynamics as they are and re-engineers them, through the device of a controller, so that they are more to 
our liking. Control engineering, to recall, delivers the smoothness and comfort we all appreciate in the flight 
of the modern passenger plane. But the “our” is emphasized because PR allows for five distinctive “ours” 
and five distinctive sets of company wants. According to PR and IEE, therefore, there can be five ways of 
designing, assembling, and (season-in, season-out) operating the company’s portfolio, to serve one or 
more of the company’s mission-critical tasks. This includes therefore the uncomfortable prospect of, say, a 
Maximizer design of portfolio having subsequently to be operated by a Pragmatist, as the seasons of risk 
turn. 
How might the design and assembly of an initial portfolio of company investments be guided in order to 
serve long-term company resilience, prior to its operation? If we were to follow Peterson et al (1998), we 
should need to achieve pretty much what the above definitive quote says, but with ecosystem replaced by 
portfolio and species by financial assets. What precisely might then be the portfolio’s mission-critical 
function(s) for the company — for the long term as much as the seasonal and the short term — we shall 
leave undefined, but trust that a book such as Silver’s (2017) Finance, Society and Sustainability would 
assist in its eventual elaboration. In this culmination of our blueprint for the Adaptor strategy in ERM we 
offer just the very beginnings of some possible considerations for the design and operational delivery of 
resilience in an investment portfolio. 
Noting thus the markedly differing dynamic attributes of the mouse’s and the moose’s responses to the 
disturbances and opportunities (d) impinging upon them in their wetland ecosystem, we shall offer just the 
brevity of the following with regard to the selection of assets and the assembly of the portfolio. Whatever 
ends up as the wants, yw(T) for the actual, eventual performance of the portfolio of assets over all time, 
y(t;T;∞), each constituent asset in the portfolio should ideally have its own respective and distinctive set of 
intrinsic, systemic, dynamic attributes. They are its “systemic dynamic” parameters α. In the vocabulary of 
control engineering, they are called time constant, damping factor, natural frequency, dead-time, and so 
on. The dynamics of a mouse of an asset, for instance, might be parameterized, in effect, as having no dead 
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time, a small (very fast) time constant, a low damping factor, and a high natural frequency.36 And the whole 
point in delivering long-term resilience in portfolio performance according to the definition of Peterson et 
al (1998), is that the constituent dynamics of each separate asset should be parameterized (in these terms) 
so as to cover features such as diversity, duplication, and redundancy of portfolio functions within and 
across scales of asset, not least in respect of their characteristic dynamic properties. 
Conspicuous by its absence from this design of the portfolio is our core idea of these systemic dynamic 
parameters being capable of exhibiting variation over time — of being not only “systemic dynamic” 
parameters but also “time-varying” parameters, i.e., some more of the α(T) (hence the difficulties here in 
minimizing confusion in our wording). After all, it was for one such parameter, a time-varying damping 
factor, for which Diks et al (2015) and Rye and Jackson (2016) were searching in their analysis of long-term 
national GDP time-series. 
But this re-introduction of α(T) also marks the distinction between the prior design of the portfolio and its 
subsequent operation, through company decision strategy: first, not least according to some proposed 
model of variability in actuarial decision making; second, specifically in the pursuit of resilience over the 
longer-term, through reserving decisions in the controller (K) block of Figure 3.2; which decisions, third, 
might be guided (in part) by diagnostic evidence about these time-varying, systemic dynamic parameters 
α(T) of each constituent asset (of the mouse-like, the moose-like, and so on); and, fourth, which evidence, 
once more, ought to fall within the province of diagnosis by the Adaptor, for example along the lines of the 
foregoing proposition of something akin to a “best current snapshot” of the structure of an asset’s dynamic 
behavior. 
Last, if the mouse and the moose have evolved in the absence of any plan of Nature, to participate thus in a 
co-evolved wetland ecosystem (our understanding of which we seek here to benefit from), so too has the 
endotherm species of warm-blooded creatures (ourselves included). In drawing the distinction between 
the (superior) ecological and (inferior) engineering kinds of resilience, Holling (1996) has pointed out how 
endotherms operate at body temperatures perilously close to lethal maxima. And they do so by virtue of 
the soft duplicative redundancy in the endotherm body’s multiple (five) ways of discharging the creature’s 
mission-critical function of cooling. The qualification of “soft” here signals the fact that (for Holling) none of 
the five biological mechanisms discharge their task in a notably efficient technocratic-like or economic 
manner.37 
Could there be something to be learned from this, for the purposes of actuarial decision making? Consider, 
for example, our point of departure into control and systems thinking, Figure 3.1. Home in one last time on 
the comparator junction (Σ). Imagine now not one but four arrows emanating from the junction, each 
feeding into its respective parallel controller (K) block, with then the four constituents of the decisions (u) 
emerging from their four respective controller blocks and being applied back to the input side of the 
insurer’s (S) block operations. Fine for an endotherm, we might say, but not for Plural Rationality and 
Rational Adaptation in ERM in an insurer: because PR is about just the single correct feedback controller for 
the single correctly diagnosed season of risk. But then Holling (1996) does not tell us whether all five 
 
 
36 The dynamics of the climate system, we can say, have a very slow and very long time constant, if not quite a long dead time before their 
consequences are palpable. It was the dead time in claims processing that required the introduction of feedback control for the stabilization of 
an insurer’s financial performance in Balzer and Benjamin (1980). 
37 For completeness, two things should be noted in passing. First, Holling (1996) observes how the “tightest” of internal operational control “at 
the edge of chaos” (his words) enabled the endotherms to acquire an evolutionary advantage in exploring their external worlds for 
opportunity. Second, and perhaps exceptionally so, he writes in admiring terms of the astounding operational feats of modern military aircraft, 
whose designs are inherently unstable, yet the control (re-)engineering of which bestows a previously unrevealed possibility space of 
aerodynamic behavior — once off the ground and in the air. 
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cooling mechanisms in the endotherm’s body are always operative in parallel in all seasons. And the 
empirical evidence from ERM in practice — in the results of Section 2 of this report, as well as over the 
turns of the insurance cycle of Underwood and Ingram (2013) — reveals that something from two or more 
of the Basic 4 rationalities is evident in hybrid forms of actuarial decision making. 
An Altogether Different Genre of Assets? 
The thing about the constituent assets in which insurers can currently invest is that the range of systemic 
dynamic parameters (α) their behavior over time covers is not conducive to the attaining of resilience in 
financial performance over the long term. This, we note, is abundantly clear in Silver (2017), albeit 
expressed in quite different terms. A relevant question, therefore, is whether this might ever change. In 
composing (again) but a modest response to this question, we hesitate to observe anything about “living in 
unprecedented times”, since each generation no doubt holds this to be so. And yet, there is climate 
change; and now we are reminded of pandemics. 
In 1998, therefore, Thompson and Rayner (1998) gave us much of the definition of the “institutional” 
parent of the Institutional Evolutionary Economics (IEE) of Section 1 above in the monumental four-volume 
Human Choice & Climate Change (Rayner and Malone, 1998). A decade later, Arthur (2009) gave this 
closing part of our report, in particular, the temporal dimension of IEE as inherited from its second parent 
of Evolutionary Economics. Yet in Arthur’s Nature of Technology any reference to the Nature of the 
environment and climate was confined to the very beginning and very ending pages of the book.  
Between the two ends of Arthur’s book, we would like (in due course) to place the following three recent 
developments, each of which on its own might contribute to the emergence of a new genre of investment 
asset, with, in particular, some novel systemic dynamic parameters (α) enabling overall a more resilient 
operational performance of an insurer’s portfolio. This threesome has the following form: 
The principles of Investing for Resilience, as enunciated in a Cambridge Institute for 
Sustainability Leadership (CISL) report under its Climate Wise (Insuring a Sustainable 
Future) program, authored by IFoA’s current (2021) President Louise Pryor (CISL, 2016). 
The object of the investing to which the report refers is urban infrastructure. 
The notion of “Cities as Forces for Good in the Environment” (CFG), including climate 
repair and mindful of a significantly elaborated version of the (perhaps already forgotten) 
principles of the Triple Bottom Line (Beck, 2011; Beck et al, 2013; Thompson and Beck, 
2014; and Villarroel Walker et al, 2014, 2017). 
Incorporation of the institutional embeddedness of Plural Rationality (and IEE) into the 
co-evolving technology and economy of Arthur’s (2009) arguments.38 
  
 
 
38 As a result of this present project, we now see the proceedings of a 2019 Workshop on “How Engineers Think” — in an institutionally 
embedded manner — as underpinning such a future development. The Workshop, notably, was co-sponsored by the Institute for Science, 
Innovation and Society (InSIS) at Oxford University and the U.K. Collaboratorium in Research on Infrastructure and Cities (UKRIC). 
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Appendix A: Plural Rationalities and ERM39 
Corporations and the people who run them have their own views of risk and risk management. These 
perspectives have formed over time, in response to personal and firm experiences, by current risk-taking 
capacity, by the changing business environment, and through being influenced by watching various 
strategies succeed or fail. Studies show that risk perspectives fall into four broad groups with almost wholly 
incompatible views—and only one of those four perspectives is totally compatible with the current 
paradigm of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). If proponents of ERM do not offer approaches that make 
sense for each of the four risk perspectives, ERM can and will fall out of management favor as it did in 
many firms during the boom heading up to the financial crisis of 2008-9. 
A.1 FOUR DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON RISK 
The four basic risk perspectives were first discovered in the practical experience of the insurance industry 
in the context of research that was not originally seeking to study risk attitudes. But clear patterns emerged 
in the data and have proved quite resilient over time. Most people tend to identify with one of the 
following perspectives: 
Maximizers. This perspective does not consider risk to be very important—profits are important. 
Businesses managed according to this perspective will accept large risks, so long as they are well 
compensated. Managers who hold this perspective believe that risk is mean reverting—gains will always 
follow losses—and the best companies will have larger gains and smaller losses over time. 
Conservators. According to this perspective, increasing profit is not as important as avoiding loss. Holders 
of this view often feel that the world is filled with many, many dangerous risks that they must be very 
careful to avoid. 
Managers. Careful balancing of risks and rewards is the heart of this perspective. Firms that hold this view 
employ experts to help them find risks offering the best rewards, while at the same time managing these 
risks to keep the firm safe. They believe that they can balance the concerns of the first two groups, plotting 
a very careful course between them. 
Pragmatists. This perspective is not based on a specific theory of risk. Pragmatists do not believe that the 
future is predictable—so, to the greatest extent possible, they avoid commitments and keep their options 
open. They do not think that strategic planning is especially valuable, but rather seek freedom to react to 
changing conditions. 
Each of the different perspectives leads to a strategy for dealing with risk. Firms led by Maximizers seek out 
risk, believing that no risk is inherently unacceptable—every risk presents an opportunity, and the trick is to 
negotiate appropriate compensation. Conservator firms shun risk of all sorts. Manager firms carefully 
manage and calibrate both the amount and type of risk. Pragmatist firms seek diversification but otherwise 
have no overarching strategy— they operate tactically, reacting to each new development. 
  
 
 
39 Adapted from Ingram, Underwood “The Full Spectrum of Risk Attitudes” The Actuary, August/September 2010 
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A.1.1 RESISTANCE TO THE CURRENT ERM PARADIGM IS INEVITABLE 
The ERM paradigm currently touted as the solution to all risk problems comes straight out of the Manager 
playbook. ERM helps firms with a Manager orientation to do a better job at what they were trying to do 
anyway. 
But, given the four fundamental risk perspectives (and various hybrids thereof), it is hardly surprising that 
adoption of ERM has been less than universal and often less than enthusiastic. No matter how reasonable 
ERM sounds to its Manager-oriented proponents, it does not align as well with other risk perspectives. In 
many cases, managers are only pretending that ERM is their new management program. 
For example, Maximizer firms see ERM as an unnecessary restriction. Why should a limited risk appetite be 
enforced, when any risk can be accepted for the proper price? That means turning away potential profit! If 
a Maximizer firm bows to outside demands for ERM—such as those imposed by a rating agency or 
regulator—this may be largely a charade, a sop to the unrealistic pessimists and worrywarts. 
For Conservator firms, ERM is a dangerous strategy because it encourages taking more risk. Establishing a 
risk appetite would only give permission to the cowboys in the ranks to expand risks to fill that risk budget. 
While such a firm may—with trepidation—adopt an ERM program, Conservator executives remain 
convinced that risk assessments can never be comprehensive enough; risk quantification cannot be trusted 
because the result is always too low. 
Pragmatic firms do not trust risk assessments either. But they are not sure whether the existing 
assessments are too optimistic or too pessimistic. Adherents of the Pragmatist perspective think that ERM 
takes too constant a view of an ever-changing world. In their minds, ERM means letting a model run the 
company. And a fixed set of rules and metrics hampers their ability to react to changing circumstances. 
In a world of multiple risk perspectives, a Manager-only approach to ERM is as self-limiting as an auto 
manufacturer that offers “any color you want, as long as it’s black.” 
A.2 ERM NEEDS A BIGGER TENT 
The truth is, risk management in one form or another has been practiced since the dawn of time—by 
adherents of all of the four basic risk perspectives. And it would be difficult to argue that adding an 
enterprise-wide view to any risk management strategy is not beneficial. A broader and more flexible 
definition of ERM would bring more managers and more firms “into the tent,” enabling the benefits of an 
enterprise-wide view of risk to be realized more broadly. 
Careful examination of risk management practices in a large number of financial and non-financial firms 
reveals that there are four different strategies that fall under the general heading of risk management: 
Loss Controlling. This is the most traditional form of risk management; indeed, it pre-dates ERM. It seeks to 
identify and mitigate the firm’s most significant risks. Commonly practiced by nonfinancial firms, Loss 
Controlling also applies to financial risk; examples include the careful underwriting of loans or insurance 
policies, as well as the practice of claims management. Risk management of this sort is not new—but the 
inclusion of an aggregate, firm-wide view of risk is a relatively new development that could be termed Loss 
Controlling ERM. This type of ERM is favored by Conservator firms. 
Risk Trading. A newer form of risk management, this approach arose from bank trading desks and the 
insurance industry. Risk Trading focuses on getting the price of risk correct— which leads to sometimes 
complicated models of risk, reward and economic capital. While a Risk Trading strategy can be applied on a 
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transaction-by-transaction or other “siloed” basis, establishment of a consistent risk valuation on a firm-
wide level is Risk Trading ERM. This type of ERM is favored by Maximizer firms. 
Risk Steering. Under this strategy, the ideas of Risk Trading are applied at a macro level to the major 
strategic decisions of the firm. Here, rather than focusing on the proper price of risk, the question becomes 
one of how much risk the firm should take—and how to steer the firm in that ideal direction. By its very 
nature, this is an enterprise-wide approach. Perhaps this is why some seem to think that only Risk Steering 
ERM is “real” ERM. Risk Steering ERM is highly favored by academics and consultants; Manager firms find it 
appealing, but firms that hold any of the other three strategies do not. 
Diversification. Spreading risk exposures among a variety of different classes of risks, and avoiding large risk 
concentrations, is another traditional form of risk management that pre-dates contemporary ERM. Formal 
diversification programs will have targets for the spread of risk with maximums and minimums for various 
classes of risks. The newer ERM discipline adds the idea of interdependencies across classes, providing 
better quantification of the benefits of risk spreading. Pragmatists tend to favor diversification because it 
maximizes their tactical flexibility, but they avoid reliance on any particular risk mitigation process and 
often mistrust quantitative measurement of diversification benefits. 
We believe that limiting the field of ERM to Risk Steering ERM alone would be a serious error. Such a 
restrictive definition of ERM would alienate firms and practitioners holding any of the other three risk 
perspectives40. Moreover, such a limited view is inherently incomplete, for reasons that the Pragmatists 
know all too well. 
Simply put, the world does not stand still. 
A.3 CHANGING RISK ENVIRONMENTS 
Why do different people prefer different colors? That’s a difficult question, influenced no doubt by 
personality, individual differences in color perception, and early experiences and associations. The 
existence of the four different risk perspectives may be easier to explain—and clearly a key factor is that, 
over time, the risk environment changes. 
A simplistic model of changes in the risk environment might posit that either things are “normal” or they 
are “broken.” But people do not necessarily agree about what is “normal.” An observer viewing the world 
through the lens of Conservation might say that extreme hazard and danger are the “normal” state of 
affairs—while a Maximizer, finding this view timid and overly pessimistic, might argue that profitability is 
“normal” and hazardous conditions prevail only when the market is “broken.” 
Expanding the model to allow more than two states allows for the possibility that both the Conservation 
view and the Maximizer view can make sense. Consider a world with four risk regimes: 
1. Boom. Risk is low and profits are going up. 
2. Bust. Risk is high and profits are going down. 
 
 
40 We found that only 17% of insurance industry managers held a pure Manager point of view, while another 45% hold a hybrid view of 
Manager with one of the other three risk attitudes who may or may not agree with the ERM approach to risk. That leaves 38% without any 
belief in the Manager paradigm.  Ingram, Thompson, Underwood  All on the Same Train, Intelligent Risk (2014). 
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3. Uncertain. Risk is very unpredictable; profits might go up or down. 
4. Moderate. Both risk and profit fall within a predictable range. 
Such a model seems to be a reasonable description of economic cycles—whether in the banking world, the 
insurance sector or the broader economy. As the cycle moves through these four different states, external 
conditions match the worldview of each of the four different risk perspectives. Each perspective has been 
correct part of the time—and will be again, at some point in the future. But none of the risk perspectives is 
perfectly adapted to external conditions all of the time. 
Purists with the Manager point of view may object that their view takes into account the full range of the 
cycle. But economic cycles are not sine curves; the period and amplitude are irregular, unexpected “black 
swan” events do occur, and there are always “unknown unknowns.” Model risk can never be eliminated, 
and restricting ERM to a Manager-only view obscures this important fact. Moreover, nothing says that Bust 
must follow Boom or that Moderate must follow Uncertain. 
A Risk Steering ERM program works especially well in the Moderate risk environment when risks are fairly 
predictable. But in a Boom environment, firms following such a program will unduly restrict their 
business—not as much as Conservator firms, but certainly more than Maximizer firms—and more 
aggressive competitors will be much more successful. In the Bust environment, a Risk Steering ERM 
program again advocates a middle path; this may mean the firm sustains too much damage to be 
positioned to take full advantage of the market when it turns. When times are Uncertain, a firm following a 
Risk Steering ERM program will be frustrated by frequent surprises and a world that does not quite fit the 
model. Competitors not tied to a particular view of risk will fare better, making decisions in the moment 
with maximum flexibility. 
Why then do corporations adhere to a particular risk perspective? The firm may have been formed during 
an environment aligned with their perspective. Alternatively, the company may have suffered traumatic 
damage during a period of dissonance between an old perspective and the risk environment and then 
made a shift, perhaps under the direction of new leadership. The firm may have been wildly successful at 
some point in the past, and now clings stubbornly to the strategy that worked for them then. Corporate 
culture tends to be self-perpetuating: individuals are drawn to employers with a perspective that makes 
sense to them—and those in a position to make hiring decisions typically prefer to hire staff whose views 
mesh with their own. 
In any given risk environment, companies holding a risk perspective and following an ERM program aligned 
with external circumstances will fare best. (See Table 1) 
Yet in each risk regime, there are companies following strategies that are not well aligned with the 
environment. Some of these firms muddle along with indifferent results according to their own stance on 
what constitutes success and survive until their preferred environment comes back. Others sustain enough 
damage that they do not survive; some change their risk perspective and ERM program to take advantage 
of the new environment. Meanwhile, new firms enter the market with risk perspectives and ERM programs 
that are aligned with the current environment. 
Since many of the poorly aligned firms shrink, die out or change perspective— and since new firms tend to 
be well-aligned with the current risk regime—the market as a whole adjusts to greater alignment with the 
risk environment via a process of “natural selection.” 
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Table A.2 
RATIONAL ADAPTABILITY: ALIGNMENT OF ATTITUDE, ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGY 
Risk Attitude Maximizer Conservator Pragmatist Manager 
Risk Environment Boom Bust Uncertain Moderate 
Risk Management 
Strategy 
Risk  
Trading 
Loss 
Controlling 
Diversification Risk 
Steering 
So far, four attitudes, Environments and Strategies have been identified. There is a fifth that is based upon 
the risk attitude of being aware of and open to all four of the basic four risk attitudes and all four of the 
possible risk environments. The risk management strategy of this fifth risk attitude is called Rational 
Adaptability. This involves three key steps: 
1. Discernment of changes in risk regime, 
2. Willingness to shift risk perspective, and 
3. Ability to modify ERM program. 
The difference between Rational Adaptability and the process of “natural selection” described above is 
conscious recognition of the validity of differing risk perspectives and proactive implementation of changes 
in strategy. 
This risk perspective is called Adaptor. 
Individuals often find it difficult to change their risk perspective. Therefore, a company that wishes to adopt 
a Rational Adaptability strategy must ensure that its key decision-makers represent a diversity of risk 
perspectives. Furthermore, the corporate culture and the managers themselves must value each of the risk 
perspectives for its contributions to the firm’s continued success. 
An insurance company is best served by drawing on the respective expertise of underwriters, actuaries, 
accountants, contract attorneys and claims experts—and members of one discipline should not feel 
slighted when the expertise of another discipline is called upon. Similarly, any firm that wishes to optimize 
its success under each of the various risk regimes should have Maximizers, Conservators, Managers and 
Pragmatists among its senior management; and those who hold any one of these risk perspectives should 
acknowledge that there are times when an-other perspective should take the lead. The CEO must exercise 
judgment and restraint, shifting among strategies as needed and shifting responsibilities among the 
management team as required.  
Rational Adaptability recognizes that during Boom Times, risk really does present significant 
opportunities—and it is appropriate to empower the Maximizers, focusing ERM efforts on Risk Trading to 
ensure that risks are correctly priced using a consistent firm-wide metric. When the environment is 
Moderate, the firm employing Rational Adaptability will give additional authority to its Risk Reward 
Managers, examining the results of their modeling and using these to reevaluate long-term strategies. And 
in times of Recession, a firm following Rational Adaptability shifts its focus to Conservation: tightening 
underwriting standards and placing special emphasis on firm-wide risk identification and risk control. 
Resisting the pull of his or her own personal risk perspective, the CEO must be willing to listen—and act—
when others in the firm warn that the company’s risk management approach is getting a little too focused 
upon just one strategy.  
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Appendix B: Four Rhyming Cases: Tulipmania, The South Sea Bubble, 1929 
and 2007/8 
Here we turn from the vindication of Kondratieff and his much-maligned cycles to four examples of those 
cycles. These range from brief accounts of Tulipmania and of the South Sea Bubble, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries respectively, to more detailed discussions of the two most recent upturns: one 
culminating in the 1929 Crash, the other in the 2007/8 Credit Crunch-cum-Global Financial Crisis. Together, 
these two historic “classics” and the two recent ones that are still almost within living memory span nearly 
four hundred years. As we will see, they demonstrate similar structural characteristics – characteristics that 
are in conformity with Kondratieff’s hypothesis – along with recurring similarities in deviant practices, with 
the definitions of deviance themselves altering in the way we have predicted. Though the methods and 
instruments used display a remarkable consistency, they have over time developed in terms of both 
sophistication and scope. Not so much full circle, you might say, as full spiral. 
B.1 TULIPMANIA 
Tulips had been introduced to northern Europe in the mid-1500s from the Middle East and southern 
Europe. By the late 1570s they were fashionable at courts and among the aristocrats of France, Germany 
and England. By the end of the century a taste for them had spread to the richer middle classes of Vienna 
and Holland, for whom they became a status symbol – a demonstration of their wealth and good taste. As 
prices rose, collections came to include ever more refined and rarefied specimens. These were graded and 
classified, and the prices of the rarer ones attracted substantial premiums. 
The early to mid-seventeenth century was Holland’s Golden Age (see Schama 1997). At the hub of a trading 
empire with colonies in Asia and America, she had a vast maritime fleet and dominated the lucrative East 
India trade. She also had a developed banking system that facilitated the creation of credit – though much 
credit was also supplied by vendors. The trade in tulips, therefore, could readily be fueled by a prosperous 
middle class with surplus funds accumulated from a rise in prosperity from 1622 and particularly during the 
first half of the 1630s. Holland was thus well set to exploit the rising demand for tulips, and its soil and 
climate were particularly conducive to producing them. As trade in tulips in the 1620s extended well 
beyond its borders, methods of harvesting, storing, packing, transporting and securing tulips had to be 
developed. A new industry and new specialisms emerged: expert tulip assessors appraised new mutations, 
insurances were arranged, and the banks undertook large investments in especially designed tulip vaults 
(Beckman 1990:15-16). The credit they offered became integral to the new industry and to Holland’s 
economy, which became dependent on the trade in tulips. Investments, we can say in retrospect, were 
being fed, in excess, into just one asset class – tulips – in much the same way that they were piled into 
domestic property in the years leading up to 2007/8 (see Figure 2.2). 
Speculation mounted in the early 1630s. At Tulipmania’s peak, prized bulbs were selling for over 4,500 
florins and the average price of a single bulb exceeded the annual income of a skilled worker.  
Four fat oxen could be bought for 480 florins while the price paid for the rarest bulb of 
all, one of only two specimens was 4600 florins, a new carriage, two grey horses and a 
complete set of harness … Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung 
temptingly out before the people and one after the other, they rushed to the tulip-marts, 
like flies round a honey pot. Everyone imagined that the passion for tulips would last 
forever and the wealthy from a every part of the world would send to Holland and pay 
whatever prices were asked for them. (Mackay 1993:91) 
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Beckman (1990:17-18) records a variety of scams during Tulipmania, “Tulip Jobbers … accrued huge profits 
buying massive quantities each time there was a fall in price and rapidly selling out on every rise.” They could 
do this because of the tight networks in which they operated while simultaneously spreading rumors about 
the market’s inherent stability. More obviously criminal activities also developed: 
… manipulators of the tulip market trained animals to dig up and devour bulbs for the 
purpose of creating a scarcity of selected strains, thus forcing prices higher. Ducks, cats, 
geese, pigs, chickens and various other household livestock were turned loose on the 
multifarious tulip patches to create havoc for the tulip breeder, grower and profits for 
their owners.  
In a foretaste of insider trading, “tulip riggers” emerged who purchased the stocks of a specific grower and 
then spread rumors of calamitous destruction. 
The price of tulips from the region [would rise]to astronomical heights in anticipation of a 
permanent shortage of the species destroyed. They would then sell … to unsuspecting 
buyers preparing for further prices rises. 
What later came to be known as rings were established. 
Tulip riggers would form a pool and choose a particular species of tulip that was out of 
favor … By buying and selling among themselves – the riggers would make it appear that 
the selected species was suddenly in demand (Beckman 1990:25-6). 
They would do this repetitively, moving from one stock to another. But at the mania’s peak some dealers, 
well aware that perpetual upward prices were beginning to appear unsustainable, sold out. As selling 
mounted, panic took hold and tulip prices dramatically collapsed. 
After the crash, as with all crashes, there was a public outcry and calls for regulation and control. In 
November 1636 the Dutch government ineffectually declared “that all contracts made at the height of the 
mania or prior to the month of November 1636 should be declared null and void and that after that date 
purchasers should be freed from their engagements on paying ten percent to their vendors” (Mackay 
1993:6). 
Tulipmania thus set the scene for our understanding of subsequent crashes. It demonstrated a dependence 
on a surplus of funds from earlier in the upturn, a ready supply of available credit and a generalized belief 
that prices would rise in perpetuity. It embraced a network of market manipulators who knowingly 
encouraged this belief and a refined development of criminal and deviant specialties. Together these 
contributed to euphoric bidding that rose to a peak and was followed by a sudden crash, a downturn 
(lasting in this case until around 1650), public outrage and resultant moves for government regulation. 
B.2 THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 
By the early eighteenth century England had eclipsed Holland and was the trading center of the world. Its 
economy was booming, with a wave of developments in construction and transport, and its trade was 
supported by the unrivalled power of its empire and its navy. Large profits were simultaneously accruing to 
its trading companies operating abroad, such as the Hudson’s Bay Company and the West and East India 
Companies. As in Holland a century earlier, England was thus well set to launch a company that offered 
trading opportunities in the South Seas and beyond. 
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The South Sea Company’s principal asset was a monopoly, granted by the British government in 1711, to 
exploit the riches of the South Seas (which extended also to South America, the West Coast of North 
America and onwards to the Far East). It was granted, together with the right to obtain the revenues of 
certain taxes, in return for accepting responsibility for the national debt – swollen by liabilities in 
maintaining unmanageably expensive army and navy debentures. These costs were causing mounting 
government concern because they involved unsustainably high taxes. Since the South Sea Company had 
explicit government support, the new enterprise seemed to be following the precedent of the lucrative 
East India Company and it was enthusiastically over-subscribed. 
After its launch in 1711, the stock suffered various setbacks but the directors, “by various arts” (Mackay 
1993:65) and then with specific government backing, encouraged: 
… the most extravagant rumors [about supposedly emergent treaties] between England 
and Spain … whereby the latter was to grant a free trade to all her colonies; and the rich 
produce of the mines of Potosi-la-Paz was to be brought to England until silver should 
become as plentiful as iron. For cotton and woollen goods, with which we could supply 
them in abundance, the dwellers of Mexico were to empty their gold mines. The 
company of merchants trading to the South Seas would be the richest the world ever 
saw, and every hundred pounds invested in it would produce hundreds per annum to the 
stockholder (Mackay 1993:51). 
In little over the ten years of the company’s existence, the enthusiasm of investors had at different times 
faltered and revived by the spreading of false rumors, by paying, on occasion, double the expected level of 
dividend, at others by the issuance of new stock, and by the use of “tame” journalists. One such journalist 
was Daniel Defoe (the author of Robinson Crusoe) who, when the shares were at their peak, wrote a journal 
article “puffing” the price further. It is suggested that he owned shares in the companies he promoted: an 
early example, it is claimed, that illustrates the later venality of much of the press which had become well 
established by the time of the 1920s upturn (many later examples of which are offered by Kindleberger and 
Aliber [2011:146]). 
But the exuberance surrounding the South Sea Company had simultaneously encouraged nearly a hundred 
fraudulent joint stock companies, largely funded by credit and: 
each more extravagant and deceptive than the other … promoted by crafty knaves, then 
pursued by multitudes of covetous fools, and appeared to be in effect, what their vulgar 
appellation denoted them to be – bubbles and mere cheats (Mackay 1993:54). 
Some bubble companies were established merely with the view of raising their shares in the market. “The 
projectors took the first opportunity of a rise to sell out, and next morning the scheme was at an end.” 
Some of the schemes were clearly ludicrous. One for instance was: 
for a wheel for perpetual motion – capital one million pounds … another for a company 
for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is … it was 
computed that near one million and a half sterling was won and lost by these 
unwarrantable practices, to the [eventual] impoverishment of many a fool, and the 
enriching of many a rogue (Mackay 1993:54-55). 
The growth of these more obviously fraudulent companies was soon seen as posing a serious threat to the 
South Sea Company, since money invested in them was not available to it. When in 1720, the South Sea 
Company’s share price again wavered, its directors sought support from the government – many members 
of which were shareholders. In 1720 it passed what came to be called ‘The Bubble Act’ which outlawed 
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companies without a royal warrant. The move was successful and the price of South Sea shares rose to 
peak at £1,000. 
The directors owned significant blocks of shares and were able to collateralize them and use the funds 
raised to invest in real estate. Their central concern was then to boost the value of the stock to effect a 
capital gain, and the spreading of rumors was integral to this. The company chairman Sir John Blunt “had 
six contracts to buy estates … another [insider] had four … on which he owed £100,000”. It was therefore 
necessary to increase capital and the price of stock simultaneously and at an accelerating rate “as in a Ponzi 
scheme” (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011:14). Despite the company’s efforts, the peak price of £1,000 was 
not sustainable. The chairman, his close associates, various directors and members of the government, well 
aware the value of their assets was minimal compared to their stated values, sold out. When knowledge of 
this became public, the stock crashed and soon was worthless. 
As with Tulipmania, popular clamor was again raised that “this must never happen again”. Mobs rose and 
pressure mounted on the government to regulate market excesses, which in part it did by outlawing the 
issuing of stock certificates, thereby abolishing limited liability. This law was not repealed until 1825 and 
thereby helped inhibit the subsequent recovery. 
B.3 THE 1929 CRASH (AND ITS PRECURSOR: THE FLORIDA LAND BOOM) 
The 1929 Crash followed a similar progression to its predecessors and exhibited similar (though more 
sophisticated) behaviors. Its sequence began in 1920-22, with a recession in wholesale prices of 42 percent 
and a fall in the Dow Jones Index of 33 percent. Similar or worse falls were recorded in France, the U.K. and 
elsewhere though the markets recovered fairly quickly. 
But there was a further portent of disaster when massive speculation in land, based upon exploiting 
Florida’s warm sunshine, led to the Florida land boom and the emergence of Charles Ponzi. As many as 65 
building sites per acre, together with streets laid out on sub-marginal land, were offered that were 
larcenously described as “being on the seashore when they were up to 15 miles inland” or, in Ponzi’s sales 
pitch, described as “being near Jacksonville when they were sixty five miles distant from the city” (Galbraith 
1994:62-3). But in their scramble to invest, buyers were not bothered by such detail – they were in the 
market to speculate, not to reside in Florida. The end, in 1926, was swift: the supply of new buyers ran out 
and land prices crashed. “Some land having passed through the hands of half a dozen speculators, each 
reaping the rewards of leverage, was returned, in successive defaults to the original owner … In 1925, bank 
clearings in Miami were $1,066,528,000. By 1928 they were down to a mere $143,364,000” (Galbraith 
1994:64).41 
But the Roaring Twenties roared on, and a record number of new and inexperienced investors with surplus 
funds from the prior boom began to gamble on the stock exchange. They focused particularly on the newly 
emergent industries and technologies dominated by automobiles and radio. As in Holland three hundred 
years earlier and in England a century after that, financial affairs in this period were 
noted for manipulation and swindling. Interest brokers, blockers, traders and owners 
banded together to manipulate stock prices by trading them between each other for 
 
 
41 Quoting Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper 1931), p. 282. 
  70 
 
Copyright © 2021 Society of Actuaries Research Institute 
slightly more each time. An ignorant public noticed the trend and invested through credit 
whilst the manipulators sold at a healthy profit. (Beattie 2012) 
Meanwhile the market soared. One important reason it soared was leverage: shares could be bought from 
brokers “on margin”, in anticipation of their imminent rise, for as little as a 10 percent down-payment of 
the purchase price (though some purchasers were required to offer up to 50 percent). The balance was 
borrowed from the broker who in turn borrowed from the banks. 
Galbraith suggests a second, more sophisticated, example: “closed ended investment trusts” which could 
effect multiple levels of leverage – and which, when they crashed, involved multiple scales of de-leverage. 
These trusts were pioneered by Goldman Sachs in 1928 when it created a company, Goldman Sachs 
Trading Corporation, the sole function of which was to own other companies’ stock. It issued securities 
amounting to $100 million (a billion dollars at 1994 prices), 90 percent of which were sold to the public, 
with 10 percent being retained by Goldman Sachs. The Trading Corporation issued common stock, bonds 
and preferred stock. The latter two had fixed returns that did not rise with the price of the stock so that all 
gains accrued to the price of the common stock. Goldman Sachs then sponsored a further company (whose 
initial issue was said to have been over-subscribed seven-fold) and that company sponsored yet another. 
All the intervening companies in their turn issued the three types of security. The large gains in the stock of 
the final company soared as its holdings boomed and these went “in powerful concentrations” to add to 
the stock of the intervening companies until it was fed into Goldman Sachs (thereby anticipating the 
nickname – “the Vampire Squid” – that it was to have pinned on it some eight decades later). The Goldman 
Sachs initial issue sold at a hundred and four and after the crash was worth one and three quarters 
(Galbraith 1994:70-4). 
Galbraith notes that there followed many other examples of closed-end trusts, some even more spacious in 
scale and imagination. As a result of this explosion of highly leveraged credit, equity prices rose to a peak of 
30 times earnings (Beattie 2012). Then, between September 1929 and the end of that October, and 
without apparent warning, the Dow Jones fell by 40 percent. There followed a further, albeit slower but 
nonetheless precipitous collapse, so that by July 1932 the Index had fallen 90 percent from its 1929 peak. 
Speculation had thus again been facilitated by an explosion of unregulated credit. Its level had risen from 
45 percent of U.S. GNP in 1925/6 to over 150 percent in 1929 (Elliott 2011). When prices fell speculators 
were then required to fund a higher percentage of their margins. But the banks would not extend further 
credit, and debts were liquidated in a self-feeding chain reaction that rapidly extended throughout the 
global economy. Once again there was public clamor. 
Much of this clamor, unsurprisingly, was directed against the banks. During the upturn, many U.S. banks 
had established security affiliates to float bonds and underwrite corporate stock issues. In this they had 
benefitted from banking’s two classic profit-making strategies: their ability to create credit by increasing 
their margins of lending as a proportion of their assets, and their ability to use such resources to engage in 
risky ventures. The banks made massive profits until the crash of 1929. In 1932, after nearly 5,000 banks 
had failed, an appalled Congress, responding to vigorous public pressure, passed the emergency Glass-
Steagall Act as part of Roosevelt’s New Deal. The Act imposed controls on bank lending and reintroduced 
the boundaries that traditionally had governed banks’ activities – notably by separating their commercial 
and investment functions, thereby reducing their ability to take risks. 
The Glass-Steagall Act’s provisions were made “permanent” in 1945. But the next upturn’s lobbying, 
spearheaded by the financial services sector, again pressed for a loosening of financial controls. Reagan’s, 
and later Clinton’s, Congresses responded favorably and the Glass-Steagall Act was emasculated by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. This imposition of controls during the downturn (when, theorists of plural 
rationality argue, they are not needed and are actually a brake on recovery) and their later removal, 
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through the lobbying efforts of proponents of the Maximizer strategy, in the subsequent upturn (when, 
theorists of plural rationality argue, they are essential) can be seen as analogous, but on a “whole system” 
scale, to those ultimate bad luck firms (we met some of them in chapter 3) that change their strategy as 
the risk seasons change and always get it wrong. And this sort of “rational maladaptation”42 is at its most 
deleterious when there are no dissenting voices: when, at each turning point, just one form of solidarity 
manages to impose hegemony. 
While this sort of “one herd at a time and always the wrong herd” alternation is indeed pretty much what 
has happened with all four of our cases, it does not have to be like that. Things could be arranged (indeed, 
as we will see, when we look at insurance companies, are to some extent already arranged) so that, instead 
of “serial elegance”, we have some degree of “continuous clumsiness”. Put another way, we can ease 
ourselves away from the bottom-left province in our Figure 3.6 and up towards the top-right one. Then, as 
with the tropical rainforest, instead of one massive bout of creative destruction every fifty or so years, we 
can have much smaller, and much more frequent, patchy collapses: collapses that do not raise that dread 
specter “too big to fail, jail or bail”. We cannot eliminate the cycling – we cannot have “no more boom and 
bust” – but, as we have suggested in chapters 2 and 3, that cycling does not have to be so all-or-nothing. 
B.4 THE 2007/8 CREDIT CRUNCH-CUM-GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The Credit Crunch of 2007/8 was triggered by the bursting of a U.S. housing bubble and was distinctive in 
two ways. First, it was the product of an upturn that had lasted longer than any other and, second, it was 
fueled by a greater excess of credit.43 This credit was sourced from the earning surpluses of developing 
countries – mainly China – and from the recycling of surplus commodity earnings, especially from Australia 
and Canada. This massively available credit coincided with the Federal Reserve’s determination, post the 
dot.com bust of 2000, to keep U.S. interest rates low, which pressed down global interest rates. As a result, 
surplus available credit at low prices meant that global returns from investments such as government 
bonds declined to record low levels. Low returns then encouraged investors to assume more risk by 
seeking higher returns wherever they could be found. They were found in funding mortgages for the 
housing market, particularly in the U.S.. 
Sub-prime mortgages, sold by “bonus-fueled” lenders, led to a U.S. domestic property boom that quickly 
extended globally, particularly to the U.K.. It was backed by a general supposition that house prices could 
never decline, and it was further boosted by the increasingly frenetic activity of an orchestrated financial 
services sector that was extensively backed by cheap credit. In other words, the upward trend – 
dramatically evident in Figure 2.2 – was expected to continue indefinitely. Of course – again dramatically in 
Figure 2.2 – it did not. 
The U.S. financial services sector was – and still is – dominated by the relatively small number of firms that 
emerged after a series of amalgamations in the 1990s. In 2006 it comprised five investment banks: Morgan 
Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and two conglomerate firms – 
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase (which straddled several functions). They were supported by AIG, the 
world’s largest insurance company, and three assessment (or rating) agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
and Fitch. Acting in unison, these companies – thanks to a shared and increasingly hegemonic “risk 
 
 
42 “Rational” in that it is the sensible behavior, given their convictions as to how the world is; “maladaptation” in that, unfortunately, the world 
at that moment is not that way. Hence our choice of the term “rational adaptability”, which refers to the situations in which the convictions as 
to how the world is in alignment with how it actually is (as in the top-left to bottom-right diagonal in our Figure 3.1). 
43 In the U.S. at the peak of the boom in the last decade it had reached 300 percent [a record] while in the U.K., as the boom mounted, people 
had withdrawn £300 billion in equity from domestic property (Elliott 2011). 
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culture”, along with multiple “revolving doors” to other companies, government/regulatory posts, business 
school professorships and so on – were integral in exploiting the domestic housing market and ultimately in 
creating the 2007/8 crash (Ferguson 2011). 
On top of all this, a new, sophisticated and highly influential development made its appearance during this 
upturn; a mathematical formula was devised by which elements of risk could be calculated and factored 
into transactions, loans could be made and profits gained by lending to people not considered safe by 
orthodox measurements and then insuring against the odds of their failure to comply (Black & Scholes 
1973). The formula was massively applied to value derivatives, enabling them to be traded as commodities 
prior to maturity. The financial services industry avidly embraced the Black-Scholes formula and 
by 2007 was trading derivatives valued at one quadrillion dollars per year … 10 times the 
total worth, adjusted for inflation, of all products made by the world’s manufacturing 
industries over the last century. The downside was the invention of ever-more complex 
financial instruments whose value and risk were increasingly opaque (Ian Stewart, The 
Observer 2012). 
The Black-Scholes formula facilitated speculating on speculation. It eventually failed because its 
mathematics did not take account of certain imponderables which would inevitably intrude, as they did 
when Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2007. So, this fatally flawed formula provides a further reason for the 
extended length of the last upturn (and perhaps for the unusually long and disruptive Uncertain phase that 
has followed on from that Bust). However, the investment banks, seemingly oblivious to these risks, bought 
up large numbers of mortgages which they then “bundled” into units called “collateralized debt 
obligations”(CDOs). CDOs thus became the newest member of a family of financial instruments known as 
“derivatives”. Investors were soon snapping them up, thanks to the AAA ratings they were awarded by the 
rating agencies which, in their turn, were paid by the banks to assess them. Though this may appear 
somewhat dodgy, the assessors insist that it is not, arguing that if they were to succumb to temptation they 
would stand to lose credibility, and that such a loss would always outweigh any possible gain.44 
CDOs, however, were known, by some, to be far from safe investments, since they included 30 percent of 
subprime mortgages: mortgages granted to those with little hope of sustaining them. They also comprised 
similarly risky car-financing and student loans. But, because the assessors had rated them AAA, they were 
eligible to be purchased by retirement funds and other financial institutions, and by individuals seeking safe 
investments.45 So, as with the PPI (Payment Protection Insurance) scandal that has now landed British 
banks with compensation payments totaling £20 billion (with the final figure estimated to reach £35 
billion), we have a glaring instance – deliberately engineered or inadvertent – of information asymmetry; 
those who knew the risks were there were able to doom those who did not. Strip away the technicalities 
and the formulae, and we are back among the divers and dodgers of Tulipmania and the South Sea Bubble! 
Did the bankers know that the derivatives they were selling were duff products? “Not all, certainly”, is Ben 
Chu’s answer. “There is some evidence”, he continues, “that the heads of these banks were as clueless as 
their customers about the MBSs [Mortgage Backed Securities] and CDOs they were selling” (Chu 2015). In 
 
 
44 Loss of credibility to whom, however, is the question. The three rating agencies tend to move in something close to lock-step, and they have 
virtually no competitors. As with the so-called “challenger banks” that, it was hoped, would pop up like mushrooms, entry costs are a major 
deterrent to the emergence of new rating agencies (as in that old quip “Why is there only one Monopolies and Mergers Commission?”). 
45 Retirement funds were prevented, by their legally backed constitutions, from investing in anything other than AAA securities. That this (along 
with adherence to the tenets of modern portfolio theory) did not ensure that fiduciary duty was duly exercised has now led to a major re-think 
(see Hawley et al 2014). 
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other words, the line between skulduggery and incompetence is seldom easily drawn, and we have 
recently seen the head of Volkswagen in the U.S. testifying that he knew nothing about his company’s 
deliberate cheating over emissions from their cars, and that it was all the work of a couple of software 
engineers. 
There is considerable evidence, however, that the five major U.S. banks were well aware of the insecure 
nature of the housing market and of the CDOs they were selling, for which they took out insurance against 
the likelihood of a drop in the housing market (e.g. Ferguson 2011; Lewis 2010; Beattie 2012). When the 
CDOs proved toxic, their purchasers, including many retirement funds, took massive losses, as did the 
retirees who were dependent on them and AIG (also rated AAA) which was the insurer of last resort. But, 
as with so many of the banks, AIG was deemed “too big to fail” and required more than $150 billion in 
taxpayers’ emergency aid. 
The same rating agencies had similarly assessed Lehman Brothers as AAA, until it too crashed (but was not 
bailed out) in 2007. Goldman Sachs, however, was unscathed: 
In 2006 and 2007, the Goldman Sachs Group, aware of the imminence of a tipping point, peddled more 
than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it 
was secretly betting [through insurance] that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of 
those securities plummeting. (Beattie 2012) “Only later”, as another commentator observed, “did investors 
discover that what Goldman Sachs had promoted as AAA-rated investments were closer to junk.” 
McClotchyde (2009) 
Parallel deception (i.e. skulduggery not just incompetence) was evident in the U.K. when Sir Fred Goodwin, 
head of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the U.K.’s largest bank (at one time the world’s largest), was publicly 
denying his bank held sub-prime securities when in fact it was so heavily involved that they brought it 
down. Deemed “too big to fail”, it was bailed out by the U.K. taxpayers, with Goodwin losing both his job 
and his knighthood in the process. 
All this deviant behavior – so different from those days, back in the 1960s, when the City of London’s 
culture could be summarized in the pledge “My word is my bond”46 – has its roots further back in the 
upturn. In the 1980s, for instance, Margaret Thatcher’s pro-“enterprise culture” government, like that of 
Ronald Reagan in the U.S., was dedicated to the deregulation of industry and commerce (see Hargreaves 
Heap and Ross 1992). It was therefore a pushover for the financial sector lobbyists, the result being a large-
scale scrapping of regulations: “the Big Bang”, as it is called. Its various Building Society Acts allowed 
building societies to demutualize and become banks: a transition – away, in our terminology, from 
egalitarian/conservator and towards individualist/maximizer – that also tore them from their local roots 
and turned them into global (but often none-too-competent) players. Their subsequent buying of sub-
prime mortgages then mirrored the U.S. banking experience. Large profits were made, and large salaries 
and bonuses paid to their executives on the basis of those short-term gains. This continued until (and, 
indeed, after) most of those newly created banks had crashed (and then been a bailed out) in 2007/8. 
As with Tulipmania, the South Sea Bubble and the 1929 Crash, as the upturn moved towards its peak the 
scale of imaginative innovation grew. Nor were these instances of increasingly audacious deviance 
restricted to the financial services sector.  
 
 
46 For an account of life and culture in those distant and remarkably upright days see Edwards (2008). 
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In the U.S., for instance, the Enron debacle was massive. Originally trading in electricity, natural gas, water 
and broadband, and then widely extending its interests, its stock had risen 1700 percent. Described by 
Fortune Magazine as “the most innovative corporation in the U.S.”, in its final year it fell from an opening 
price of $61m to a closing price of 20 cents (Cruver 2003). “At its peak its market capitalization had been 
$250 billion, the market value of its stock … over $200 billion and its publicly owned bonds $40 billion” 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 2011:129). It rapidly reached this pinnacle in part by refining versions of the South 
Sea Company’s share-boosting techniques. Enron’s senior managers were incentivized by the award of 
stock options as bonuses so that the bigger and more consistent its profits the more their options were 
worth. Enron ensured that reported profits were consistently high by over-valuing future contracts and 
including their revised valuations in current profits, as well as engaging in complex sale and leaseback 
arrangements. Both methods increased their stated current assets at the expense of future profits. Further, 
they borrowed in ways that avoided balance sheet notations through legalized accountancy finagling and 
then used the funds to support their own stock price (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011; Cruver 2003). By these 
means, the company was able to boost earnings while concealing its debts. But it could do so only for as 
long as its share price remained buoyant. To this end, and like the South Sea Company, Enron used the 
press. As well as buoyancy, the consistency of its share price was important to Enron, since the financial 
press made quarterly assessments of company incomes. A fall in a single month’s assessment could lead to 
a 20 percent drop in the share price. Enron therefore ensured that earnings were “smoothed” with larger 
than necessary increases in profits being deferred by delaying receipts or prepaying expenses. When profits 
were less than deemed necessary, they practiced the reverse. Their efforts were eased by payments to 
certain financial journalists, who received retainers of $25,000 a year for attending one meeting a year. 
In upturns there is a general loosening of auditing standards that reflects the overall climate of 
deregulation, and it was this that facilitated Enron’s strategies. After the upturn post 1890s, there had 
developed a progressive reduction in the expected distance between auditors and those they audited until 
their interests were perceived as having merged and the profession lost public credibility. In 1913 a new 
firm, Arthur Andersen, was established. It proclaimed a fresh moral approach and its success in 
emphasizing conformity to the then downturn’s deviance-resisting values was marked.47 It quickly rose to 
become one of the U.S.’s top four accountancy firms. It is ironic, therefore, that in the period of 
deregulation during the past upturn, Arthur Andersen should have become auditors to Enron. 
As Enron’s auditors, Arthur Andersen merged the incompatible functions of both auditor and highly paid 
consultant. For these services Enron paid it $2 million and $25 million a year respectively. These dual roles 
facilitated a whole set of ingenious, accountancy-based scams until the market crashed in 2000 and both 
firms collapsed together. This was despite consistently positive assessments by Standard and Poor’s, who 
had been paid by Enron to assess it as a suitable vehicle for investment. This it did, awarding it continuous 
AAA ratings and, along with other rating assessors, maintained this until Enron could no longer juggle its 
liabilities and imploded. The rating agencies argued that their assessments were largely dependent on the 
distortions emanating from Arthur Andersen: a bit like VW’s boss blaming it all on “a couple of software 
engineers”. 
 
 
47 These values extend to wider social concerns: boundaries tighten, and pressures mount to roll back the perceived excesses and tolerances of 
the prior upturn. Sexual constraints are promoted and women’s fashion becomes more modest – no more “flapper dresses” or revealing 
hotpants – and, along with longer hemlines and covered shoulders, come calls for increased controls over immigration. Conspicuous 
consumption – so “in yer face” during the upturn – is frowned upon. (For a fuller account of these sort of value shifts see Beckman 1983:333-
47.) 
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While Enron was perhaps the upturn’s most dramatic failure, this failure, as Nelken (2007) has noted, 
represented the “flip side” of the company’s earlier success. Fortune Magazine had not been wrong; for 
many years Enron had been a genuinely innovative company. Indeed, in embracing the opportunities 
offered by the Black-Scholes formula, they had successfully been making money out of risk and thus 
conforming to the essence of capitalism; they were, in effect, selling insurance. So, Enron’s rise and fall 
nicely illustrates the shadowy nature of the line between parasitism and turning an honest penny: between 
illegality and being within the law. Sometimes, however, we have actors who are clearly on the deviant, not 
to say criminal, side of that line.  
The ebullient 1990s and 2000s also gave us Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scam: the greatest in history. When the 
stock exchange crashed in 2008 and his clients attempted to withdraw $11 billion from his fund, they found 
it was not available. The scale of the fraud was then revealed, with estimates of loss ranging from $20 
billion to over $60 billion. Madoff, however, was distinctive only in the scale of his fraud. He was at the 
forefront of a wide range of lesser Ponzi schemes that flourished through the upturn. 
Many forms of upturn deviance involve the manipulation or theft of information which not only includes 
the spreading of false rumors and the commissioning of journalists “puffing” articles, as in our four cases, 
but theft of information that facilitates insider dealings. For instance, on 13 April 2011 Raj Rajardnam, 
founder of the Galleon Hedge Fund, was convicted in New York of insider dealings. The judge estimated his 
takings were “well over $50 million”, derived from corporate acquisitions and by benefiting from inside 
knowledge of large changes to corporate earnings (New York Times, 27 April 2011). Rajardnam was later 
jailed for 11 years and fined $10 million. He worked through a network of executive informants in major 
companies and was arraigned with 26 others, accused of passing or applying confidential information. 
As the current downturn proceeds, another aspect of managerial behavior is increasingly seen as deviant 
(though not criminal) which was not considered so during the upturn. Senior U.K. managers (mirroring 
similar changes in the U.S.) increased their pay from a multiple of 14.5 of average worker’s pay in 1979, to 
a multiple of 75 in 2009-11. This discrepancy is widest at the very top. In 2011 the average CEO of a FTSE 
100 company was taking home 145 times the basic pay of an average worker, plus bonuses, pension 
payments and share options – averaging, in all, £4,365,636 against average earnings of £25,900 (High Pay 
Commission, 2011). These differences have continued to accelerate. Top managers in 2009-10 increased 
their takings by a further 30 percent, and in 2010-11 by 49 percent, compared to their workers’ average 
increases of 2.3 percent and 2.5 percent (The Guardian). These later increases were awarded after the 
downturn was well established and when some businesses – and especially banks – were not even covering 
the cost of their capital in terms of the risks taken. 
This – our final example – raises an intriguing question: how is it that managers, in many cases irrespective 
of their company’s performance and in marked contrast to what has obtained in the past, have been able 
to increase their share of their company’s profits so massively? The answer, it has been suggested (by Lord 
Myners, the U.K.’s Financial Services Secretary from October 2008 to May 2010),48 is that it has resulted 
from a progressive uncoupling of the balancing elements in corporate governance. In the conventional 
wisdom, the different forms of power exerted by managers, “independent” directors and shareholders (the 
owners) are expected to balance out, and in a way that ensures that the business is run for the long-term 
benefit of the shareholders, thereby reining-in inherent managerial excess: a clumsy compromise in our 
terminology, that prevents a slide into elegance – into a situation where the individualist/maximizer voice 
 
 
48 In a radio program, “In Business – Corporate Governance”, presented by Peter Day, BBC Radio 4, 14 August 2011. 
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drowns out all dissent. This balancing act, it is argued, has now failed as shareholders have progressively 
conceded their power to the managers, withdrawing their traditional oversight as long as those managers 
produce favorable, albeit short term, results: an accelerating process that Warren Buffett (2001) sees as 
being operated by “Ratchet, Ratchet, Ratchet and Partners”.49 
B.5 SIMILARITIES IN VARIATION 
Our four selected cases show that, though history may not repeat itself, it most certainly rhymes. In each 
period there are evident variations in institutional structures, in dominant technologies and in the 
sophistication of deviant and fraudulent practices. But the dynamics of each upturn remain similar: they 
reveal the same patterns of bubbles, followed by the same patterns of crashes. While methods of 
manipulative innovation become progressively more complex, they too remain essentially the same. And 
each sequence, “fits” the amended regularities of Kondratieff’s economic cycles. 
We find that, as markets rise, deviant insiders have attempted to boost their company’s prospects by lying 
in public pronouncements, by planting false rumors and by secretly selling out at what they believe is the 
top of the market while continuing to encourage sales to the wider public. These were the practices during 
Tulipmania in 1636 and of the South Sea Company’s directors in 1720. And they emerged again prior to the 
1929 Crash and yet again in The Housing Crash and Credit Crunch of 2007/8. 
In the more obvious examples of deviance, we therefore see variations of practice but consistency in the 
principles employed. The extensive operations of “riggers” in Tulipmania are paralleled by the escalation of 
contemporary “boiler shops”, whose principals trade with each other to increase the price of stocks they 
hold – the resulting rises in price encouraging repetitive “cold-caller” sales to gullible investors. Other 
consistent variations involve borrowing on overstated assets to buy lavish life-styles – as the directors of 
the South Sea Company did in 1720 and the directors of Parmalat did before it crashed in 2010.50 And after 
each crash, public perceptions of what is and is not deviance shift and pressures mount for government 
regulation against entrepreneurial (in our terminology, individualist/maximizer) excess. Déja vu all over 
again, in other words. 
  
 
 
49 In terms of our “easy to use boardroom device” (Figure 3.6) this process takes the “policy sub-system” all the way from the sunny heights of 
“clumsy institution” to the dismal depths of “closed hegemony”. 
50 The dairy food manufacturer, the eighth largest firm in Italy, failed to meet interest liabilities of €18 billion. 
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Appendix C: More Details of Property Casualty Transition Matrix 
Development 
Table C.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF RBC RATIOS 
Percentile RBC Ratio (%) 
1.0% 312 
5.0% 447 
10.0% 539 
25.0% 702 
33.3% 770 
50.0% 901 
66.7% 1070 
75.0% 1173 
90.0% 1485 
95.0% 1738 
99.0% 2666 
max 3674 
 
Table C.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMON STOCKS  
AS PERCENT OF SURPLUS  
Percentile 
Common Stocks 
as Percent of 
Surplus 
1.0% 1.2% 
5.0% 7.1% 
10.0% 11.4% 
25.0% 19.0% 
33.3% 22.0% 
50.0% 29.1% 
66.7% 36.6% 
75.0% 41.9% 
90.0% 61.1% 
95.0% 75.0% 
99.0% 100.7% 
max 133.8% 
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Table C.3 
PREVALENCE OF ASSIGNMENTS OF APPROACH  
TO THREE INDICATORS OF RISK 
Assignments 
Count 
(Company/Year) 
111 73 
112 59 
113 58 
121 69 
122 81 
123 68 
131 79 
132 61 
133 54 
211 49 
212 42 
213 72 
221 57 
222 63 
223 61 
231 80 
232 101 
233 74 
311 87 
312 60 
313 100 
321 65 
322 64 
323 71 
331 41 
332 69 
333 42 
Assignments are in the order of Premium, RBC, Common Stock; where 1 is Low Risk, 2 is Medium Risk and 3 
is High Risk.  
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Table C.4 
ASSIGNMENTS TO OVERALL BELIEFS 
Assignments 
Count 
(Company/Year) Overall Belief 
111 73 Conservator 
112 59 Conservator 
113 58 Conservator 
121 69 Conservator 
122 81 Manager 
123 68 Pragmatist 
131 79 Conservator 
132 61 Pragmatist 
133 54 Maximizer 
211 49 Conservator 
212 42 Manager 
213 72 Pragmatist 
221 57 Manager 
222 63 Manager 
223 61 Manager 
231 80 Pragmatist 
232 101 Manager 
233 74 Maximizer 
311 87 Conservator 
312 60 Pragmatist 
313 100 Maximizer 
321 65 Pragmatist 
322 64 Manager 
323 71 Maximizer 
331 41 Maximizer 
332 69 Maximizer 
333 42 Maximizer 
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